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Correlational findings

Study Dräger (2015): study DE 1995

Public
Employees, Germany, followed 6 years,1995-2001
Survey name
DE-SOEP
Sample
Respondents
N = 4120
Non Response
Assessment
Interview: face-to-face

Correlate

Authors's Label
Employment protection legislation reform
Our Classification
Remarks
Reform A A-T1 Before reform 1995 (January-September) A-T2 During reform 1996 A-T3 After reform 1996-1998 Reform B B-T1 Before reform 1997-1999 B-T2 During reform 1999 B-T3 After reform 1999-2001
Related specification variables
Operationalization
Liberalization of employment protection legislation for permanent contracts (EPLP)

Reform A: Before the reform all workers in firms with more than 5 FTE's were protected by employment legislation, i.e. permanent workers could not easily be fired. After the reform small firms could dismiss newly hired permanent workers much more easily.

Reform B: In this reform the changes of Reform A were reversed to the old situation before Reform A, i.e. employment protection was increased, specifically in small firms (6-10) for those employed after 1996.

Observed Relation with Happiness

Happiness Measure Statistics Elaboration / Remarks O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d = CHANGE HAPPINESS following reduction of job protection (A) O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d DM = - p < .05 TEMPORARY WORKERS in Midsized firms (5-199)
at TIME OF REFORM A:
A-T1      M= 7.08
A-T3      M= 6,87
difference  -0,21
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.40 ns b-fix controlled for:
- year fixed effects
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.55 p < .05 b-fix additionally controlled for:
- interaction effect firmsize x reform BEFORE the reform
- interaction effect firmsize x reform AFTER the reform
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.41 ns b-fix additionally controlled for:
- firm size dummies
- log household income
- working hours2
- age
- age2
- education
- gender
- marital status
- child dummies
- state fixed effects
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d DM = - ns PERMANENT WORKERS Midsized firms (5-199)
at TIME OF REFORM A:
A-T1      M= 7.04
A-T3      M= 6,95
difference  -0,09
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.04 ns b-fix controlled for:
- year fixed effects
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.10 ns b-fix additionally controlled for:
- interaction effect firmsize x reform BEFORE the reform
- interaction effect firmsize x reform AFTER the reform
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.06 ns b-fix additionally controlled for:
- firm size dummies
- log household income
- working hours2
- age
- age2
- education
- gender
- marital status
- child dummies
- state fixed effects
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d = CHANGE HAPPINESS following restauration of job protection (B) O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d DM = + ns TEMPORARY WORKERS in idsized firms (5-199)
at TIME OF REFORM B:
B-T1      M= 7,11
B-T3      M= 7,17
difference  +0,06
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.01 ns b-fix contrololled for:
- year fixed effects
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.07 ns b-fix additionally controlled for:
- interaction effect firmsize x reform BEFORE the reform
- interaction effect firmsize x reform AFTER the reform
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.02 ns b-fix additionally controlled for:
- firm size dummies
- log household income
- working hours2
- age
- age2
- education
- gender
- marital status
- child dummies
- state fixed effects
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d DM = + ns PERMANENT WORKERS in Midsized firms (5-199)
at TIME OF REFORM A:
B-T1      M= 7.02
B-T3      M= 7,07
difference  +0,05
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = +.03 ns b-fix contrololled for:
- year fixed effects
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.00 ns b-fix additionally controlled for:
- interaction effect firmsize x reform BEFORE the reform
- interaction effect firmsize x reform AFTER the reform
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = +.00 ns b-fix additionally controlled for:
- firm size dummies
- log household income
- working hours2
- age
- age2
- education
- gender
- marital status
- child dummies
- state fixed effects
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.54 ns TEMPORARY WORKERS REMAINING TEMPORARY WORKERS
AT REFORM A

b-fix contrololled for:
- year fixed effects
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.60 ns b-fix additionally controlled for:
- interaction effect firmsize x reform BEFORE the reform
- interaction effect firmsize x reform AFTER the reform
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.59 ns b-fix additionally controlled for:
- firm size dummies
- log household income
- working hours2
- age
- age2
- education
- gender
- marital status
- child dummies
- state fixed effects
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.17 ns TEMPORARY WORKERS REMAINING TEMPORARY WORKERS
AT REFORM B
b-fix contrololled for:
- year fixed effects
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.21 ns b-fix additionally controlled for:
- interaction effect firmsize x reform BEFORE the reform
- interaction effect firmsize x reform AFTER the reform
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.14 ns b-fix additionally controlled for:
- firm size dummies
- log household income
- working hours2
- age
- age2
- education
- gender
- marital status
- child dummies
- state fixed effects
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.57 ns TEMPORARY WORKERS REMAINING TEMPORARY WORKERS
AT REFORM A

No missing values

b-fix additionally controlled for:
- firm size dummies
- log household income
- working hours2
- age
- age2
- education
- gender
- marital status
- child dummies
- state fixed effects
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.02 ns b-fix additionally controlled for:
- firm size dummies
- log household income
- working hours2
- age
- age2
- education
- gender
- marital status
- child dummies
- state fixed effects
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d DM = + PERMANENT WORKERS
Midsized firms (5-199) at TIME OF REFORM A:
A-T1      M= 7.02
A-T3      M= 7,07
difference  +0,05
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = +.03 ns b-fix contrololled for:
- year fixed effects
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.00 ns b-fix additionally controlled for:
- interaction effect firmsize x reform BEFORE the reform
- interaction effect firmsize x reform AFTER the reform
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = +.00 ns b-fix additionally controlled for:
- firm size dummies
- log household income
- working hours2
- age
- age2
- education
- gender
- marital status
- child dummies
- state fixed effects
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.54 ns TEMPORARY WORKERS REMAINING TEMPORARY WORKERS
AT REFORM A
b-fix contrololled for:
- year fixed effects
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.60 ns b-fix additionally controlled for:
- interaction effect firmsize x reform BEFORE the reform
- interaction effect firmsize x reform AFTER the reform
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.59 ns b-fix additionally controlled for:
- firm size dummies
- log household income
- working hours2
- age
- age2
- education
- gender
- marital status
- child dummies
- state fixed effects
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.17 ns TEMPORARY WORKERS REMAINING TEMPORARY WORKERS
AT REFORM B
b-fix contrololled for:
- year fixed effects
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.21 ns b-fix additionally controlled for:
- interaction effect firmsize x reform BEFORE the reform
- interaction effect firmsize x reform AFTER the reform
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.14 ns b-fix additionally controlled for:
- firm size dummies
- log household income
- working hours2
- age
- age2
- education
- gender
- marital status
- child dummies
- state fixed effects
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.57 ns TEMPORARY WORKERS REMAINING TEMPORARY WORKERS
AT REFORM A

No missing values

b-fix additionally controlled for:
- firm size dummies
- log household income
- working hours2
- age
- age2
- education
- gender
- marital status
- child dummies
- state fixed effects
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.70 ns Less employable employees (self-perceived)

b-fix additionally controlled for:
- firm size dummies
- log household income
- working hours2
- age
- age2
- education
- gender
- marital status
- child dummies
- state fixed effects
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.17 ns TEMPORARY WORKERS REMAINING TEMPORARY WORKERS
AT REFORM B

No missing values

b-fix additionally controlled for:
- firm size dummies
- log household income
- working hours2
- age
- age2
- education
- gender
- marital status
- child dummies
- state fixed effects
O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-d b-fix = -.14 ns Less employable employees (self-perceived)

b-fix additionally controlled for:
- firm size dummies
- log household income
- working hours2
- age
- age2
- education
- gender
- marital status
- child dummies
- state fixed effects