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CHAPTER I
SOME PRELIMINARIES

Given the importance of the concept of happiness in our thinking about our own lives and about society, the neglect it has suffered is surprising. The attention paid to the concept has been far less than one would expect, considering the great use that has been made of it in everyday affairs, ethical theory, and social philosophy. In this dissertation I shall examine various analyses of the concept that have been offered or implied in philosophical literature, and offer an analysis which functions, I believe, both to capture what it is we generally mean when we talk about happiness, and to provide some insight into the complexity of human desire by means of an account of the various levels of desire and their relationships.

Before launching into my analysis of the concept of happiness, there are two things I must do to prepare the way for it. One is to distinguish the various uses of the word "happiness" to avoid some possible confusions and indicate the focus of the dissertation. The other is to argue for the possibility of an analysis of the concept of happiness.

Uses of "Happiness"

There are a number of distinguishable uses of "happiness," "happy", and "happily" in ordinary language. The main ones seem to be the feeling use, mood use, behavioral use, attitude use, and life use. I shall be arguing that the life use is the most significant use. There are some other uses which are not main uses and need not be considered here. They include the use of "happily" where it means "fortunate" (e.g. "Happily, even though it was very cold, the car started"), and "happy" where it means something like "glad" (e.g. "I was happy I could meet you" and "I was happy to hear of the change in the time of the meeting").

"Happy" and "happiness" are sometimes used to refer to feelings or emotions. For example, statements like "How happy he was when he found out he had won the Irish Sweepstakes" or "When she found out she landed the job she was very happy" clearly refer to some state of consciousness of the person, and do not by themselves imply that the life of that person, or a significant portion of that person's life, is a happy one. We have no clear distinction between feelings and emotions. One way the distinction is made is in terms of the strength of the experience, with an emotion being a stronger, more vivid experience. If we draw the distinction in this way, we would probably classify happiness as an emotion. Another, sharper way the distinction has been drawn is to claim, as Anthony Kenny does, that feelings make up a category of experiences of which there are three kinds: perceptions, sensations and emotions. Emotions, unlike perceptions, are not connected with a specific organ or part of the body, and, unlike sensations, are not located in part of the body and are directed toward objects. If we draw the distinction in this way, the feeling use of "happiness" refers to a feeling, and more specifically, to an emotion, since it obviously would not be a sensation or a perception. A question may arise concerning the possibility of a feeling of happiness that does not take an object (e.g., waking up one morning feeling happy without feeling happy about anything in particular). Perhaps the object might be just one’s life or the pattern of activity one is engaged in. Even if it turns out that in such a case there is no object of the emotion, it might be argued, as Kenny argues about objectless fears, that talk about such an emotion must derive its plausibility from the typical cases of feeling happy where there is an object of the emotion. I shall indicate
later that some have attempted to analyze what I will be calling the life use of happiness in terms of feelings, sometimes confusing the feeling and life uses.

Sometimes “happy” is used to refer to a mood of a person. Some examples are “Jones was in a happy mood today” and “Having had four drinks, he was feeling happy.” Even though the word “feeling” occurs in the second example, the expression seems to mean that the drinks put him in a happy mood. This use indicates someone has a disposition to have happy feelings, to see things as being favorable, and likes elements of his situation over a period of time.

The adverb “happily” is sometimes applied to behavior, such as in “The children were in the yard, playing happily.” This behavioral use applies to situations where someone is doing something enthusiastically, with vigor, or cheerfully.

What I shall call the attitude use (e.g., I’m happy with my dentist’s work,” “Jones is happy with his job,” “Smith is happy with his marriage”) seems to indicate that one is content, satisfied, or pleased with something, that one likes it the way it is and does not want a change in it. This use indicates that the thing satisfies the person's standards for assessing it. We should note that this use includes quite a wide range of cases. Some of them have to do with relatively unimportant things (e.g. "I'm not happy with this word, but I can't think of a better one") and others have to do with extremely important things (e.g. "Smith is happy with his marriage"). The criterion of importance will be how significant a role the thing in question plays in the person's life. Thus, one's marriage and one's job play more significant roles in one's life than does the quality of one's dentist's work. Some analyses of happiness take this attitude use as being central, claiming that happiness has to do with the attitude one takes towards one's life. I shall be discussing this view of happiness in Chapter Four.

The last use of "happiness" I shall consider is what I call the life use. I believe this is the central or primary use of the term. Some examples are "Jones is a happy man; he's doing exactly what he wants to be doing in his life" and "Happiness is an activity of the soul in conformity with virtue." In these uses, happiness is attributed to a life or a portion of a life, or alternatively, to a person with respect to his life or a portion of it. This is a long-term use since it doesn't refer to a state of the person which lasts a short period of time, but to a portion of his life or his entire life. This use is, I believe, the most significant use of the term, and that which I offer an analysis of in this dissertation. There are two ways one can argue for its being the most significant use of the term: first, one can argue for the possibility of its being a central or primary use of the term, and second, regardless of whether there are any conceptual connections between the different uses, one could argue that it is the use we are most concerned with in our lives.

There are a number of possibilities with regard to relationships between these uses. They might all be connected in some way; perhaps some are and some aren't; and perhaps there are no connections at all. The third possibility seems implausible; there should be at least some connections between the uses. At the outset, some possible relations might be noted. It is possible that the life use is primary, and that at least some of the other senses are derivative. For instance, the feeling use might derive from the life use, meaning a state of the person indicative of a happy life. The same might be true of the mood and behavior use. Thus, for these uses, the relation between the life use and the other uses might be like the relationship Aristotle noted between "health" and "healthy" when ascribed to food, complexion, etc., what has recently been called "focal meaning." The attitude use doesn't, at least initially, fit into this scheme. One could be happy with
a word in a passage, one's dentist, or even one's job, without having a happy life. Being happy with these things does not seem to indicate a happy life, except where we get into things that one might be happy with that are relatively more important. After I have argued for my analysis of the life use of "happiness" I shall make some more comments about possible relations between these different uses. I believe my analysis will enable us to see more clearly some of the relations there might be among these different uses.

Even if the conceptual priority of the life use of "happiness" cannot be demonstrated, there is another argument that can be given for its being the most significant of the uses of "happiness" and the one that most deserves attention. That argument is that in our thinking about our lives it is this sense we are most interested in, and it is this sense that philosophers have been most concerned with in arguing about what sort of life is the best life or in making use of happiness in developing a theory of obligation. I believe this interest in the life use of "happiness" is sufficient for establishing that it is the most significant use of the term, and the use that should be focused on in a study such as this. I should note, though, that at the end of the dissertation I will make some suggestions about what conceptual connections there might be between the various uses of "happiness" which will give some support to the first kind of argument for the life use as the most significant use of the term.

Because happiness (life use) has often been thought of as a feeling, either pleasure or some special emotion or feeling that arises from a certain pattern of life, we must take note of the differences between the life use and the feeling use of "happiness." Cases of feeling happy typically seem to be cases where the object is some notable success or good fortune (e.g., winning the Irish Sweepstakes, landing a certain job, the ending of a war, a class lecture that goes well). Happiness in the life use seems to refer to some state of the person which is of longer duration than a feeling of happiness, and which is not an emotion felt upon the attainment of some success. It makes sense, for instance, to claim that a person was happy though he suffered a great deal. When philosophers have written about the happy life, it has often been clear it is not a feeling or emotion. For instance, Aristotle claimed it was virtuous activity. Mill at one point notes that what utilitarians have meant by "happiness" was

... not a life of rapture, but moments of such, in an existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and various pleasures, with a decided predominance of the active over the passive, and having, as the foundation of the whole, not to expect more from life than it is capable of bestowing. 3

Thus, the life use and feeling use are clearly distinguishable. Since happiness has often been identified with some feeling, though, I shall later spell out several such views and argue against them.

Is Happiness an Open Concept?

Before launching into my analysis of happiness, there is one view concerning the nature of the concept that I must examine, for, if it is true, it would indicate that the kind of analysis of the concept I am offering (one in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions) is impossible. That view is that happiness is an "open concept." I shall consider two ways it might be argued that happiness is an open concept. One is to argue that it is partly
Aiken's claim is that "happiness" is a term which is, at least in part, normative, and this is one way in which it would be an open concept. And this is a reason one might give for the claim that descriptive analysis of the concept is futile, and that definitions will typically be persuasive definitions, where one takes advantage of the vague descriptive meaning of the term and its emotive force to recommend applying it to a certain kind of life.

I shall be examining the claim that "happiness" is normative more closely in Chapter Four, where I shall consider the views of Hare, Smart and von Wright. However, at this point I might note two things about the claim that "happiness" is normative. First of all, I think it is sometimes used in a normative way. Thus, when someone says "True happiness is giving up yourself in a cause," this particular way of life is recommended or encouraged. Typically such a use of "happiness" seems to be preceded by "true" or "real." It seems to me there can be a normative use of a term without the term itself being essentially or partially normative. The term "science" may be similar in being sometimes used in a normative way without being essentially normative. Second, in its typical use in first and third person judgments about lives, "happiness" is not used in such a way. Typically, first person judgments are not normative, but are more like descriptive appraisals (though they may be made in the process of evaluating one's life), judgments that one's life is, as a matter of fact, a happy life. Also, third person judgments of happiness are typically not evaluations of or approvals of the lives of others, but rather judgments that they are, as a matter of fact, happy.

Morris Weitz presents the most extensive discussion of open concepts in an article about aesthetic theory. According to Weitz, normative concepts are only one variety of open concepts. The thesis of his article is that art, in its descriptive use, is an open concept, that no definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions is possible. He says:

A concept is open if its conditions of application are emendable and corrigeble; i.e., if a situation or case can be imagined or secured which would call for some sort of decision on our part to extend the use of the concept to cover this, or to close the concept and invent a new one to deal with the new case and its new property. If necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a concept can be stated, the concept is a closed one. But this can happen only in logic and mathematics where concepts are constructed and completely defined. It cannot occur with empirically-descriptive and normative concepts unless we arbitrarily close them by stipulating the range of their uses.

In the last sentence, the claim that normative concepts are open is not surprising. However,
the claim that all empirically-descriptive concepts are also open is quite strong, and debatable. The only closed concepts, Weitz says, are in logic and mathematics. It would then follow that attempts philosophers have made to analyze or define concepts in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions are futile.

In order to determine whether happiness is open to the sort of analysis I attempt, I shall indicate Weitz' arguments about art and consider parallel arguments that could be made about happiness.

In his article, there are three main claims made about open concepts. (1) He claims that it is part of the "logic" of concepts like art (and all empirically-descriptive and normative concepts) that definitions are logically impossible. The only way we can define such terms is by arbitrarily stipulating necessary and sufficient conditions for them and thereby close them. (2) If we follow Wittgenstein, and "look and see" how the concept is used, we will find that there are no common properties of all instances of art, but only strands of similarities or family resemblances. (3) We must recognize art as an open concept to insure creativity. If we close the concept, we prevent new art forms from coming into being.

Let me start with Weitz' second claim first, the claim that if we "look and see" how the concept is used, we will find there are no necessary and sufficient conditions, but only, at most, strands of similarities or family resemblances. I have already given examples of expressions making use of different uses of "happiness," "happy," etc. For that set, I think perhaps all we will find is strands of similarities. But those expressions involve different uses of the term, and their not having necessary and sufficient conditions for their application that are the same is no stumbling-block to my analysis. What would preclude the kind of analysis I am attempting is there being nothing but such strands of similarities in different instances of the life use of the term.

If one were to examine different philosophical accounts of happiness, for example, "virtuous activity" (Aristotle), "pleasure" (Bentham), "an enduring satisfaction of the whole self" (Dewey), etc., one might claim that the failure to come to agreement would make us conclude that no analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions is possible. Instead of being definitions or analyses of happiness, these different theories function to draw our attention to features of the concept that haven't been noted, just as, according to Weitz, different theories of art have done.

When one is confronted with a variety of applications of a term such as in different philosophical accounts, there are two different reactions one might have: (1) one might conclude that no account of happiness is forthcoming, or (2) one might claim that an account of happiness is possible. (1) will not follow just from the variety of accounts offered. In claiming (2) one might argue that one of the accounts is correct, or that there is some truth in some or all of them but that a fully adequate account has not yet been worked out but might be worked out sometime. Given this, our "looking and seeing" the various things that have been said about the life use of "happiness" will not block an analysis. But we must see if the other claims will.

Weitz' second argument about art as an open concept was that it had to be open to allow for creativity. A similar claim might be made about happiness: that a necessary and sufficient condition analysis will arbitrarily rule out certain ways of life as happy lives. One might point out, for instance, that Aristotle's definition suggests that only the person
who engages in theoretical activity is happy, and that this seems to preclude many lives' being happy that we would normally judge to be happy. It seems to me that this fear that analysis will limit possible variations is the main reason for claiming that a concept like happiness is open.

If an analysis were to arbitrarily rule out the possibility of certain lives' being happy, that would be sufficient reason for concluding it is a bad analysis of happiness, just as an analysis of art that forecloses on new art is a bad analysis. It does not follow that no analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions is possible. Rather, we could claim that in working out an analysis we must be careful to allow for creativity, for the variations that should be possible.

Finally, we must go on to Weitz' first claim, that it is part of the "logic" of concepts like art that they are open. Such a claim might plausibly be made about happiness, especially given the wide variety of things that have been said about it. However, there seems to be nothing noticeable about the "logic" of "happiness" that itself tells us no analysis is possible. To defend this, Weitz would have to appeal to his other two points. But we have seen that they do not support the claim that concepts like art or happiness are open. Therefore, this point about the "logic" of such concepts fails. We have no good reason to believe that happiness is an open concept and that an analysis of happiness is impossible. The strongest argument against the claim that happiness is an open concept would be to give an adequate analysis of happiness in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions which doesn't violate our use of the concept, where such use is legitimate, and which doesn't arbitrarily limit happiness. This it what I shall attempt to do.

**Scope of this Study**

Some features of the methodology I will follow should be noted. The skeleton of my argument is this: I shall examine various views concerning the nature of happiness and show why they will not suffice and argue that my analysis of the life use of "happiness" avoids the vices of the rejected views while sharing their virtues. In brief, my analysis is that the nature of happiness is the realizing of a life plan with the absence of serious felt dissatisfaction, the absence of an attitude of being displeased with or disliking one's life, and a tendency or disposition to experience favorable feelings and attitudes.

In arguing for my analysis I shall use a variety of arguments. Sometimes I shall appeal to some obvious features of happiness such as its being a relatively long-lasting thing (these sorts of things are often reflected in language and considered judgments of happiness); sometimes I shall appeal to obvious cases of happiness or unhappiness (e.g. that a person who has serious felt dissatisfaction is unhappy); and one extended argument I shall use involves presenting a view concerning the complexity of human desires and ends and their relationships which seems to have considerable explanatory value, and showing that my view of happiness fits in well with it.

I shall from time to time in my analysis of happiness bring up examples which can be used to test views concerning the nature of happiness. A correct analysis should handle any particular case of happiness. The difficulty that most views of happiness run into is that of being too narrow, excluding cases that shouldn't be excluded. There are certain general truths about happiness that can be noted that will later be illustrated with
examples:

1. Happiness is a relatively long-lasting thing. It does not come and go quickly, as some feelings do. In the feeling use, a happy feeling can be relatively short in duration (e.g. "I was happy for a minute, until I found out I didn't really get the job"), but in the life use the state of happiness is a relatively long-lasting thing.

2. A person can have many pleasures or enjoyments and still not be happy. I shall use a reflection by B. F. Skinner as an example of this in Chapter Two.

3. Happiness seems typically to be influenced by whether one is attaining the goals or what I shall later refer to as the more important higher order ends a person has.

4. Being in the process of achieving a goal or higher order end is at least in some cases more important for happiness than having achieved it. I shall discuss later the example of Hemingway, who had more than realized his goals as a writer, but was unhappy because he feared he couldn't continue to write well.

5. There is rather great variation in the particular kinds of lives that can be happy lives. There are people who enjoy and can be happy in a state of great stress; others who cannot. There are happy and unhappy businessmen, philosophers, artists, clerks, etc. Any theory that restricts happiness to one or a few particular kinds of life will be a too narrow theory.

This list is not meant to be exhaustive. It does include, though, the more important truths about happiness, I believe, and keeping them in mind will help direct consideration of the concept of happiness.

It should be noted that there has been a certain sloppiness in the way "happiness" has been used. Here we might consider what Mill has said in *A System of Logic* concerning the definition of some abstract terms like "justice":

Language . . . "is not made, but grows." A name is not imposed at once and by previous purpose upon a class of objects, but is first applied to one thing, and then extended by a series of transitions to another and another. By this process . . . a name not unfrequently passes by successive links of resemblance from one object to another, until it becomes applied to things having nothing in common with the first things to which the name was given; which, however, do not, for that reason, drop the name; so that it at last denotes a confused huddle of objects, having nothing whatever in common; and connotes nothing, not even a vague and general resemblance. 

The use of "happiness" has not reached so serious a stage that it denotes a "confused huddle of objects, having nothing whatever in common." However, its use does require some sharpening, some precising. Mill suggests that when a word is used in an imprecise way because of this process he has been describing happening, it . . . can only be made serviceable by stripping it of some part of its multifarious denotation, and confining it to objects possessed of some attributes in common, which it may be made to connote.
Not every application of the term "happiness" is legitimate. It is this kind of sharpening up I shall do. In this respect an analysis will be, in a certain sense, recommendatory. I shall recommend that we take care in using the term "happiness" in its life use to use it not in such a way that it is inconsistent with my analysis. However, on the whole my analysis is descriptive. I believe it gives us what we want in an analysis of happiness.

To see how the concept of happiness is best analyzed, we must first consider various theories of happiness that have been offered. Thus, Chapter Two will be devoted to a consideration of five views of the nature of happiness. In Chapter Three I will be developing my own view, which is a version of what I will call an inclusive end or pattern view of happiness. I develop my view by arguing for the existence of orders of desires and ends and for the life plan as the highest order end of a person. The basic claim of my view is that happiness is the realizing of a life plan. In Chapter Four I will focus on the nature of judgments of happiness. I will consider another important view of happiness, the attitude view, and develop my own view further by adding some conditions, keeping the realizing of the life plan as the basic logical condition of happiness. In Chapter Five I will indicate my general conclusions, and make some suggestions concerning the uses of "happiness."

Endnotes Chapter I

5 This will be discussed further in Chapter Four
7 Ibid., p. 31
9 Ibid., p. 99
CHAPTER II

THEORIES OF HAPPINESS

Nature and Condition Questions Distinguished

In this section I shall discuss several analyses of happiness that philosophers have given. Before doing this, I must make a distinction that is often not kept clear between two kinds of questions that are asked concerning happiness. The difference between the two questions is sometimes hidden by the use of the same question, "What is happiness?", in asking both. The two questions are: (1) What is the nature of happiness?; and (2) What are the conditions of happiness? Questions about the conditions of happiness (I shall call them "conditions questions") are questions about what will lead to happiness, bring it about, necessary conditions of it, or what will cause it. Answers to conditions questions often occur in the form of recipes: if you want to be happy, then do this. But conditions questions imply that happiness is something different from these conditions. On the other hand, questions about the nature of happiness (I shall call them "nature questions") are questions calling for a description of what happiness is. Nature questions are questions about what it is, whereas conditions questions are questions about what brings it about.

There is a sense, though, in which answers to nature questions are answers to conditions questions as well. That sense is this: a statement concerning the nature of happiness is also a statement concerning the conditions of happiness, when we construe "conditions" in a rather broad sense. Let us consider, as an example, Aristotle's claim that the nature of happiness is virtuous activity. 1 If happiness is, by nature, virtuous activity, then it is also true, in a sense, that virtuous activity is a (or the) condition of happiness. Virtuous activity leads to or occasions happiness, because it is happiness. Now this involves our using terms like "conditions," "causes," "leads to," etc., in a slightly odd way. Nevertheless, there is still some plausibility in saying that virtuous activity leads to happiness, because it is happiness, particularly when someone may not be aware of what the nature of happiness is. Similarly, one might offer as an answer to both of the questions "What is the nature of bachelorhood?" and "What are the conditions of bachelorhood?" that it is being male, unmarried, and of such an age. This is an answer to the conditions question about bachelorhood precisely because it is what bachelorhood, by nature, is.

Though answers to nature questions are, in a sense, at the same time answers to at least one kind of conditions question, it is not always true that answers to conditions questions are also answers to nature questions. They sometimes are, as, for instance, in the examples I have discussed above. However, most often they will not be. For example, when Aristotle suggests that some of the conditions of happiness are being well-born, not ugly, possessing some worldly goods, etc., 2 he is suggesting that these are, to some extent, individually necessary conditions of happiness. However, for Aristotle,
they do not constitute happiness.

The reason for making this distinction is that people have often confused the two questions, and answers to them. Sometimes statements about conditions of happiness will be interpreted as statements about its nature. Sometimes the rather wide variations in ways of bringing about happiness has been given as a reason for claiming that an analysis of happiness is impossible. This claim is false, because it involves a confusion of nature and conditions questions. However much variation there may be in the conditions of happiness, there still may be a nature of happiness which can be described or analyzed. Answers to nature questions have a generality which answers to conditions questions do not have (except for those which are also answers to nature questions). A correct answer to the nature question will be true of the many particular instances of happiness, the conditions of which may differ. In my discussion I shall be concerned with answers that have been given to the nature question about happiness. It is the nature question that we are asking when we are searching for an analysis of happiness.

I shall distinguish five main views concerning the nature of happiness: Aristotle's view; the identity view (pleasure and happiness are the same); the collection view (happiness is a collection of pleasures); what I call the unique state of consciousness view (happiness is a state of consciousness other than pleasure; pleasure contributes to but does not constitute it); and what I call the pattern or inclusive end view (happiness is the orderly and harmonious satisfaction of one's desires). It seems to me that the pattern view is the most plausible view, and I shall be developing a form of this view.

It should be noted here that historically many of the philosophical discussions of happiness have occurred within the context of the ethical question of whether happiness is the summum bonum, or greatest good. In my discussion I shall be concerned not with this question, but rather with the question "What is happiness?" as a question within the philosophy of mind.

**Aristotle's View**

The first view of the nature of happiness I would like to look at is Aristotle's, which has historically had a great influence on discussions about happiness. In considering his view, the distinction between nature and conditions questions about happiness should become clearer, since there is some dispute about whether Aristotle's view is telling us about the nature or the conditions of happiness.

Aristotle's view is that happiness ("eudaimonia") is "an activity of the soul in conformity with excellence or virtue, and if there are several virtues, in conformity with the best and most complete." Depending on how one interprets Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, is to a life of either primarily intellectually excellent activity or both intellectually excellent and morally excellent activity. Before looking at Aristotle's arguments for his view, I must digress and make point about the translation of the term "eudaimonia."

It has sometimes been emphasized that "happiness" may not be a good translation of "eudaimonia" because "eudaimonia" doesn't have the hedonistic overtones and the suggestion of pleasure that "happiness" has in English. The possibility then arises that...
Aristotle and more recent philosophers may not really be talking about the same thing.

We must be a little cautious in translating this term, particularly since many, even of the stature of Bentham and Mill, have used "happiness" and "pleasure" synonymously. However, I think there is no serious problem in using "happiness" as a translation of "eudaimonia." First, Aristotle's discussion has had a significant historical influence on later discussions of happiness. Second, it is not clear that in contemporary discourse "happiness" has hedonistic overtones to the degree suggested. For instance, often a distinction is drawn between pleasure and happiness, and sometimes this distinction is used to argue against psychological hedonism.7 Thirdly, the substantive issues (such as What is the nature of happiness?) remain the same. I might point out that Aristotle notes that while men agree that the final good should so called "eudaimonia," they disagree on what it is, and many identify it with pleasure. If this is the case, then "eudaimonia" may have had "hedonistic overtones" in Aristotle's time. Therefore, I think we can consider Aristotle's view to be a theory of happiness that can be compared and contrasted with other theories of happiness.

Aristotle's argument for his view of happiness in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics starts out by noting that there must be a final good or ultimate end of all action, something we desire for its own sake and never as a means, for if there were not, an infinite regress would result, and our desires would be futile. Men agree in calling this final good "happiness," but disagree about what it is:

To resume the discussion: since all knowledge and every choice is directed toward some good, let us discuss what is in our view the aim of politics, i.e., the highest good attainable by action. As far as its name is concerned, most people would probably agree: for both the common run of people and cultivated men call it happiness, and understand by "being happy" the same as "living well" and "doing well." But when it comes to defining what happiness is, they disagree, and the account given by the common run differs from that of the philosophers.8

Aristotle claims that men agree that the final good for man is to be called "happiness," but that this verbal agreement hides some genuine disagreement as to what it is, or how it is to be defined.9 Some view happiness as pleasure, others as whatever they lack (health, wealth, etc), still others as honor.10 Aristotle excludes these views by arguing that whatever happiness is, it must be final (it is an end and never a means) and self-sufficient (once we possess happiness, we find ourselves not lacking anything significant).

What truly satisfies these conditions, Aristotle claims, is "an activity of the soul in conformity with excellence or virtue," over a lifetime.11 things like honor, pleasure, and wealth will not. They are chosen not for themselves alone, but as a means to happiness as well. So they are not final and a life devoted to them will not be self-sufficient. In addition to using these formal features of happiness to argue for his view, Aristotle also argues for it by means of an argument about the function of man.12 Whatever his function is, it must be unique to him. Aristotle sees three possibilities: simply living, a life of sense perception, and "an active life of the rational element."13 The first two are excluded by the fact that they are not unique to man. Thus, it is an active life of the rational element, which has to do both with behavior according to rules and wisdom. Happiness, or "the good of man is an activity of the soul
in conformity with excellence or virtue,\textsuperscript{14} over a lifetime.

Aristotle believes his view is confirmed by noting that it satisfies some of the important concerns of the popular views of happiness, such as that the most important goods are the goods of the soul,\textsuperscript{15} and that pleasure figures into happiness, since on his view there is a pleasantness naturally accruing to virtuous activity.\textsuperscript{16}

Aristotle notes that some external goods are necessary for happiness.\textsuperscript{17} Morally virtuous activity (which, depending on how you interpret Book X is either a part of happiness or a means to engaging in intellectually virtuous activity) requires some goods to share in the case of something like generosity, and other people that one can deal with in a morally virtuous way. But, in addition to these goods needed in order to be morally virtuous, certain goods such as noble birth, good children, and physical beauty are, Aristotle believes, goods one must have to be fully happy. But it must be noted that these goods are some of the conditions of happiness, and are not to be identified with the nature of happiness.

A puzzling feature of Aristotle's view is that happiness is something all men are aiming at, and yet there is a disagreement about what it is. Because of this puzzle, H. A. Prichard has suggested that Aristotle is deceived when he thinks he is telling us virtuous activity is the nature of happiness.\textsuperscript{18} What he is doing is answering a different sense of "What is happiness?" That sense is: "What are the conditions of realization of happiness?" or "What are the proximate means of happiness?" According to Prichard, Aristotle is really claiming men disagree about the conditions of happiness; everyone knows what its nature is. So some claim it is brought about by pleasure, others honor, etc., while Aristotle claims it is brought about by virtuous activity.

This view seems to me to be false. First of all, it is not supported by the text. The "τί ε̉ςτιν" in "But when it comes to defining what (τί ε̉ςτιν) happiness is, they disagree,"\textsuperscript{19} can be translated as "defining what," "what it is," or "what the nature (of it) is," but there is no way of translating it as "what the conditions are," or "how it is brought about." Also, earlier in the passage Aristotle says that people agree that "happiness" is the name for the highest good attainable by action. There is verbal agreement, but not agreement concerning its nature.

Since he believes that Aristotle himself is misled about the nature of his question, Prichard might not be convinced by the above argument. But there is another and more serious difficulty Prichard's view faces. Happiness is something other than virtuous activity, since it is virtuous activity which is supposed to bring it about. Men agree on the nature of happiness, according to Prichard. What is its nature? Prichard seems to be committed to saying it is pleasure.\textsuperscript{20} This clearly will not do. Aristotle at a number of places asserts that happiness and pleasure are not the same (e.g., at 1097b2-7 he points out pleasure can sometimes be an end, but also it can be a means to happiness; happiness is the only thing which is always an end and never a means). Rather than making more sense out of Aristotle's view, Prichard's interpretation puts us in a mess worse than the one we started in, and therefore must be rejected.

Therefore, it seems clear that Aristotle is offering a view of the nature of happiness. There are several difficulties his view faces. One is the lack of clarity
about whether the virtuous activity that constitutes happiness is primarily or solely intellectually virtuous activity (contemplation in the sense of theoretical wisdom), or a combination of intellectually virtuous and morally virtuous activity. Aristotle is clear on the point that intellectually virtuous activity is better, because it is the most continuous, the most pleasant, the most self-sufficient (since few external goods are needed for it), and most godlike activity we can engage in.\textsuperscript{21} However, whether it alone constitutes happiness is unclear.

Another problem with Aristotle's view is that it may be too narrow a view of happiness. Whether it is too narrow depends in part on certain difficult points of interpretation. One way in which it may be narrow is in viewing happiness as a dominant end. The desire for happiness seems to be, on Aristotle's view, the desire for virtuous activity, and especially (if not exclusively) theoretical wisdom. If that is the case, then happiness is a dominant end, the object of a single prime desire, rather than an inclusive end, the desire for which would be the desire for the orderly and harmonious satisfaction of a number of different desires.\textsuperscript{22} Aristotle's view might then be too narrow a view of happiness, since not many men seek virtuous activity, and, for that matter, not many men have a dominant end in their lives.

There are many cases where we would claim that a person is happy where we would not be claiming that he is living a life Aristotle envisions as the happy life. Another way in which his view may be too narrow is in ruling out the possibility of a wicked person being happy. It would rule this out if morally virtuous activity is included in the virtuous activity that constitutes happiness (but not if happiness is solely intellectually virtuous activity). Philosophers since Plato have been concerned to show that moral virtue is at least a necessary condition of happiness. We might note that even Kant, in spite of his view that we must ignore consequences in ethics, postulates an afterlife and the existence of God to insure that the virtuous man will be happy. So some philosophers have wanted some kind of conceptual connection between virtue and happiness to preclude "happy" from being predicated of a wicked man. I would like to argue that we should not rule out the wicked man in this way. We can distinguish between a nonmorally good life and a morally good life. The life of the wicked man is not a morally good life, though it may in certain cases be a nonmorally good life. Hence, I do not think we can rule out the possibility of the life of a wicked man being a happy life conceptually. We may hope and even expect that it is generally not true that a wicked life is also & happy one, that the wicked man is dissatisfied in some way, but I don't think the possibility should be ruled out a priori. By carefully distinguishing the nonmorally good life from the morally good life we can avoid the suggestion that this is tantamount to allowing a wicked life to be considered a morally permissible life.

There are certain features of Aristotle's analysis of happiness that any analysis of happiness may want to retain. These might include his claims that happiness is final, self-sufficient, that there is a kind of pleasantness accruing to the happy life, and that it involves activity. I shall later indicate ways in which I believe my view retains some of these features.

\textit{The Identity View}

There is one view concerning the nature of happiness, which, though it can be dismissed fairly readily, has had rather wide support. This is the view that happiness is
the same thing as pleasure. I shall refer to it as the "identity view." It is a view often associated with hedonism. However, since a hedonist could hold what I shall call the "collection view," I prefer a name that doesn't suggest all hedonists subscribe to this view of the nature of happiness. In discussing the identity view I shall first discuss some arguments against it. Then I shall go on to discuss some reasons why it has been held and some examples of philosophers who hold the view. It trades on a confusion between two uses of "happiness," what I have called the feeling use and the life use. This makes it somewhat difficult to state clearly exactly what the claim is that the view makes about happiness. One thing that it is claiming about happiness is that it is a feature of a life that is considered very important, and here clearly the life use of "happiness" is what such a theorist would have in mind. However, then a shift is made, and happiness is identified with the kind of experience we generally call a feeling (the feeling use seems to come into play here) and this is identified with pleasure. This view seems then to involve two confusions: a confusion of the feeling use and the life use of "happiness," and perhaps a confusion of the feeling referred to by the feeling use of "happiness" and pleasure. In my consideration of the identity view I shall assume it is a view about the analysis of the life use of "happiness." Before continuing, I should note that this view is different from the sort of view I shall call the "attitude view," which I discuss in Chapter Four. The attitude view claims that being happy is being pleased with or liking one's life. It suggests that the happy life is the pleasant life. The identity view, on the other hand, identifies happiness with pleasure (and pleasure is thought of as something like a feeling or a tone of an experience).

I shall discuss three arguments against identifying pleasure and happiness. The first argument is that while pleasures are fairly short-term feelings or tones of experience, happiness is a relatively long-term thing. Time spans of pleasure and happiness can't be specified with any exactness, but I believe this vagueness does not harm the point being made. When "happy" is predicated of a person with respect to his life, or a year of his life, or even his attitude toward his job or his marriage, it involves making a claim about a relatively longer span of time. On the other hand, pleasure is a relatively short-lasting thing. It seems perfectly sensible to claim that I had a pleasure that lasted for one minute, whereas it seems odd to claim I was happy (life use) for one minute. Whether one analyzes pleasure as a feeling, a tone of experience, a mode of attention, etc., it still remains the case that when the term "pleasure" is used, it refers to an experience which is relatively short in duration. Therefore, we cannot plausibly analyze happiness (life use) in terms of pleasure.

A second argument which is used to drive a wedge between pleasure and happiness is this: we can sensibly use the term "pleasure" in the plural, "pleasures," while it seems that we cannot do the same with "happiness." However one analyzes pleasure, it is something which can be plausibly considered in terms of an aggregate or collection. In the case of happiness, however, we cannot plausibly consider a collection or aggregate. The concept of pleasure allows us to think of a pleasure as something which can be separated into discrete units, while the concept of happiness does not seem to allow us to think of it in a similar way. A hedonistic calculus in terms of pleasure has some initial plausibility, and, as we shall see, this is one of the reasons why some have held the identity view. A calculus of happiness does not have such an initial plausibility. One might imagine attempting to add feelings of happiness, but the happiness of a life or a portion of a life cannot be thought of as consisting of discrete units.
A third argument that has been used to argue for the difference in meaning of "happiness" and "pleasure" has to do with adjectives that can and cannot be applied to the two terms. Sidney Zink argues that happiness has a dimension which pleasure does not have, because we can modify the noun "happiness" with the adjective "deep," while we cannot do this with "pleasure." This argument seems to involve a contrast between the feeling use of "happiness" and "pleasure," rather than the life use and "pleasure." This argument does not seem to me to be a very strong one, since this difference is possibly just a linguistic accident. There may be little difference between "deep happiness" and "intense pleasure," though there seems to be a difference between deep happiness and ordinary pleasure.

Another version of this third argument involves claiming that while it makes sense to talk of good and bad pleasures (e.g., sadistic pleasures), it does not make sense to talk of good and bad happiness. For this reason, it is claimed, happiness and pleasure must be different things. This argument seems to rest on the claim that a person conceptually must be morally virtuous in order to be happy. As I argued earlier, we cannot build this into the concept of happiness, because the morally good life and the nonmorally good life seem to be two different things. If this is so, then we would be able to sensibly raise the question of whether there can be cases of bad happiness (e.g., the happiness of a wicked man). Thus, this argument rests on a faulty view of the concept of happiness.

Before examining several examples of philosophers using this kind of analysis of happiness, I would like to point out several reasons for the curious phenomenon of the existence of this view, in spite of the rather obvious difficulties of maintaining the identity of pleasure and happiness and the synonymity of "pleasure" and "happiness." First of all, it seems that typically pleasure plays a role, and perhaps an important one, in happiness. We think of a happy life as generally including some pleasures, particularly if we are careful to use "pleasure" in a fairly broad sense. My analysis of happiness will not include pleasure or enjoyment as a necessary condition of happiness, for reasons which will be presented later. However, it seems to me that happy people tend to take pleasure in the realizing of their aims and enjoy their lives, and sometimes in thinking about happiness, the resulting pleasure gets emphasized. This may be one thing that has led people to confuse happiness and pleasure.

A second reason why the two have been believed to be the same arises from the fact that there are feeling uses of both terms. There has been a good deal of debate recently about the nature of pleasure. Against the popular view that pleasure is a feeling it has been argued that it is, rather, a tone of feelings or experiences, wanting to continue an experience one is having, for its own sake, a mode of attention, or a non-feeling episode. While I find arguments against the feeling view of pleasure persuasive, I think it can still be maintained that there is a feeling use of "pleasure," without claiming that it is a feeling.

There is a feeling use of "happiness" as well, as I have pointed out. In its feeling use, "happy," or "happiness," is used for occasions of very great pleasure or joy. Typically the feeling use occurs when we are referring to successes and good fortune (e.g., "She was very happy. She got the job."), But the feeling use of "happiness" should
not be confused with the life use, which refers to a life or a relatively long period of a life.

As I mentioned earlier, it is easy to see how someone might identify happiness (feeling use) with pleasure, particularly when thinking of intense pleasures. When this is combined with a failure to distinguish the feeling and life use of happiness, the identity view results.

A third reason for the mistaken identification of pleasure and happiness is the concern some have had for developing a hedonistic calculus. Within the framework of a teleological theory of obligation, and a hedonistic theory of value, a hedonistic calculus would provide us with a relatively clear and easy decision procedure for determining right actions. In order to make a hedonistic calculus work, one needs a relatively simple unit to use in the calculus. Pleasure seems to be a fairly simple unit to use, since pleasures are fairly short-term experiences that are relatively easy to discriminate and of which individuals seem to have immediate awareness. Thus Bentham, the father of the notion of the hedonistic calculus, held that pleasure and happiness are identical. If one is interested in working out a hedonistic calculus, happiness avoids the undesirable connotations of "pleasure" (i.e., the tendency to think of it only in terms of sensuous pleasures). This, combined with the belief that pleasure plays a significant role in happiness (however it may be analyzed in the end), makes it seem fitting as a unit of the calculus.

Now I would like to indicate two examples of the identity view. In An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, while spelling out the principle of utility, Bentham says:

> By utility is meant that property of any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same thing). . . .

In a note Bentham adds, in which he is explaining why the principle of utility is also called the greatest happiness principle, he says: "The word utility does not so clearly point to the ideas of pleasure and pain as the words happiness and felicity do." In these two passages, it is quite clear that Bentham is using "pleasure" and "happiness" synonymously.

A more recent example of the identity view occurs in a rather interesting attempt by Robert McNaughton to set up a workable hedonistic calculus. In this article, McNaughton sets up a hedonistic calculus he believes to be free of the difficulties Bentham had in measuring pleasure, by spelling out a concept of happiness and a set of assumptions which will, he claims, enable us to measure the happiness of a single individual, and of groups of individuals as well. I would like to focus on the concept of happiness McNaughton uses. I shall not discuss his version of the hedonistic calculus as such.

McNaughton uses "happiness" and "pleasure" synonymously. He goes on to analyze happiness as the preference a person has for some moments in his experience rather than others, for their own sake. He states:

> Happiness is fundamentally a property of a moment of an individual's experience.
The only way to determine how happy a person is is to examine him or listen to his testimony. His happiness or unhappiness may be caused by something in his environment, but in meaning it depends only upon what is within him. Furthermore, happiness, so to speak, comes in moments. If an individual is quite happy now, it is possible that he may be less happy, say, a minute from now. His happiness then may be caused by something which is occurring in his present experience, but in meaning it depends only on what will be within his experience at that moment. So, on McNaughton's view happiness is primarily a felt property of a single moment in a person's experience. The happiness of an experience lasting several moments can be analyzed in terms of his happiness at each separate moment constituting the longer experience. There are two ways, on McNaughton's view, that we can determine that a person is happy. Firstly, we can "examine him." I suppose this Means that there are certain sorts of behavior that are characteristic of a happy man. A man in pain exhibits pain behavior. He might moan, scream, clutch himself where he is feeling the pain, etc. A happy man would likely exhibit behavior such as smiling, being enthusiastic about whatever he is doing, etc. Secondly, we can "listen to his testimony." The avowals of an individual are thus another way we can ascertain that he is happy. Happiness sight be short-termed, for a person can be less happy a minute from now. In fact, any long-term happiness is long-term because it is made up of short-term happinesses.

I think McNaughton's view falls prey to the arguments I discussed earlier against views which equate pleasure and happiness. Happiness (life use) seems to be a long-term, rather than a short-term thing. It doesn't seem right to think of it in the plural, while it seems at least initially plausible to think of pleasure in the plural. The concept of happiness just does not seem to admit of being broken down into the units that McNaughton wants, as part of his hedonistic calculus. He confuses the feeling and life uses of "happiness."

The first view concerning the nature of happiness then, the identity view, is that it is the same as pleasure. The mistakes involved in it are fairly obvious mistakes. Those who adhere to it generally do not have a highly articulated theory of happiness and the relation between pleasure and happiness.

**The Collection View**

There is a second view concerning the nature of happiness, which is different from the first view in some important ways, and yet it is often confused with the first view. According to this view, happiness is a collection or aggregate of pleasures. I shall refer to this view as the "collection view." This sort of view is often identified with utilitarianism, and with some reason, since many hedonistic utilitarians have phrased their theories in this way, especially when discussing a hedonistic calculus, and how to determine the greatest happiness—either for an individual or for a number of people. However, one can be a utilitarian without holding the collection view.

There are several reasons that can be adduced for philosophers holding such a view, besides a concern with the possibility of setting up a hedonistic calculus, which fairly clearly is easier to do if one holds a collection theory than if one holds
another theory of happiness. First of all, as I mentioned earlier, there is a general belief that there is an important relation between pleasure and happiness. Given this, it would be fairly easy for someone to conclude that happiness is, by nature, a collection of pleasures.

Second, this view avoids some of the more glaring errors of the identity view. One of the arguments against that view is that it makes sense to speak of pleasures, but not of happinesses. An adherent of the collection view could argue that his theory concerning the nature of happiness handles this very adequately. Since happiness is a collection or aggregate of pleasures, it makes perfectly good sense to speak of the plural of "pleasure." However, since happiness is itself an aggregate or collection of pleasures, it doesn't seem sensible to speak of it in the plural.

Another argument against the identity view was that pleasure is a relatively short-term thing, while happiness is a relatively long-term thing. The collection theorist can handle this fairly easily by noting that while pleasures are short-lasting, a collection of pleasures cannot be viewed as a short-lasting thing. Treating happiness as a collection of pleasures allows one to speak of it as a collection over a relatively long period of time (how long is unclear, but depends on whether we are considering a happy life, happy period of life, being happy with a job, etc.).

Thus, there are a number of advantages the collection view has over the identity view. Before I go on to discuss some difficulties that face the collection view, I shall point out a number of examples of philosophers who have held the collection view.

Sidgwick seems to hold the collection view. To make the meaning of "happiness" more precise, he suggests that

\[\ldots\] by "greatest possible happiness" we understand the greatest attainable surplus of pleasure over pain; the two terms being used, with equally comprehensive meanings, to include respectively all kinds of agreeable and disagreeable feelings.\[46\]

It might seem here that Sidgwick is thinking of pleasure as something which is not itself separated into discrete units, but rather something like snow or water or dirt, units of which must be individuated arbitrarily, by applying some unit of measurement to them. But consider the following passage:

It seems, indeed, to be commonly used in Bentham's way as convertible with Pleasure,—or rather as denoting that of which the constituents are pleasures;—and it is in this sense that I think it most convenient to use it.\[41\]

Sidgwick's claim that the most convenient way to use "happiness" is as "denoting that of which the constituents are pleasures" can only be read as a claim that happiness is an aggregate or collection of individually discrete pleasures that outnumbers pains. Mill might be another example of a collection theorist. Because of his rather sloppy, use of terms like "happiness" and "pleasure," sometimes seemingly synonymously, sometimes not, it is very difficult to categorize his kind of position. When Mill says that happiness, according to hedonistic utilitarians
he pretty clearly has in mind happiness as basically a collection of pleasures. It may not be such without qualification, though. That depends on what Mill would say about his emphasis on active rather than passive pleasures, and what we do with Mill's claim about quality of pleasure affecting our estimates of happiness. If his claim about active pleasures is that they produce more pleasure than passive ones, then he could still claim happiness is a collection of pleasures. His view about quality of pleasure does seem to force a qualification of the collection view. Certain pleasures, Mill claims, are qualitatively higher, and preferable to other pleasures, even if they are less in quantity than the others. Unless you can resolve this claim about quality into one about quantity, then Mill cannot be said to hold a straightforward collection view.

In stating the collection view, I said that happiness, according to this view, is a collection or aggregate of pleasures. I did not spell out the nature of the view more thoroughly because proponents of the view rarely say more than this about the nature of happiness. I shall discuss a number of ways a collection view could be spelled out. In the end I find that all of them run into difficulties. I shall be operating on the assumption that the collection theorist should say more about the collection of pleasures that constitutes happiness, so that we know why some collections constitute happiness and others don't.

A collection theorist might maintain that any collection of pleasure (assuming, of course, that pains have been discounted in some way) constitutes happiness. On this view, a person is happy if he has more pleasures than pains, over a period of time, no matter how small the collection of pleasures is.

On the other hand, a collection theorist might maintain (and I believe most do) that the collection of pleasures must be rather large, and perhaps varied and spread out over a period of time. Not just any preponderance of pleasure will do. This version seems more plausible than the first one, since it seems obvious that not just any balance of pleasure over pain will do. In connection with this, let us consider a passage from a personal journal of B. F. Skinner:

Sun streams into our living room. My hi-fi is midway through the first act of Tristan and Isolde. A very pleasant environment. A man would be a fool not to enjoy himself in it. In a moment I will work on a manuscript which may help mankind. So my life is not only pleasant, it is earned or deserved. Yet, yet, I am unhappy.

The writer of the article about Skinner speculates that this unhappiness stems from some personal sources combined with a concern about the decay of civilization. Regardless of the source, Skinner judges himself to be unhappy, in spite of a life where pleasures certainly outnumber pains, and these pleasures include a wide variety, and many "higher" sorts of pleasures. Skinner may be overstating the case. It may be that his life is a happy life, and he is stressing that it is not a happiness where he is content with things the way they are. If he is thinking of happiness as stressing such
contentment, he may mean that he is not fully content in the sense that there is much more he wants to do. In any case, if a situation such as this is possible, where a person has a surplus of pleasures, and is yet unhappy, then a simple collection view won't work.

To handle this sort of case, the collection theorist might maintain that the collection must be a rather large one, and here it isn't large enough. But, the crucial question arises: just how large must the collection of pleasures be? Must it be larger than the collection of pleasures of the average man? What criteria would be used to determine whether a collection of pleasures is large enough? If not just any collection of pleasures constitutes happiness, then if this is to be an adequate theory of happiness, it must tell us what kind of collection constitutes happiness.

The crucial issue here seems to be that of how large a collection of pleasures must be to constitute happiness. Closely related to this issue concerning the size of the collection is a claim I shall assume to be basic to a collection view. This is the claim that happiness is proportional to the size of a collection of pleasures. The greater the collection of pleasures a person has, the happier he will be. I shall call this the "thesis of proportionality." The collection view seems committed to the thesis of proportionality when applied to individuals. It is less clear whether it is committed to it in its interpersonal formulation, which would be: given two people (or however many you are comparing), the one with more pleasures will be the happier person.

I shall discuss four problem cases, and then indicate some ways in which the collection theorist might try to handle these problem cases. I shall argue that in the end these do not work, and that the collection theory must be rejected. At the outset, I should note that I am using "pleasure" in a fairly wide sense, including "mental" as well as "bodily" pleasures, "higher" as well as "lower" pleasures. However, whatever analysis of pleasure we have must allow for pleasures or pleasant experiences to be treated as discriminable feelings or episodes that can be grouped together in a collection. In this respect, the collection view seems to preclude analyses of pleasure in terms of attention or motivation where it would be thought to be impossible to consider "collections" of pleasures.

Problem case 1: There are happy persons with relatively few pleasures. One kind of example would be happy ascetics. Ascetics who reduce their desires and pleasures now in order to be better off in eternity would not seem to be included, since presumably they would have a large collection of pleasures of anticipation. The kind who reduce their desires and pleasures in order to reduce the risk of suffering frustrated desires would be included, though. I think von Wright is correct in considering asceticism a "crippled view of happiness," because it regards happiness as the contradictory, rather than the contrary of unhappiness. In avoiding the frustration of desire one avoids unhappiness, but that does not necessarily bring one happiness. This is a problem with asceticism as a recipe for happiness. Even if it is a foolish way of seeking happiness, though, that doesn't preclude the existence of happy ascetics, persons who are happy while having a small collection of pleasures.

Another example of this first sort of problem case might be Wittgenstein. It is reported that Wittgenstein's last words were: "Tell them I've had a wonderful life!" It is, of course, possible that the claim was false, a claim made while under the distress of
dying. Norman Malcolm finds the claim puzzling, given features of Wittgenstein's life such as his extreme obsessiveness about philosophical problems, his great desire for affection combined with a kind of hostility toward most other people, and the relatively few enjoyments he had. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein himself was in the best position to make such a judgment concerning his life. In addition, even if Wittgenstein's judgment was a false one, such a life is possible—a life which is a happy life, but which is one which we would characterize as involving few pleasures, certainly fewer than most people enjoy, and the possibility of this sort of case is all we need. Assuming that Wittgenstein's life involved no notable collection of pleasures, how could it possibly be a happy life, according to the collection view?

Problem case 2: There seem to be cases of persons with a great many pleasures who are unhappy. Don Juan might be an example of this. Another type of example here would be that of Skinner, discussed earlier when I was arguing that a collection theorist could not argue that just any collection of pleasures will do. Presumably, Skinner has a fairly large collection of pleasures, and yet he finds himself unhappy.

Still another type of example here would be a case where a life devoted to the seeking of pleasures does not seem to be a happy life. For instance, when Aristotle considers whether pleasure might be the ultimate end, the good for man, instead of giving an argument, we find him citing a case: no one would judge, he claims, that Sardanapallus, a pleasure-seeking king, was happy. Such judgments might involve a confusion between judging a life to be a morally good one and judging it to be a non-morally good one, and if this is what is going on, then it doesn't necessarily represent a case of unhappiness. However, in some cases this sort of judgment seems to involve the claim that such lives, lives devoted to seeking pleasure, are, as a matter of fact, not ultimately satisfying (i.e., there is some sort of dissatisfaction that is not painful enough for us to say that it has quantitatively outweighed the pleasures involved) or that such a direction in a life is a symptom of some sort of dissatisfaction that causes such a quest for pleasures. Because of the difficulties of talking about collections of pleasures, it would be difficult to show conclusively that such cases occur, and cannot be explained away. However, it seems that such cases are possible, and it would seem to be impossible for a collection view to explain the phenomenon.

Problem case 3: There seem to be cases where two people have roughly the same number of pleasures and yet they vary in happiness: one is happy, the other unhappy. For example, Wittgenstein apparently was happy living a life with relatively few enjoyments. Clearly many people would find a life with the same quantity of pleasures dissatisfying enough to insure their unhappiness.

Problem case 4: One individual may find a period of his life when he has a smaller collection of pleasures happier than a period during which he has a larger collection of pleasures. For instance, people sometimes claim that they were happier when they were poorer, when they had less to enjoy, etc. Undoubtedly quite often when this it claimed the judgment is inaccurate because the past has been colored quite a bit during the passage of time. And in some cases, probably the complexity of the present period of life brings with it enough pains so that the earlier period of life was actually one in which there was a greater collection of pleasures. However, I am inclined to believe that in some cases such a judgment is true, and that the period of life when one had fewer pleasures was actually happier. How this sort of thing can happen will become clearer when we see the other things that affect happiness besides pleasures (e.g.,
important goals a person has that may be sought for some reason other than the enjoy-
ment involved in achieving the goal). The collection view could not make sense of this
sort of case.

Each of these cases seems to count against the collection view, for it seems essential
to a collection view that there be a proportional relation between amount of pleasure
and happiness. There are, however, several arguments a collection theorist might give to
defend himself against the force of these problem cases.

First, the collection theorist might argue that these problem cases are moving us from
the realm of the nature of happiness to the realm of the conditions of happiness. All that
is shown, he might maintain, by these problem cases, is that the conditions of
happiness vary a good deal. The nature of happiness is a collection or aggregate of
pleasures. It is impossible to give any clear cutoff point as to how large a collection
of pleasures must be in order to constitute happiness, for here we are moving into the
area of conditions of happiness—what causes it, brings it about, rather than what it is.

It is true that the conditions of happiness vary a great deal, however, I do not think
this argument works as a defense of the collection theory against the problem cases.
If a collection theorist maintains that the nature of happiness is a collection of
pleasures, then it would seem that the variability of the conditions of happiness
would have to do more with the sources and kinds of pleasures, rather than with the
quantities of pleasure. If happiness is a collection of pleasures, then the thesis of
proportionality would seem to follow, that the greater a person's collection of
pleasures, the happier he is. (The collection theorists who have been concerned with
the development of a hedonistic calculus need this kind of claim for the calculus to
work.) The counterexamples involve cases where this thesis of proportionality seems to
be violated. The first two seem to hold as counterexamples apart from the thesis of
proportionality. If happiness is a collection of pleasures then why are there persons
such as ascetics and perhaps Wittgenstein with very few pleasures who are nevertheless
happy? Furthermore, how would such a view account for the unhappiness of persons
with significant collections of pleasures? The theory seems to be too narrow in
apparently excluding some cases of happiness, and too broad in not giving us a clear
way of excluding other cases that should be excluded. It seems that viewing happiness
as being a collection of pleasures doesn't do the explaining one would expect a theory
of the nature of happiness to do; either happiness just is not a collection of
pleasures, or there is some feature besides a collection of pleasures that must be
added.

Another way the collection theorist might try to meet these problem cases is to argue
that the thesis of proportionality cannot be used in interpersonal comparisons, but only
applies to individuals. This will not fully save the collection view. If it works, the
fourth case still remains as an objection to the application of the thesis of
proportionality to individuals. In addition to this, it seems to me that even though there
are great problems in making interpersonal comparisons of pleasure, by
analyzing happiness as a collection of pleasures, the collection view is committed to
saying that in those cases where we know one person's collection of pleasures is greater
than another's, the former is happier than the latter. If this is the case, then it still faces
the first three problem cases.
A third argument a collection theorist might give to defend his view against the problem cases is this: one can still maintain that happiness is, in terms of its nature, a collection of pleasures, but add the qualification that exactly how large the collection must be varies (both from person to person and sometimes from one period of time to another with respect to one person), because it must be a collection that the individual himself believes is large enough, or that he is pleased with or likes. If the collection theorist adds this sort of qualification, he does eliminate the force of the problem cases against his view. However, in adding this qualification, he is moving away from a collection theory, saying that happiness is a collection of pleasures plus something else (the individual's judgment that it is large enough, his being pleased with it). So this saves the theory at the cost of abandoning it. This qualified sort of view I shall call a version of the attitude theory of happiness, which will be discussed in Chapter Four.

Thus, the nature of happiness cannot be identified with a collection of pleasures. The collection view either must be rejected or amplified, changing it into a different sort of view. As I develop and argue for my own view, it will become clear that the basic problem with the collection view is that it overemphasizes the role of pleasure in happiness.

The Unique State of Consciousness View

A third view of the nature of happiness, which I shall call the "unique state of consciousness view," is one of which W. T. Stace seems to be the clearest proponent. According to this view, happiness is a state of consciousness which is different from pleasure. Pleasures or satisfactions may lead to or contribute to happiness, but they do not constitute it. The overall pattern of Stace's argument is this: he makes some suggestions concerning the nature of happiness, and then discusses some general conditions on which happiness depends, in order to show how certain views (in particular the view I have called the collection view) have failed to take these into account. In failing to take these into account they do not do justice to some clear cases of happiness or unhappiness. Stace prefers to use "satisfactions" rather than "pleasures" to avoid the suggestion of sensual, "lower" pleasures. I shall use "satisfactions" in my discussion, assuming that it is roughly synonymous with "pleasures" when one is careful to avoid the negative elements in the connotation of the term. There are some problems which attend the discussion of this view. First, Stace's theory is not a fully elaborated one. As a result, at some points I shall have to project how Stace's theory might be spelled out. Second, much of his theory is negative, indicating what happiness is not. Thirdly, as we shall see, he doesn't clearly distinguish between the feeling and life uses of "happiness."

Let us look at the few positive suggestions Stace makes concerning the nature of happiness. First of all, he claims that happiness is a state of consciousness that humans experience, and when we are experiencing these states of consciousness, we know it: "For to be happy means nothing else than to feel happy. And therefore if one feels happy, one is happy." Secondly, it is a feeling or state of consciousness that is distinct from pleasure. Third, he's not sure whether it can be "analyzed" in terms of splitting up a concept "in thought into its simple elements." It definitely cannot be split up into pleasures as its units, and I shall shortly go through his arguments concerning this. But he's not sure whether it is "an unanalyzable simple ultimate
entity like a color.\textsuperscript{52} Fourth, it is a mistake to try to clearly separate happiness, and pleasure too, from the things that yield them. This is a mistake utilitarianism makes in thinking of desired concrete things as being sought as means to happiness or pleasures as ends. If we separate pleasure and happiness from things that are sought, we make each "an abstraction which no man desires."\textsuperscript{53} Happiness thus seems to be a tone of experience, and not a feeling which can be separated from those experiences and activities to which it is attached. So the overall picture we get of happiness is that it is a unique state of consciousness, a feeling tone of an experience, different from pleasure.

As it stands, this certainly could not be a description of happiness (life use). It would have to be a description of the feeling of happiness. I think Stace is vaguely aware of the difference between the life and feeling uses of "happiness" when he remarks

> What we aim at, we shall say, is not happiness, but "a happy life." This is a concrete idea. And by it is meant a life full of happy activities and experiences, a life replete with the things which bring about happiness.\textsuperscript{54}

What we mean when we speak of the life use of "happiness" is a life full of happy activities and experiences. Thus, his view of the life use of "happiness" would seem to be that it refers to a collection of happy feelings or happy states of consciousness that are tones of our experiences and activities.

Initially, I find it difficult to understand a feeling of happiness as a unique tone of experience notably different from pleasure. As I mentioned earlier, a feeling of happiness seems to be a feeling of great pleasure or joy, or a feeling of contentment. It is not clear to me that there is the unique state of consciousness that Stace talks about. But let us go on and see what Stace says about the relation between satisfaction and happiness.

Stace's view maintains that satisfactions do not constitute happiness, as the collection view would maintain. They do play an important role in happiness. But one's happiness is not proportional to the number or intensity of one's pleasures or satisfactions, as the collection view would hold. This claim, that there is a proportional relation between satisfactions and happiness, is shown to be false by cases very much like the problem cases I brought up when discussing the collection view. Because of these kinds of difficulties, Stace argues that we must deny any kind of proportionality between satisfactions and happiness. In addition, we must drive a greater wedge between satisfactions and happiness than the collection view allows. "Happiness is distinct from all and every satisfaction."\textsuperscript{55}

Stace claims that satisfactions do contribute to or lead to happiness, but they are not the only things which do so. There are two other factors which enter in and make the relation between satisfactions and happiness more complex than a simple proportional relation. One factor is the personality of the individual. Some individuals have happy temperaments and require relatively few satisfactions to make them happy.\textsuperscript{56} Therefore, the personality of an individual is involved in "processing" satisfactions of the individual.

The second factor which enters in, and which I shall discuss at greater length, is what
Stace calls the "specific nature" of satisfactions. This is what for the most part determines what quantity of happiness results from a given satisfaction. The intensity of the satisfaction has nothing to do with it. The "specific nature" of a satisfaction, Stace argues, is nothing more than that which distinguishes it from other, different satisfactions. Stace offers no explanation for why the "specific nature" of some satisfactions is such that they contribute more to happiness than other, sometimes more intense satisfactions. It is a fact of experience which men, over the years, have come to learn.

Initially, this sounds rather like Mill's distinction between quantity and quality of pleasure. However, Mill argues that we determine the difference in qualities of pleasures by preference of those who have experienced them. Stace's support for his point about the "specific natures" of pleasures is rather different. Since he is not committed to a collection theory (as Mill, at least nominally, is), he uses happiness as the standard by which one can judge satisfactions to be "higher" or "lower" ("higher" referring to those which are found in experience to contribute more to happiness). Thus, quantity of happiness, rather than preference of the experienced person, is how the "specific nature" of a pleasure is determined.

Thus, the essential elements of Stace's theory seem to be the following:

1. Happiness (feeling) = a unique state of consciousness attached to certain experiences and activities.

2. Happiness (life) = a life "full of" happy experiences and activities.

3. Relationship between happiness and satisfactions:
   a) Happiness is distinct from both particular satisfactions and collections of satisfactions. (He seems to shift here from feeling use to life use.)
   b) There is no proportional relation between intensity of satisfaction and amount of happiness:
      (1) Personality may affect how much happiness satisfactions produce.
      (2) How much happiness satisfactions produce is largely determined by the "specific nature" of satisfactions: higher pleasures or satisfactions contribute a greater amount of happiness.

Stace's view avoids the difficulties that both the identity view and the collection view faced. Since his view is formulated as a reaction to these views, and particularly the collection view, it is not surprising. It avoids the mistakes that follow from identifying pleasure and happiness, and easily handles the problem cases I brought up with regard to the collection view, since it denies the thesis about the proportional relation between pleasures and happiness. But there are problems with his view.

Two main criticisms of Stace's view are, I believe, serious ones. First, though he
avoids the difficulties that the collection view got into, he runs into some difficulties of his own in terms of the relations between satisfactions and happiness. In great part this is due to his not clearly distinguishing between the feeling and life uses. Because happiness is not a collection of satisfactions, it can serve as a standard for determining which satisfactions contribute the most to it. Happiness as experienced is a unique state of consciousness, a tone of experience. But he has claimed pleasure or satisfaction also is a tone of experience. So then the tones of experience that are satisfactions influence distinct tones of experience that are experiences of happiness. Given this kind of relation between satisfaction and happiness (feeling), it is hard to see how they are as distinct as Stace claims. We can easily see the distinctness of happiness when we think of it in terms of a happy life, but it is harder to see its distinctness when we think of it in terms of a tone of experience.

Second, Stace doesn't clearly distinguish between the feeling and life uses of "happiness," and this makes his account seem clearer than it is. A happy life is one that is "full of" happy experiences and activities. Stace's discussion of the complexity of the relationship between satisfactions and happiness has really been about feelings of happiness (though I think what he really is most interested in is a happy life). So personality differences and the "specific nature" of satisfaction will determine how much happiness (feeling) a particular experience or activity will have. The puzzle then is how these happy feelings are related to a happy life. "Full of" in "a happy life is full of happy activities and experiences" doesn't help us very much. I think Stace probably is unknowingly switching back and forth in his account between the life use and feeling use, for I think it is clear that features of the account such as the effect of personality are brought in to explain why there are differences in the amount or number of satisfactions a person needs to have a happy life. But these, in Stace's account, will only work to explain the relation between satisfactions and happy feelings; the relation between happy states of consciousness and the happy life is another matter, about which Stace has told us nothing. Then we can wonder if Stace's view will really work against the counterexamples to the collection view. For instance, presumably Wittgenstein's life had few happy feelings of the sort that Stace talks about, so if a happy life is one that is full of happy feelings, it would seem that Stace's view has as much difficulty with this case as the collection view does.

Stace's theory, which I have called the unique state of consciousness view, is commendable for its recognition of some of the complexity of the concept of happiness, which the identity and collection views failed to note. However, his view seems to focus too much on the feeling use of "happiness," thought of as a unique state of consciousness, and too little on the nature of a happy life, which it purports to give us some insight into.

**The Pattern or Inclusive End View**

Another view of the nature of happiness emerges in discussions of happiness by such philosophers as W. F. R. Hardie, H. J. Paton, DeWitt Parker, J. D. Mabbott, and John Rawls. The basic claim of this view is that happiness is the orderly and harmonious satisfaction of desires. Hardie approaches it from the point of view of the nature of happiness as an end. He argues that it is an inclusive end (a secondary end whose nature
is the attainment of various primary ends dictated by the particular desires a person has) rather than a dominant end (a particular thing which is sought as a special end). The others focus more on the nature of the happy life, and see happiness as being a pattern of life in which a person achieves the orderly and harmonious satisfaction of his desires. These views turn out to be two sides of the same coin, I believe, one focusing on the nature of happiness as an end, the other focusing on what sort of life is the happy life, and therefore, I shall refer to this position as the "inclusive end view," or alternatively, the "pattern view" of happiness.

I believe that this view is on the right track, and with some additions and elaboration will supply us with an analysis of happiness that will do justice to our notion of what the nature of the happy life is. My own view will be a variety of it, and will be developed and argued for in the third and fourth chapters. It is that the nature of happiness is the realizing of a life plan together with an absence of serious felt dissatisfaction, an absence of an attitude of being displeased with one's life, and a disposition to have enjoyments associated with the realizing of one's life plan. The negative conditions may seem redundant, already being implied in the notion of a life plan. Reasons for the necessity of including them as separate conditions will become clear later. In this section I will introduce the pattern or inclusive end view. In the next chapter, I will argue for the plausibility of analyzing happiness as the achieving of a kind of inclusive end, the life plan.

In discussing the view thus far, I have emphasized happiness as the realizing of an inclusive end. Some have claimed that there is a state of mind or unique feeling which accompanies this state of the person, perhaps a glow that attends the realizing of the various ends one has. Let us call this accompanying state of mind or feeling the subjective state of happiness, and the state of the person it accompanies the objective state, keeping in mind that some who hold the basic view may argue that there is no identifiably unique state of mind or feeling that could be claimed to be the subjective state. Once we make this distinction, several variations of the inclusive end or pattern view are possible. One variation claims that happiness is essentially a certain feeling or state of mind arising from this pattern of life. Karl Duncker might be an example of a person holding this view, when he says "Happiness is a general emotion of joy which refers to the total state of things, i.e., to one's total situation." It depends on how "one's total situation" would be spelled out, and Duncker does not do this. Dewey might be another person who holds this variation of the pattern view. He refers to happiness as "an enduring satisfaction of the whole self" and argues that it issues from objects which are enjoyable in themselves but which also reinforce and enlarge the other desires and tendencies which are sources of happiness; in a pleasure there is no such harmonizing and expanding tendency.

This language hints at the sort of view I am discussing, but Dewey is not systematic and complete enough in his discussion to allow for any certainty as to whether or not he genuinely is an example of such a view.

Another variation of the pattern view is a kind of double-aspect theory. According to this variation, happiness has two aspects, both the objective and subjective states referred to above. Sidney Zink is an example of someone who holds this view, and
perhaps DeWitt Parker, although Parker stresses the objective state and might argue that the subjective state is just a natural concomitant of the objective state.

I think the best way of getting at the essentials of the inclusive end or pattern view will be to examine the arguments given by those who hold it. I shall discuss arguments given by Hardie, Paton, Mabbott, Rawls, and Zink. Except for Rawls and Zink, the arguments for this sort of view occur within the context of interpretation of historical figures such as Aristotle, Kant and Butler.

Hardie argues that there are two main elements in Aristotle's discussion of the final good for man. One element is that men, if they are at all rational, must have some plan for their lives (in the sense of organizing what they do around some end). The other element is that the most fully rational man will have as the main object of his desire virtuous activity, particularly in the form of contemplation. Hardie claims that in the first element of his discussion, Aristotle wrongly insists that to have a plan for one's life, one must have it organized around one particular dominant end. Note the following passage from the *Eudemian Ethics*:

> Everyone who has the power to live according to his own choice should dwell on these points and set up for himself some object for the good life to aim at, whether honour or reputation or wealth or culture, by reference to which he will do all that he does, since not to have one's life organised in view of some end is a sign of great folly.

Aristotle thus believes the final end must be a dominant end, some one thing. What Aristotle is really seeking as the nature of the final good, Hardie argues, is an inclusive end, rather than a dominant end. The final good, or happiness, would then be the harmonious satisfaction of as many desires as possible. This would involve a person's having some sort of plan concerning priorities within the set of desires he has.

To support his claim that this is the view Aristotle is really searching for, Hardie quotes from Book I, Chapter Seven of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where Aristotle ultimately advances his definition of happiness as virtuous activity. In this chapter Aristotle notes:

> Moreover, happiness is of all things the one most desirable, and is not counted as one good thing among many others. But if it were counted as one among many others, it is obvious that the addition of even the least of the goods would make it more desirable; for the addition would produce an extra amount of good, and the greater amount of good is always more desirable than the lesser.

So happiness is, for Aristotle, a unique sort of end. It is the final end of man's actions—and yet is different from other ends. Particular ends, such as harmless pleasures, are good, on Aristotle's view. However, happiness is not the sort of end that can be compared with ends like harmless pleasures. Otherwise, there could be something better than happiness, namely, happiness plus some other goods. Interpreting happiness as an inclusive end makes it readily apparent how happiness can be this sort of end. Since it is a secondary end which is constituted by our primary ends, these two different kinds of ends are not on the same level. Happiness is made up of the
achievement of one's primary ends, and so it cannot be the case that the achievement of any primary good makes it better. Happiness just is the achievement of these primary goods. Aristotle's view of happiness as a dominant end makes it rather difficult to explain why it is that happiness as a good is not comparable to other goods.

At this point, it will be useful to compare the inclusive end view of happiness with the other views of happiness I have discussed. The inclusive end view sees happiness as a pattern of life, a pattern in which there is an orderly and harmonious satisfaction of desires. It is an inclusive end, made up of our primary or first order ends. The pursuit of happiness will involve determining which of our desires are more important, whether some are inconsistent, and time plans for insuring the satisfaction of as many of our desires as possible. The identity view sees happiness as identical with pleasure; its difference from the inclusive end view is readily apparent. The unique state of consciousness view might be compatible with some versions of an inclusive end view, namely those which stress the subjective state of realizing an inclusive end view, if someone like Stace were to indicate that this unique state of consciousness arises from the attaining of an inclusive end.

Distinguishing the inclusive end view from the collection view is a little more difficult. The collection view maintains that happiness is a collection or aggregate of pleasures. It would seem that one could have as an inclusive end the attainment of many different kinds of pleasures, and thus the inclusive end view could allow for some lives with inclusive ends that seem very much like lives lived the way the collection view pictures human life. However, we must remember that the collection view is a theory of the nature of happiness, and not just a view about what some happy lives are like. One way we can see the difference between the two as views of the nature of happiness is by noting the emphasis of each view. The collection view emphasizes a collection of pleasures. Here it would be appropriate to consider size as an important factor; a relatively great collection of pleasures would constitute happiness. In the pattern or inclusive end view, on the other hand, there is an emphasis on a pattern of life, that pattern being the orderly and harmonious satisfaction of desires, here there is not an emphasis on amassing a large number of satisfactions; size doesn't seem to be a crucial factor. If a collection theorist qualified his view, indicating that happiness is a collection of pleasures of a certain sort, those thought to be important by the individual, this would be close to the inclusive end view, but would no longer be a full-fledged collection view.

A second way of distinguishing between the collection and pattern views, and also a way of arguing against the collection view, is to argue that the ultimate ends of our actions are not always pleasures or things which have pleasures as by-products. If there are things that people desire as ends which are not enjoyments, and do not have enjoyment closely associated with them as a by-product, then this is a phenomenon that the inclusive end view can handle but the collection view cannot.

To illustrate how this point could be worked out, I shall consider an example from C. W. Taylor. Taylor gives his writing of his paper on pleasure as an example of something wanted for its own sake that is not an enjoyment. He wanted to write this paper, he claims, as part of (and not as a means to) being a good philosopher. And he wants to be a good philosopher, he claims, not because he expects to enjoy doing it, nor
because it will increase the enjoyment of others, but because he wouldn't be content unless he were doing philosophy. The desirability-characteristic sought (that characteristic which would be at the end of a series of why questions) is in his case not that of being enjoyable, but that of "being a good state for a man; more specifically, being a state which consists in the exercise of a characteristically human capacity, viz. the capacity of finding out about things." An enjoyment has as its object an action or passion of the person whose enjoyment it is. The case of seeking the exercise of a human capacity involves an object which is not an action or passion of his, and hence could not be an enjoyment. The significance of Taylor's example is this: if it is true, and there are some cases of the satisfaction of desires which are not enjoyments, and hence not pleasures, then there may be some patterns of life in which there is an orderly and harmonious satisfaction of desire which includes satisfied desires which are not pleasures. If so, on the pattern view some of the important elements of the pattern might very well not be pleasures. In the case of the collection view, however, all of the elements of the collection are pleasures.

One can easily envision responses to Taylor. It might be claimed that while Taylor didn't seek enjoyment from the activity of writing the paper, when his desire to write it was satisfied, there must have been some enjoyment associated with having written it (e.g., thinking of it with pride, feeling relief that he's done, etc.). It might be argued also that his doing it while he wouldn't have been content not doing it means that he got some enjoyment in doing it. Some argue that any instance of the satisfaction of desire is, by definition, a pleasure (e.g., Parker). Parker claims that this is true even in the case of the satisfaction of a desire that is disappointing (e.g., whatever we desired isn't as great as we expected it to be). This is so because there is a pleasure or assuagement attending the achievement of any object of desire, even if the attained object doesn't meet all the standards, expectations built into the desire.

I think Taylor's reply to this would be that we can maintain this definitional truth about enjoyment and satisfaction of desire only at the cost of having a very broad, eviscerated notion of enjoyment. There seem to be many human activities (crafts, games, writing, research, etc.) which are perhaps originally undertaken because one enjoys doing that sort of thing, but when one becomes involved in doing activities or projects of that sort, standards of excellence are adopted which add the dimension of doing these things in a certain way, not because of expected enjoyment, but because one wouldn't be content doing otherwise.

If this point holds, then it is clear that some ends might be part of an inclusive end which are not pleasures or enjoyments, and hence wouldn't be captured in a collection view. There do seem to be many important human activities (ranging from building detailed sand-castles to writing philosophy papers) where it would seem to involve a gross misdescription of the activity to say it is merely the seeking of enjoyment, that the only desirability-characteristic is enjoyment. If it were, then any such activities would seem to be very inefficient, given the low proportion of pleasures achieved compared to the effort put into the activity. Thus, if this point holds, the collection view cannot handle this, while the inclusive end view can. But even if this way of distinguishing the two views doesn't ultimately work, the first way still remains.

Another point which could be noted, which serves to distinguish both the collection and identity views from the inclusive end view, is that both the identity and collection
views seem to view happiness as a dominant rather than an inclusive end. Having distinguished the inclusive end view from the other views I have discussed, I shall now go on to consider some discussions of happiness as an inclusive end or pattern of life.

H. J. Paton develops a pattern view in an interpretation of Kant and his theory of the function of practical reason in the pursuit of happiness. Paton points out that Kant seems to use two different theories of happiness in his writing. One is rather hedonistic, equating happiness with pleasure or uninterrupted pleasantness (a mixture of the identity and collection views). The other is the pattern view, equating happiness with the orderly and harmonious satisfaction of desires (the attainment of various ends which are "constituent means" to happiness). Paton argues that the latter view is a better one:

It is absurd to suppose that the only object we desire and the only end we seek is continuous pleasure and the avoidance of pain. The principle of rational self-love is not so much a principle of using the means to continuous pleasant feeling, but is rather a principle of integrating our ends, of which pleasant feeling is only one, into a single comprehensive whole.

Hence, on this interpretation of Kant, the maxim of rational self-love, on which practical reason acts, is not just to seek a means to a specific (dominant) end, uninterrupted pleasure, but rather to integrate our varied ends. An advantage of the latter view is that it avoids an egoistic interpretation of the pursuit of happiness, since elements of one's inclusive end may well be other-regarding. The first interpretation of Kant, where happiness is uninterrupted pleasure, seems to imply that the pursuit of happiness (which would be one's own pleasantness) would be egoistic, even if one allows for sympathetic, benevolent pleasures.

J. D. Mabbott argues for a pattern view in an article concerning the various ways reason affects non-moral conduct. He develops the pattern view in an interpretation of Bishop Butler's principle of self-love.

At the outset, Mabbott notes a third manner in which reason affects non-moral conduct that has generally gone unnoticed. The first two ways have been discussed a good deal. They are: (1) reason discovers means to achieve the ends that are set by our desires; and (2) reason shows that certain actions will lead to other ends, or preclude certain ends which we may desire or wish to avoid. The third manner in which reason can affect conduct is by arranging, by means of a time-plan, for the satisfaction of two or more desires which cannot be satisfied simultaneously. When there is a conflict of desires—for instance, we want to do both A and B, but cannot do both right now—we need not satisfy just whichever is the strongest desire. We might set up a time plan, according to which we now satisfy one of the desires, and later satisfy the other. Time plans can be used to control the satisfaction of desires in other ways, too. They can be used to weaken a desire, avoid a desire by anticipating it, or make it difficult to satisfy a desire if it is one we do not wish to have.

This notion of a time plan enables an interesting interpretation of Butler to be carried out. According to Butler, self-love is one of the elements of human nature. Self-love is the individual's desire for his own happiness. In the virtuous person, reason will see to it that it is subordinated to conscience, along with the other
elements of human nature. Self-love, on Butler's view, is rational in a way that particular desires are not. But there are strands of two different accounts of self-love in Butler's writings.

Butler does not clearly distinguish between happiness and pleasure, suggesting, at first glance, an identity view. Fitting this into his notion of self-love, self-love would then be the desire for pleasure. Since the desire for pleasure is a particular passion, it is difficult to see how Butler would substantiate his claim that self-love is rational in a way particular passions are not.

However, there are strands of an alternative account of self-love, Mabbott points out. In this account suggested by some things Butler says, happiness is distinguished from particular pleasures, and it consists of or is constituted by the satisfactions of our particular appetites, affections and passions. The desire for it is a kind of second-order desire. Since on this account happiness is an end which includes as sub-ends all of the particular objects of desire of a person, it is easy to see how self-love could be rational in a way particular desires could not.

My discussion of Rawls and Zink will be rather brief. I will be discussing Rawls' view at greater length when I develop the notion of a plan of life further. My main purpose in bringing up Zink's theory is to use it as an interesting example of a kind of double-aspect theory of happiness.

Rawls argues for a pattern or inclusive end view of happiness.

Happiness is, on his view, an inclusive rather than a dominant end, and consists in the successful carrying out of a rational plan of life. Along with this, he stresses the importance of confidence that the realizing of one's plan will continue. He says:

    First of all, happiness has two aspects: one is the successful execution of a rational plan (the schedule of activities and aims) which a person strives to realize; the other is his state of mind, his sure confidence supported by good reasons that his success will endure.

Even if a plan has been and is being carried out successfully, a lack of confidence that such success will continue might preclude happiness.

Sidney Zink has an interesting double-aspect theory of happiness. There are two senses of "happiness," Zink argues, and these correspond to the two aspects of happiness: one is the feeling sense of "happiness" (corresponding to happiness as a feeling), and the other is the state sense of "happiness" (corresponding to happiness as a state of a person's life).

The feeling of happiness, Zink argues, is nothing more than the pleasure a person has when he judges his life to be a happy life. Zink argues that the state of happiness is a condition of a pattern of moments which may extend over a whole life or a part of a life. However, as to exactly what this condition is, Zink is rather unclear. He says that it requires pleasures of various kinds, and in particular pleasures resulting from virtue. Zink could, on the one hand, have in mind that happiness is constituted by such pleasures. Then his view of the state of happiness would be a collection view. On the
other hand, he could have in mind that this condition of happiness is a pattern of life, of the sort that I have been discussing. I am inclined to consider his view a version of the inclusive end view. He doesn't emphasize quantity of pleasure in his discussion, and he does emphasize the notion of pattern. In addition, since the feeling of happiness is pleasure, if his view were a version of the collection view, it would be hard to make sense of the feeling of happiness (the state of happiness would be a collection of pleasures while the feeling of happiness would be a pleasure that comes from knowing one has a collection of pleasures).

Zink's feeling sense of "happiness" and what I have previously discussed as the feeling use of "happiness" are somewhat different. For Zink the feeling of happiness is tied to the state of happiness, whereas the feeling use of "happiness" I am using is broader, covering cases of great pleasure and joy, some of which may not be related to a happy state.

Now that we have had a preliminary look at how the inclusive end or pattern view can be set out, before we see how my own version of the inclusive end view is to be elaborated, we might consider what advantages the inclusive end view has in general over the other views of the nature of a happy life that we considered. First, it might be noted that it is free of the difficulties the identity view faced concerning the duration of happiness, confusing the feeling and life uses, etc. Second, it doesn't seem to exclude any of the problem cases we considered with regard to the collection view. Since it doesn't have to emphasize pleasure as an end, it will allow for happy lives with few pleasures, such as may have been the cases with Wittgenstein and ascetics. It can also handle the case of unhappy persons with many pleasures. In such cases there might be primary ends the person has that aren't being achieved, and some of these might not be pleasures, thus not increasing the collection of pleasures once achieved. There may be persons with roughly similar collections of pleasures who vary in happiness because the natures of the inclusive ends made up of their primary ends may differ. Finally, an individual might be happier during a certain portion of his life when he has fewer pleasures because the pattern of life which is his inclusive end differs and involves fewer ends whose desirability-characteristic is enjoyment. I think it will become obvious as I develop a version of the inclusive end view that this sort of view fits in much better with our considered judgments concerning the happiness of lives than alternative views. I shall now turn to developing my position. I shall argue for happiness as the realizing of an inclusive end which is a "life plan."

Endnotes Chapter II

1 It has been argued by Prichard that Aristotle offers this as a claim about the causes or conditions of happiness, not its nature. I shall be considering this argument when I discuss Aristotle's view of happiness.
3 John Hospers, in *Human Conduct* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1961), p. 114, brings this up as a popular answer to the question "What is happiness?" Hospers argues, though, that it is a mistaken response.
4 Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1. 7. 1098a16-18.


Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1. 4. 1095a15-22

There is some disagreement as to whether Aristotle means that there is disagreement concerning the nature of happiness or the conditions of its realization. I shall be discussing this shortly.

From this point on I condense Aristotle's account somewhat; I do not believe this distorts his argument for his view of happiness.

Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1. 7. 1098a15.

Ibid., 1. 7. 1097b22-1098a15.

Ibid., 1. 7. 1098a5.

Ibid., 1. 7. 1098.16-18.

Ibid., 1. 8. 1098b13.

Ibid., 1. 8. 1099a8.

Ibid.. 1. 8. 1099a31-68.


Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1. 4. 1098a20.


Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 10. 8. 1178a7-1179a32.


There is a temptation to call this "the feeling view," since it seems to identify happiness with a feeling. However, I believe the main claim of the view is to identify happiness with pleasure. Since there is general disagreement about whether pleasure is a feeling, it would be presumptuous to give it this name. One could hold the identity view while denying that pleasure is a feeling. We might use "feeling view" for that species of the identity view which does hold a feeling view of pleasure.

Sometimes a long pleasure is implied in statements such as "Your party was one continuous pleasure," but this seems to be hyperbolic.


It is interesting to note that F. H. Bradley, who wrote during the time a number of British philosophers claimed that "pleasure" and "happiness" were synonymous, referred to this claim as "an outrage on language." See "Pleasure for Pleasure's Sake," in Ethical Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 96.


Karl Duncker takes this use of "happiness" to be the primary use of the term in "On Pleasure, Emotion, and Striving," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, I (1941), 404, where he says: "Happiness is a general emotion of joy which refers to the total state of 'things, i.e., to one's total situation."

A proponent of a hedonistic calculus doesn't have to hold the identity view. Some have held a collection view, claiming that happiness can be analyzed as a collection or aggregate of pleasures.

36 Ibid., p. 368.


38 Ibid., p. 173

39 For example, W. T. Stace in *The Concept of Morals* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937), p. 140, states that this is the utilitarian view concerning happiness.

40 Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, p. 120.

41 Ibid., p. 92.


43 'Skinner's Utopia: Panacea, or Path to Hell?', *Time*, September 20, 1971, p. 53.

44 This seems to be what Epicurus is driving at in his view of happiness. He argues that a hedonistic zero-state, the absence of pleasure and of pain, is the most pleasant state we can attain. I believe what he has in mind is that, in order to obtain positive states of pleasure, we have to desire things. And here things can go awry: our desires may not be satisfied, and the frustration of desire brings about pain.


47 Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1. 5. 1095b22.

48 For example, in his autobiographical collection of stories, *A Moveable Feast* (New York: Charles Scriber's Sons, 1964), p. 211, Ernest Hemingway notes: "But this is how Paris was in the early days when we were very poor and very happy."


50 Ibid., p.126

51 Ibid., p.129

52 Ibid., p.129.

53 Ibid.,p.134

54 Ibid.,p. 134.

55 Ibid., p.143.

56 Ibid., p.145.

57 Ibid., p.147.

58 Ibid., p. 156

59 John Hospers, who himself holds the collection view, in *Human Conduct*, p. 111, argues that Stace confuses two senses of pleasure: pleasurable states of consciousness and pleasurable sensations, and, p. 116, that he confuses pleasure with the "lower" sources of pleasure. I find nothing in Stace to substantiate these claims.

60 Ralph Barton Perry may be an example of someone who holds this sort of view, in addition to the others mentioned here. He emphasizes the importance of the harmonious satisfaction or integration of interests in a happy life. However, in what he says about happiness he seems to hold that it is a special sort of satisfaction. For instance, in *General Theory of Value* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 442, he claims that happiness is not satisfaction or a series of satisfactions, but a present satisfaction arising from the contemplation of one's life when one's interests have been harmoniously satisfied.


63 V. J. McGill claims in *The Idea of Happiness* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1967), pp. 162-164, in discussing self-realization views, that Dewey emphasizes that objective state rather than the subjective state. Dewey isn't clear enough to be sure about this, but I find that his own language suggests emphasis on the subjective state.


65 Aristotle *Eudemian Ethics* 1. 2. 1213b6-11.

66 Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1. 7. 1097b16-21

67 The notion of time plans is important in Mabbott's discussion, and I will be treating that notion further when I come to Mabbott.

68 This would also serve as an argument against psychological hedonism. It should be noted that not just any
argument against hedonism will show that the collection view is not true to life. The most common argument against hedonism is that people don’t seek pleasure itself, but rather particular objects; pleasure results as the by-product. One could assent to this and still hold a collection view, regarding happiness as a collection of those pleasures or enjoyments that are by-products.

70 Ibid., p. 16.
71 Ibid., p. 17
73 Passages illustrating the different views of happiness implied in Kant’s writings will be found in Appendix I.
75 Ibid., p. 86.
77 Ibid., p. 115
78 See Appendix II for passages in Butler suggesting this view.
CHAPTER III

LIFE PLANS AND HAPPINESS

Introduction

In the previous chapter I discussed a number of important theories of happiness: the identity view, which identifies happiness with pleasure, the collection view, which claims happiness is a collection of pleasures, the unique state of consciousness view, and the inclusive end or pattern view. I argued that there were serious difficulties with all of the views except for the inclusive end or pattern view. In this chapter and the next I shall be arguing that happiness is most plausibly analyzed as basically the realizing of a life plan, this realizing of the life plan being a higher order end. I shall support this claim by elaborating on the notion of plans applied to behavior, parts of lives, and lives. Plans will be analyzed in terms of orders of desires and ends, and the stratification of desires and ends will be argued for. I shall show how orders of desires can be related in various ways: in terms of means and ends, some desires (ends) constituting other desires (ends), some desires being more specific versions of other more generic desires, and some desires causing other desires. Recognizing these various relations makes the notion of plans applied to behavior and human life more plausible. Once this groundwork concerning levels of desires and plans is established, I shall go on to a more detailed discussion of life plans and happiness. I shall argue that the life plan view of happiness is a more plausible analysis than other alternatives, and fits in better with our basic beliefs about happiness, and representative claims concerning happiness. In the following chapter I shall expand my analysis of happiness somewhat, by comparing it with some other contemporary views of happiness, adding several conditions to the analysis: the absence of both serious felt dissatisfaction and an attitude of disliking or being displeased with one's life, and a disposition to experience pleasure upon realization of elements of one's life plan and to enjoy one's life. However, the main condition of the analysis of happiness is the realizing of a life plan, and it is this condition which I shall be focusing on in this chapter.

The Notion of a Plan

Some uses of the word "plan" focus on a design or scheme for realizing a particular end (e.g., "In examining the various plans for reducing the consumption of gasoline, they decided that a system of rationing was the only one which would work"). In such uses, the goals or ends are regarded as givens, and a plan is a suggested design or scheme for achieving the goal. Other uses of "plan" focus on an aim, intention or goal (e.g., "He went to college with the plan of studying law," and "On her trip to Europe she planned to visit as many major art museums as she could"). These uses of "plan" seem to focus on what ends or goals a person has chosen, rather than designs for achieving them. Of course, such designs may exist or be forthcoming. My use of "life plan" will be closest to the latter use of "plan." To show the plausibility of claiming that happiness is the
realizing of a life plan, I shall first say something about how the notion of a plan can be applied to human behavior. I shall show how we can speak of plans for simple actions, complex activities, portions of life, and a life.

When a person performs an intentional action, he can be said to be carrying out a plan consisting of his wants (what acts he wants to perform or states of affairs he wants to bring about) and his beliefs (what he believes will be means to or constitute performing the act or bringing about the state of affairs). Consider the example of a person taking a book down from a shelf. He intends to raise his arm, grasp the book and carry it down. These are features of what we might call his action plan. Other things may occur which are not features of the action plan, and for that reason are unintentional. For instance, if, while pulling the book off the shelf, he should knock over a vase, this would be unintentional, not being included in the action plan. An action plan, and indeed any plan, is usually not a detailed, precise blueprint. The speed with which one raises one's arm or the firmness of one's grasp will only in special circumstances be or become part of the action plan (e.g., the book's being tightly lodged in the shelf may require grasping it firmly).

Moving on to a complex action or activity, such as walking to a mailbox to mail a letter, we can still speak of this as being an activity performed according to a plan. Important features of the activity, such as getting out of one's chair, walking toward the mailbox, and putting the letter in, will probably be fairly clear features of the action plan. Only in special circumstances will a plan specify the number of steps to be taken on the way, or the jacket one will wear, or stopping at the corner to wait for traffic to pass. Such features may become parts of subplans (e.g., waiting for traffic once one sees it), but that does not mean that the general activity of walking to the mailbox does not occur according to a plan. Here the plan consists of an aim or goal (mailing the letter) and a design or scheme for achieving that goal.

People seem to have plans for periods of time such as days, weeks, etc. In such cases there is typically some degree of emphasis on goals or ends, and not just on designs or schemes for realizing given goals. For instance, I might plan to plan a course for the coming quarter and revise a portion of my dissertation today. These are goals or ends chosen for this portion of time, and the method of achieving these ends may be very sketchy. A longer portion of time is often planned, as for example, in the case of a vacation trip. Someone traveling for two weeks may plan to visit certain places, and the "plan" (in the sense of a design for realizing these goals) may be worked out in detail, or it may be very sketchy. Even in the case of someone planning a very spontaneous sort of trip (e.g., to go nowhere in particular, just where his impulses lead him) has planned his trip, and a basic part of the plan is the chosen principle of determining subplans for portions of the trip by impulse.

The notion of a plan can also be applied to periods of a person's life. One may plan to spend one's college years studying literature, to be a businessman during the working portion of one's life, etc. These plans typically emphasize goals or ends one wishes to realize, and they may be rather sketchy concerning any design as to how one is going to achieve these goals.

It might be objected that applying the notion of plans to human behavior in this way is misleading, because it makes these various kinds of behavior seem entirely under the
control of the individual, failing to recognize that much of a person's activity is not planned by him. A businessman doesn't himself plan all of his duties, for instance, many are imposed on him. This objection can be answered by noting that plans can have as their sources others as well as the person himself. In obeying a command to open a window, one is appropriating a plan given by someone else. Many of the duties the businessman must perform will be plans he is expected by his employer to carry out. I shall discuss the various sources of plans in further detail later in this chapter.

Finally, the notion of a plan can be applied to a person's life. Much of this section will be concerned with spelling out how this can be done. I shall introduce the notion by indicating what desires or plans a person has that could be considered elements of the life plan. The claim that there are such things as life plans and the further claim that all persons have them will be argued for in two ways. First, I shall argue for the existence of a stratification or hierarchy of human desires and ends, and that higher order ends which are elements of the life plan influence one's behavior. This kind of structure of human desires and ends gives evidence, I believe, for the sort of thing I call the life plan, which consists of one's higher order desires (ends). Second, I shall later indicate some examples where some persons have claimed to have a plan for their lives. Then I shall go on to argue that if we have a correct understanding of "life plan," we can see that all persons have them.

"Life plan," as I use it, shall refer to the more important desires and goals a person has, including such things as occupational goals, desires concerning the kind of life one would like to live (e.g., a desire to be married, to have a family), desires concerning avocations, desires concerning the sort of person one wants to be, etc. It must be emphasized that these are not detailed plans. These major ends or goals of a person impart a kind of design or pattern to a person's life by governing the development of many of the lower order desires (ends) a person comes to have, as well as which of such desires he will act on. A plan in the sense of an elaborate blueprint is impossible, given the fact that one doesn't know all of the situations that will arise in which one has to act.

Because of the great variation among people with respect to features of their life plans (e.g., for some people occupational goals are very important; for others they are not important), illustrating the notion of life plans with examples would be difficult. I think it will be more illuminating to establish what criteria are satisfied by a desire or end which is an element of the life plan. I believe there are three: permanence, comprehensiveness, and importance. Those ends which are part of the life plan are relatively more permanent, comprehensive and important. Some lower order ends may have one or more of these properties, but to a lesser degree.

The first criterion is permanence. Desires or ends which are part of the life plan tend to be relatively more permanent. There are two related aspects of permanence that characterize elements of the life plan; one focuses on the desire, the other on the corresponding end. First, with respect to higher order desires, as desires of the individual, these do not change rapidly or frequently. To be sure, there can be changes in one's life plan, such as when one matures, when one develops new important interests, or when one undergoes important changes for some reason or another, such as a change in occupation, a religious conversion, or a personality change. Higher order desires which are elements of the life plan are not fleeting or transitory. Second, focusing on the end of
higher order desires, we find that there typically is a kind of permanence that characterizes them (and this seems to be why the desires for them are relatively more permanent). This is that the objects of higher order desires are objects that are not attained completely in a short span of time. The objects have a kind of continuance that does not typically exist in lower order desires. There are two ways this occurs. Sometimes this is due to the long-range, complex nature of the object. For example, if someone wants to become president of the United States, the attainment of this object involves many activities over a long period of time. Sometimes this continuance of the object of the desire is due to its being the sort of thing that is never completely attained and over with. For example, if someone desires to be a good philosopher, this desire has an end which is ongoing, continuing; it is a desire which is never completely assuaged, since its object is not the sort of thing one attains at a certain time. Other examples would be a desire to have a good marriage and to gain knowledge. Thus, in these two different ways, higher order desires and ends tend to be relatively more permanent.

The second criterion is comprehensiveness, or inclusiveness. Elements of the life plan tend to be comprehensive. They are ends which are broad, affecting a rather wide range of one's experience. For instance, if one's life plan includes a desire to be a philosopher, or to raise a family, these desires will affect many of the desires and experiences of the person. Thus, elements of the life plan can be distinguished from ends that people have which are rather narrow in their range.

Importance, the third criterion, is closely related to comprehensiveness. The importance of an end which is an element in the life plan accounts for its broadly affecting the desires of a person. What I wish to bring out by distinguishing importance from comprehensiveness is that elements of the life plan tend to be desires whose frustration brings serious dissatisfaction. The realizing of a desire which is an element of the life plan, or the prospect of realizing it, is important to a person. This importance is manifested by the fact that frustration of it will lead to either relatively strong and long-lasting dissatisfaction or a revision of at least major portions of the life plan or both.

Distinguishing life plans and their elements in terms of these criteria, rather than by examples, is useful in allowing for the openness of the concept of happiness in terms of the great variation of ways of life that people seek to realize. The criteria of permanence, comprehensiveness, and importance will certainly allow for rather conventional sorts of life plans which include occupational goals, etc., but it also will allow for odd cases, such as Mill's miser, for whom the possession of money is an element of his life plan (or, the way Mill put it, "part" of his happiness), or a person who has as an important aim of his life to climb Mt. Everest.

Thus, the notion of a plan seems to be appropriately applied to actions, and might very well be applicable to lives. I shall now go on to argue that there are orders of human desires and ends. This will eventually lead to a defense of my claim that people have life plans which consist of higher order ends that influence much of their behavior.
To defend my claim that happiness is the realizing of a life plan, I shall first discuss some different senses of "order" that can be used in speaking of orders of desires (or, correspondingly, of ends) and argue that there are orders of desires. Once this is done, I shall go on to discuss the ways different orders of desires (in the system sense of "order" I shall be adopting) can be related. Then the concept of happiness can be more clearly fit into this framework.

There are two important senses of "higher order" with respect to desires that imply different criteria for distinguishing between higher and lower order desires. It is important to discuss them because the notion of higher order desires is an important part of my account, and I would like the sense of "higher order" I am using to be as clear as possible. The first sense speaks of first order desires as desires for particular objects or states of affairs, second order desires as desires to have certain first order desires, third order desires as desires to desire to desire, and so on. It is the more straightforward, simple use of "order" with respect to desires. I shall consider as an example of the use of this sense of "orders of desire" a discussion by Harry Frankfurt.

The second sense of "orders of desire," which I shall call the "system sense," involves a more complex notion of orders, speaking of higher order desires as desires with more complex objects, and not simple desires to desire. I shall be using the system sense in my account. This sense can incorporate the kind of ordering spoken of in the simpler sense of "order" while enabling us to speak of some relationships that exist between desires that the other sense does not include.

Harry Frankfurt has used the first sense of "order" in developing the notion of levels of desires in a recent article about freedom of the will and the concept of a person. A characteristic peculiar to humans, Frankfurt argues, is their ability to form second order desires. A first order desire is simply a desire to do something or not to do something (construed broadly, so as to include possession of objects, activities, and being in certain sorts of situations). A second order desire is a desire or want to have, or not to have, a certain desire. An example would be having a first order desire to smoke, and also having a second order desire not to desire to smoke. Frankfurt uses this distinction to develop his criterion of being a person, which is to have second order volitions (desires that are effective, leading to action). To be a person is to be able to evaluate one's desires and act on one's preferences.

Frankfurt deals primarily with first and second order desires, though he does not believe these are the only levels of desires there are. There can be conflicts of second, and perhaps even third order desires. Frankfurt argues there is no theoretical limit to the series of levels of desires. In practice, though, we should regard the series as ended when a person decisively identifies himself with one of his first order desires (meaning that his second order volition is decisive). In these cases, his "commitment 'resounds' throughout the potentially endless array of higher orders," but any beyond the second order have no explanatory value. To clarify Frankfurt's claims, let us consider an example of his, of a man who wants to be motivated by a desire to concentrate on his work when he is doing something. He wants to want to concentrate, and wants that want to be effective in action. This is a second order desire, while the desire to concentrate would be a first order desire. He may have other competing first order desires, such as a desire to daydream. In this case his second order desire is the desire that his desire to concentrate be effective (i.e., that it be his will). In the case where his second order desire is to have a desire he does not now have, then it is a desire to have a certain
desire (e.g., the first order desire to concentrate). Frankfurt doesn't extend the example to higher orders of desire. When we move much beyond a third order desire in this sense of "order," it seems to me that it becomes psychologically implausible that such higher order desires exist.

There is another sense of "order" that has been used in discussing desires. This is a sense used by John Rawls, DeWitt Parker, and Charles Fried, though none of them spells out the structure of orders of desires very much. I shall call this the system sense. I shall opt for this sense of "order" and later show that it can incorporate the other sense of "order."

This sense also distinguishes levels of desire in terms of objects of desire. However, instead of making the distinction by noting whether the object of the desire is some thing or state of affairs, or a desire, etc., here it is made in terms of the complexity of the object of desire. The distinction is a relative one, because it is impossible to isolate and name separate orders or levels very neatly. However, a first order desire (and the lower limit of orders of desire) will be one whose object is a single or small group of things, states of affairs, etc. Desiring to possess a pen might serve as an example. This desire is one whose object can be attained in one limited series of events. A higher order desire will be one whose object is not a single or small group of things or states of affairs. There are two somewhat different kinds. One kind is exemplified by a desire to write a book. The object of this desire is a complex set of activities that would occur over a relatively long period of time. Another kind is exemplified by a desire for knowledge. Here the object of the desire is a complex set of activities and mental states. It differs from the example of the desire to write a book in that the object of desire is not something which can be fully attained (assuming it is a desire for knowledge in general and not knowledge of some particular topic, such as relativity theory). Thus, the desire is not the sort which can be satisfied completely and the desire for its satisfaction ended. Rather, its end is such that its satisfaction is an ongoing thing. By this I do not mean that it is a desire which must remain forever frustrated, but rather that its satisfaction is not a kind of satisfaction of desire that can be fully attained and become a thing of the past, such as the desire to write a book.

Using this sense of "order" in distinguishing orders of desires, we don't seem to have the precise, neat levels of desire that one has when using "order" in the simpler sense. Rather, we must rely on the intuitive obviousness of the levels of relatively higher and lower level desires. Thus, the following list of related desires moves from a first order desire to higher and higher order desires: a desire to possess a pen, a desire to write a page, a desire to write a book, a desire to be an accomplished author, etc. It will prove to be unnecessary, I believe, to tag distinct levels of desire.

A higher order desire, in order to be satisfied, requires that a certain set of acts be performed, and perhaps that certain things outside of the person's control occur. For example, a desire to write a book would likely involve acts such as thinking about what one will write, spending certain times each day writing, etc. For this reason, it will be useful, following Parker, to call the object of a higher order desire the realization of a plan. Achievement of plans generally requires not only the performance of certain actions, but the occurrence of certain events outside of one's control. For instance, the plan to write a book requires that it be accepted for publication, which would be an
event outside of the control of the agent. Thus, a desire to write a book has as its object a plan. The details of the plan may be sketchy, and may be filled in as time goes on. A desire to possess knowledge has as its object a plan. This desire would then be satisfied by a person's engaging in various knowledge-gaining activities. The complexity of the relationships between various sorts of desires should become clearer when I discuss those relations.

Before going on to consider whether there is in persons a highest order desire, I would like to point out that one of the reasons why it is difficult, when using the system sense, to tag different levels of desire neatly, is that their complexity is essentially a feature of how they structure the desires of an individual. Higher order desires are distinguished from lower order in terms of the role they play in structuring the desires of an individual, and we cannot tell the order of a desire until we see its role in an individual's behavior. For example, let us imagine a man (X) who has his heart set on being married to a particular woman who happens herself to have a higher order desire to be married to an influential politician. Let us further imagine that this desire to be married to the woman is dominant enough to lead X to adopt the desire to be an influential politician in order to get the woman to marry him. Thus, the object of his desire is a plan, a subplan of which is to be an influential politician. Desiring to be married is a relatively higher order desire, subsuming all sorts of lower order desires under it, and desiring to be an influential politician is also a relatively higher order desire. In this particular case, the desire to be married becomes of a higher order than one would normally expect, because of the unusual context and the degree to which this desire is dominant in X's life (its great comprehensiveness).

We can distinguish between higher and lower order desires within an individual and higher and lower order desires in the abstract (not as desires of a particular individual). However, talk of higher and lower order desires in the abstract derives its meaning from what is typically the case in individuals (what desires typically function as higher order desires of individuals). We can say that the desire to write a paper is a desire of higher order than the desire to smoke a cigarette, because typically it is a desire which structures more of a person's desires and activities. We can imagine unusual cases where the desire to smoke a cigarette becomes as high in order as the desire to write a paper. For instance, a smoker who was a World War II concentration camp victim might have had a great deal of his activity structured around his desire to smoke a cigarette (e.g., working extra hard so the guard might reward him with a cigarette, saving bits of food at meals to trade for cigarettes). In an unusual circumstance like this, what is typically a lower order desire may come to have the comprehensiveness and importance of desires of relatively higher order. So when talking of higher order desires, we must remember we are talking primarily of desires which function in a certain way in individuals, and secondarily of desires that can be said to be higher order in the abstract.

We have a lower limit on orders of desire (a first order desire whose object is a single or small group of things, states of affairs, etc.), and the question arises: is there an upper limit to orders of desire in the system sense? We saw that in discussing orders of desire in the simple sense, Frankfurt sets no upper limit, except on pragmatic grounds, arguing that even if there are infinitely many orders of desire, when a desire is decisive, it is one that "resounds" through the whole structure of desire.
Parker is the only one of those who uses the system sense who directs himself to this question. He claims that a person's desire to realize his life plan is a desire of the highest order. He does not, however, argue for this claim. I think the following argument could be given for it. Given the notion of the life plan as the most important and comprehensive aims a person has, the desire to realize it must be the highest order of desire. This is not just a verbal argument. It seems psychologically impossible to go any higher in orders of desire. Since a person lives only one life, it would be impossible for him to have several actual life plans at the same time with a higher life plan over them. It is true that a person may not have a settled life plan—he may not know what sort of life he wants to live, and actually desire incompatible ways of life. But this is not a conflict between several actual life plans he has, but rather a conflict between several life plans he possibly could adopt. In the case of a person living a life according to a life plan with inconsistent elements (e.g., wanting to work devotedly and wanting very great amounts of leisure), we still have just one life plan. Of course, it is possible that a person's life plan may change, but at any given time his life plan will be his highest order desire.

These, then, are two ways of speaking of "higher order" desires and ends that imply different views of criteria for distinguishing them. I shall argue now that the system sense is the sense that most clearly shows the structure of human desire I want to bring out. Its complexity more accurately depicts human experience, and it seems that the ordering spoken of in the simple sense can be incorporated within it.

There is a complexity in the ordering of human desires that the system sense shows which the simpler sense cannot. In the system sense, higher-level desires have as their objects plans, and their objects cannot be attained in one action. In this way they govern desires of lower orders, resulting in various plans and first order desires subsumed under them. This allows us to speak of various higher order desires such as the desire to build a house, to be a philosopher, etc. The relationship between these higher order desires and lower order desires subsumed under them is obviously much more complex than the relation between orders of desires using the simpler sense of "order." The simpler sense doesn't enable us to speak of such desires as higher order desires, since they are not merely desires to desire, etc., but rather desires which are related in various ways to desires subsumed under them. I shall be discussing in more detail the various relations that seem to exist between orders of desire.

At the same time as the system sense enables us to show this complexity which the simpler sense does not, the ordering spoken of in the simpler sense can be incorporated within it. When a person has a higher order desire of the kind thought of in the system sense, it will frequently involve desiring to have or to be motivated by desires. For instance, my desire to be a philosopher may result in my desiring to desire to understand a passage in Aristotle, etc. An example of a higher order desire, in the system sense, causing a third order desire might be this: if I am very concerned to be a good teacher, I may desire to desire to help a student see a certain difficult point clearly. Thus, the system sense is wide enough to incorporate the kinds of orders spoken of in the simpler sense.

The simpler sense used in Frankfurt's discussion provided a rather simple and elegant way of distinguishing levels of desire. However, it does not do justice to the complexity of our desires. This deficiency is perhaps most apparent in Frankfurt's claim that when there is no further conflict of desire we can stop at second order desires, since there is no need to go further (though even in such cases desires of higher order
may implicitly exist). When we consider life plans, however, it is clear that higher order ends exist even where there is no present conflict between lower order desires. Since the sense of "order" Frankfurt uses conceals some of the complexity of orders of desires, and can be incorporated within the system sense, the latter view is the preferable sense to use in discussing the structure of human desire.

A serious objection to this talk of orders of desires is the claim that there is no need to distinguish orders of desires.. All desires are of the same order, it might be claimed, first order. They are feelings that compel me to act or dispositions to do or not to do certain things. Competition between desires is a contest of strength; I act on what happens to be the strongest desire. For example, I may now want to do some work on my dissertation. I may also desire to read a newspaper, or go for a walk. According to this view of desire I am presently discussing, each of these desires is of the same order. In this case I will do whichever of the three actions I have the strongest desire to do, or still another action if I have a stronger competing desire. The only possible kind of rational evaluation of desires in order to determine which desire I shall try to satisfy is merely introspecting to find out which first order desire is strongest.

This view of desires is frequently combined with the view that desires, or the ends men pursue, are givens, not open to rational criticism, and not open to revision by the person except by various persuasive, emotional and propagandistic sorts of forces acting on him. Rationality only enters in in a minimal way, with regard to determining which of my desires is, as a matter of fact, the strongest, and the assessment of means devised to pursue ends; the ends themselves are assumed to be beyond the pale of rationality.

This point, about the ends of desires not being open to rational reflection, is not itself defeating to the claim that there are orders of desires. However, if it can be established that desires are open to revision in the light of rational consideration of them, this enhances the plausibility of the view that there are orders of desires. Such a view can more easily account for the possibility of rational assessment of ends. I shall first argue for this. Afterwards I shall argue that even if no such rational evaluation of desires occurs, we have experiences of higher order desires, and the existence of orders of desires provides us with a much better explanation of conflicts of desires than does the view that there are no orders of desires. At the outset let me indicate that intensity of desire may very well be a significant factor in what one does, and it does seem to be true that very often we do just act on the strongest desire we have at the time. However, it is a very misleading picture of what we do to claim that we are confronted with all sorts of desires that are of the same order and, once we are aware of which has the greatest intensity, we act on that desire. First of all, there is a deliberating process of the individual that sometimes occurs such as in cases of conflicts of desires that is left out here: we may decide to do that desire among our first order desires which fits in with the most important of our higher order desires. As we are determining this, this desire which is chosen may not be the strongest of our conscious desires. Once chosen, however, its intensity may increase, so that it may turn out that we act on the strongest of our desires. But its strength is not given; rather, it is a by-product of its having been chosen as the desire we want to act on. Second, even in cases where we simply act on the strongest desire we happen to have, we might ask how the desire happens to have the strength it does. It seems to me that a plausible answer is that it has this strength because of the way it fits in with major aims, elements in our life plan.
Richard Brandt has argued that ends can be evaluated by asking whether the desire in question is one which would be kept by a rational person who is vividly aware of the properties of such a desire. For instance, if a rational person finds that the origin of the desire is "unauthentic," that is, acquired through some means other than actual experience of the thing in question (e.g., an aversion to certain kinds of jobs because one has been taught that they are "undignified"), or that he has mistakenly believed that something has the same features as something else he liked and come to desire it, he will most likely want to rid himself of these desires. Other reasons which may cause the person to want to rid himself of a desire are discovering that the object of desire is logically or causally impossible, or that the desire resulted from a false belief, or is overly intense because of early deprivation.

If such rational criticism and revision of desires is possible, and it seems likely that any person who becomes aware of such details about the origin or object of his desires will want to rid himself of such desires, then the view that desires are just givens, and not open to rational evaluation, is mistaken. If such rational evaluation of desires occurs, then one plausible explanation of the possibility of it is the existence of orders of desire. If desires are all of the same order, then the only kind of conflict possible among them is one of intensity, with the strongest felt desire winning out. On the view that there are orders of desires, this rational evaluation of desire seems much easier to explain. If, for instance, a person discovers that his desire to own a sportscar is based on the belief that it will make him more appealing to women, he may have a higher order desire or plan which is incompatible with it and which causes him to want to rid himself of the desire.

Another aspect of this that can be noted is a point made by David Braybrooke. Unless second order (and here I believe "second order" is used in the generic sense, meaning "higher order" in general) preferences for ways of life operate, by which we judge the worthwhileness of first order desires, he claims that people run the risk of many of their first order desires which are not really needs becoming needs, thereby precluding the development of plans pursuing ideals that the person would otherwise have. Thus, Braybrooke is claiming that plans and life plans are necessary to avoid the proliferation of needs. Such plans, or higher order desires, are necessary for assessment of first order desires.

Thus, if this kind of rational assessment of desires and rejection and adoption of desires occurs, there being orders of desires serves well to explain the possibility of it. This, then, can provide us with one argument for distinguishing orders of desire, contingent on the possibility of rational reflection about desires. But there are arguments for orders of desire which are independent of this sort of claim, and I shall move on to those now.

First, orders of desire can be argued for by appealing to experience. We often experience second order desires of the following sort. A smoker, because of a higher order desire to maintain good health, may desire to desire not to smoke; a person on a diet, because of a higher order desire to maintain his health or appearance, may desire to desire not to eat, even at the same time as he desires to eat. The view that there aren't different orders of desire does not do justice to the effect of higher order desires,
nor does it do justice to the object of the second order desire—that it is a desire, and not a thing or a state of affairs other than a desire.

If we focus now on other sorts of desires of higher order (those emphasized by the system sense of "order") we can note that we do have experiences of such desires, desires which have more complex objects than lower order desires, and whose achievement may involve performing a rather large set of actions. Some examples would be my desire to write this paragraph, a desire to build a house, and a desire to be a philosopher. We do experience such desires, and these desires result in desires of lower order (in ways to be explained shortly). For instance, someone's desire to build a house may bring about a desire to examine various plans of houses, and someone's desire to be a philosopher may bring about or be partly constituted by (a relation to be discussed shortly) a desire to read a particular philosophical book. The view that there are no orders of desires would not be able to make much sense of these relationships.

The first argument I gave for the existence of orders of desires was based on our experience of them. A second argument for it is that it provides us with a much better explanation of conflicts of desire than the opposing view, the view that different orders of desire do not exist. This view would claim that conflicts of desires are conflicts of desires which are all of the same order (first order) and the strongest desire wins out in the conflict. According to the kind of view I am considering, desires are typically thought of as something like urges or impulses we have with given strengths. A conflict of desires is a simple tug of war between two urges or impulses. Now I shall show how the view that there are orders of desire gives a better explanation of this.

Let us consider the example of my competing first order desires to work on my dissertation, to read a newspaper, and to take a walk. According to the view I am arguing for, the determination of which of these desires I will act on is sometimes made not just on the basis of the strength of various competing desires, but typically will involve higher order desires. So, if I desire to be a good philosopher as part of my life plan, and if my desire to work on my dissertation is subsumed under that, then my desire to work on my dissertation may win out (if I am not weak-willed) because of its importance in being part of a sub-plan subsumed under my life plan. Initially the other competing desires may be experienced as stronger desires, and the desire to work on my dissertation may become stronger in the deliberation involved because of its relationship to my higher order desire.

When there is a conflict of desire (at any level), I can try to resolve the conflict by reference to my higher order desires. A conflict of desires then becomes not just a situation where I am pulled in various directions and my strongest desire wins out, but rather a situation where I find I have competing desires, and the plans (higher order ends) I have (ultimately my life plan) can be used to try to resolve this conflict. It seems to me that this is a much more plausible view of most conflicts of desire, and how such conflicts are resolved, than the view I sketched at the beginning of this section, which is fairly widely held. Again let me repeat the point that it may well be true that we act on the strongest desire we have. However, the strength of desires is not always simply given in our experience. We do not on every occasion just introspect and see which desire we happen to have that is the strongest. Desires are very complex and there are orders of desires related in various ways. The strength of a first order desire can be affected by higher order desires we have. They may antecedently be strong because of their role in the life plan; in deliberation in cases of conflict, they may be chosen to act on because of this role even if they initially were weaker than some other desire.
Conflicts of desire may be very complex and difficult to settle, particularly because various plans we have may be unspecified to such an extent that it is difficult to see which of several desires can be subsumed under the plan. Nevertheless, the orders of desire view gives a more plausible picture of conflicts of desires. When a person has such conflicts, he finds that some desires are more important than others, because they fit into a plan or higher order desire we have, and not because they are stronger desires.

Thus, there are orders of desire. The existence of orders of desires can be argued for on the basis of experience and on the basis of offering a better explanation of the nature of conflicts of desires than the view that such orders do not exist. Now I shall go on to indicate some of the relationships there are between desires and ends. This will help to make clear what the role of the life plan is in our desires.

Relations Between Desires and Ends

In developing the notion of happiness as the realizing of a life plan, I have stressed the complexity of human desires. This complexity is especially apparent in the various kinds of relations in which desires, and correlativeiy, ends, can stand with respect to each other. I shall separate my discussions of the relations between desires of lower orders and higher orders up to desires for such ends as occupational goals, and the relations between these higher order ends and the life plan, because it may turn out that there are important differences between these. I shall first consider relations that obtain between desires of orders up to higher orders such as occupational goals. Some of these relations are between desires of the same order, but most are between desires of different orders. The relations I shall discuss are: (1) time plans, (2) means-ends, (3) constituting desires or ends, (4) generic and specified desires or ends, and (5) causal relations of desire generation.

A "time plan" is a plan to delay the satisfaction of one desire in order that another desire might be satisfied. If a person desires to do both A and B, but he cannot do both at the same time, it would be rational for him to try to schedule his doing A and his doing B at different times, so they can both be done. These two desires then would stand in the relation of both being part of a schedule. I considered earlier J. D. Mabbott's study of the formulation of time plans as a rational activity often overlooked in considerations of the role of reason in behavior.

Time plans can be formulated for desires of the same order, or sometimes, it seems, for desires of different orders. I may have two relatively lower order desires, such as to go for a walk and read a newspaper, and formulate a time plan so as to enable me to satisfy both desires. I may have two higher order desires which are such that acts subsumed under them sometimes cannot be performed at the same time, such as the desire to be a good philosopher, and the desire to be a good husband. In such a case one may have a time plan to insure that acts of both kinds can be performed. Indeed, a great deal of the activity involved in developing life plans seems to be involved with scheduling ends in this way. Finally, there seem to be cases where desires of different orders can be parts of a time plan. Thus, a relatively higher order desire, such as to write a philosophy paper, may compete at a certain time with a lower order desire, such as to play a game of chess, and a time plan may be useful in enabling one to satisfy both desires.
Another relation between desires is the means-ends relation. The means-end relation has tended to dominate thinking about relations between desires. In particular, the constituting relation and generic-specified desire relation, both of which I shall be discussing shortly, have often been left undistinguished from the means-ends relation. I shall explain this relation by considering some examples, a simple one first.

Suppose I desire to eat an apple. In addition, I know there is one in the refrigerator. This knowledge, plus my desire to eat the apple, will very likely lead to a derivative desire to go to the refrigerator to get it. I desire to go to the refrigerator as a means to satisfying my desire to eat the apple. Given the way I have distinguished between orders of desires in terms of the complexity of the objects of desire, it would seem that these two desires related in a means-ends relation are not of different orders.

Let us move on to another example. This will be an example of a higher order end resulting in a lower order end as a means to achieve that end. Suppose I, when I enter college, desire to be a good philosopher. Believing that majoring in philosophy will be a means, albeit a partial means, I may come to have as a derivative end that of majoring in philosophy. There seem to be many cases like this, of higher order ends bringing about lower order ends perceived as a means to achieving the higher order end. If the structure of desires I as arguing for does exist, then it seems to be tautologically true that no lower order ends generate a higher order end as a means to achieving the lower order end. Generating desires is one of the characteristics of a desire which is a higher order desire, structuring the lower order desires of the individual.

As a third case let us consider an example that Parker offers. He offers it as an example of a higher order desire which cannot be assuaged by satisfying particular desires that fall under it. He says:

Your love of your young daughter is not assuaged by giving her a new doll on her birthday or on Christmas, by providing her an education or trousseau, a layette for her infant, or by any other act expressive of your love. True it is, of course, that each of these acts will cause you pleasure. But your desire does not terminate in any one of them. A whole series of acts extending through the years is necessary in order to assuage the desire.

I am not sure whether love here should be analyzed in terms of a higher order end or in terms of a state of the individual in which he has a disposition to have certain desires such as to seek the welfare of the loved one, etc. For simplicity, I will operate with the latter approach, and discuss Parker's example in terms of a desire to seek the welfare of his daughter. Each of the lower order ends listed in the example (giving her the gift, providing for her education, etc.) may be desired as partial means of satisfying the higher order desire to bring about the welfare of his daughter. None of these lower order desires is envisioned as completely satisfying the higher order desire once it is satisfied, but each is desired as a means of improving her welfare.

An interesting feature of this third example is that it is a case which overlaps the means-ends relation, and the constituting relation. In some cases, it may seem more plausible to consider a case like this one in which the lower order desires constitute the higher order desire. If, for instance, the man really has no conscious desire for improving the welfare of his daughter (as implausible as it might seem), but just desires to give her
gifts, provide for her education, etc., then this might be more plausibly construed as a case of the lower order desires constituting the higher order desire. Now I shall turn to the relation of certain desires constituting other desires.

The third kind of relation is that of certain desires constituting other desires. This relation holds only between ends of different orders. As I mentioned above, this relation sometimes overlaps with the means-ends relation. Let us return to an example I discussed earlier. When we consider the higher order end of being a philosopher and ends such as that of writing a philosophy dissertation, understanding Aristotle, and helping a student understand a difficult philosophical point, it seems plausible to consider the various lower order ends as constituting the higher order end. One might argue that the higher order desire might just be a fiction, if it is not actually desired consciously by the person. In this case, he has separate desires to write a philosophy dissertation, understand Aristotle, etc., but no felt desire to be a philosopher. And if there is no desire for the end, one might wonder whether it really is an end.

There are a number of things that might be said to support the claim that an end that is constituted by a number of lower order ends is really a desired end. I shall indicate first two brief arguments, and then go on to discuss some recent claims about the concept of desire that are of help here. First, one might argue that in the kind of case we are envisioning, if he were asked, the individual would avow having the end constituted by the other ends. His sincerely avowing desiring the end would seem to be sufficient evidence for his having the desire for the end even though, prior to avowing it, he had no felt desire. Second, one could argue that since the higher order end is not a mere artificial grouping or collection of the relatively lower order ends, one has a desire for it by virtue of desiring those ends that constitute it. Here it will be of value to note some important features of recent discussions of desire.

A widely held pre-reflective theory of desire holds that desires are states of consciousness, or conscious experiences of which we are immediately aware. This view, generally called the phenomenological view, has some serious difficulties. First of all, we must distinguish between "occurrent" and "standing" desires or wants. Occurrent desires are desires of which we are conscious. Standing wants or desires, however, are wants we can have without being conscious of them at the moment. A person may desire a trip to Europe without consciously desiring it at the moment. It is a desire which he has a disposition to experience, but does not now experience as a felt, occurrent desire.

Another difficulty that the phenomenological view of desire faces is the possible existence of unconscious desires and unrecognized desires. Unconscious desires are desires which a person is claimed to have on the basis of behavioral evidence according to some psychoanalytic theory, but which he has repressed and would deny having. What we might call an unrecognized desire is one which the person is not aware of having, but which hasn't been repressed, and which he might avow, if asked. The existence of these is less controversial than the existence of unconscious desires. It is sometimes claimed that other people are often better judges of some of our long-term desires than we are. For instance, a person might have a desire for prestige that he doesn't realize or misidentifies, but which those familiar with him can note. If such desires exist, then they provide strong counterexamples to the phenomenological view.

In place of the phenomenological view, a number of people have argued for a hypothetical...
According to this sort of view, the meaning of "desire" is best worked out in terms of the role it plays in our explanations of behavior. It figures in law-like statements that relate desires to certain psychological states (such as being pleased, daydreaming, etc.) and to behavior (feeling an impulse to act). On this view of desire it becomes easier to claim that the end that is constituted by a number of lower order ends is itself desired. The higher order end can fit into some of the conditions which constitute the set of statements that explicate the meaning of "wanting" or "desiring" on such a view. For instance, two of the conditions that Brandt and Kim include are:

If X wants P, then, under favorable conditions, if X judges that doing A will probably lead to P and that not doing A will probably lead to not-P, X will feel some impulse to do A.

If X wants P, then under favorable conditions, if P occurs, without the simultaneous occurrence of events X doesn't want, X will be pleased.

If we can interpret the "lead to P" in the first condition as including cases where A in part constitutes P, we can easily fit higher order desires constituted by lower order desires into such a condition. So, if X wants to be a good philosopher, he will feel some impulse to engage in those activities which he believes constitute being a philosopher, and if he wants to bring about the well being of his daughter, he will feel some impulse to engage in those activities which constitute bringing about the welfare of his child. Since on this view we are not committed to viewing desires as felt, conscious impulses, it can plausibly be claimed that an individual has a desire for the end constituted by the lower order ends.

Finally, it might be noted that frequently in explaining action, people seem to appeal to higher order desires. For example, in reply to a question about why one is writing, a response might be "Because I want to finish a philosophical paper." "Why?" "Because I want to be a good philosopher."

A fourth relation between desires, the generic-specified relation, is another which is sometimes confused with the means-ends relation. This relation holds between many of our desires and is a relation between desires of the same order. Desires are often generic, and as one gains knowledge of the features of the kind of thing or activity desired, those available, etc., one's desire becomes more specified. An example of this would be someone's having a desire for a car (though no particular car) and then later coming to desire a particular car. The first desire is a generic desire, while the desire for a particular car is a specified one. We might call this more specified desire a "derivative desire." The specification of this generic desire may occur over a relatively long period of time.

To serve as an example of some higher order desires being related in a generic-specified way, we might consider the case of a person having the generic desire to be a good philosopher, and then coming to have the more specified derivative desire to be a good metaphysician. I am considering this as a case of one's desire to be a good philosopher becoming more sharpened, specified into the desire to be a good metaphysician, and not a case where one's desire to be a good philosopher is in part constituted by a desire to be a good metaphysician.
There is difficulty in this relation in terms of whether the generic and specified desires are properly regarded as the same or as different desires. I have implicitly treated them as different desires, referring to the more specified desire as a derivative desire. The inclination to treat them as being the same desire stems from the fact that they certainly are more closely related than two different desires such as a desire to take a walk and one to read a newspaper. If, on the other hand, I desire to take a walk and then, on leaving the door, decide to walk to the river, it seems a bit strange to consider the latter desire as a completely different desire. Nevertheless, when a desire has become more specified, it seems that what will satisfy it is different from what will satisfy the more generic desire. If I have a relatively generic desire for a car, then it seems that if I should suddenly come into the possession of any sort of car, my desire will be satisfied. If I desire a Ford, or a particular Ford, then not just any car will do. Overall, it seems best to regard a generic and related specified desire as being different desires, keeping in mind that their relation is a very close one, in which their objects cannot be said to be totally distinct.

Next I want to examine causal relations that may hold between desires. This is the fifth and last kind of relation I will examine. There are a number of ways in which higher or lower order desires can be causally generated. First, let us consider ways in which higher order desires can generate lower order desires. I have already discussed one way, in terms of the means-ends relation. If one desires the welfare of his daughter and sees providing for her education as being one means of aiding her welfare, one may come to desire that relatively lower order end as a result. A second kind of example of higher order desires generating lower order desires which is not a means-ends relation is a desire to be a good philosopher generating, at some future time, a lower order desire to write a paper. A third manner in which higher order desires can serve to causally generate lower order desires is in conflicts of desires. In cases of conflicts of desires, a higher order desire can cause a lower order desire subsumed under it to be our will, rather than one of the other lower order desires we have that conflict with it.

It seems also that lower order desires can generate higher order desires. A person, in observing his own interest in visual things may develop a higher order end of being an artist. This higher order end comes to systematize his lower order desires that generated it. This process of higher order desire generation to occur rather often in the development of life plans. In this way a person seems to "fall into" his life plan, by following where his lower order desires lead him.

I believe that this group of relations between desires (from lower order desires to higher order desires short of the life plan) that I have distinguished and discussed includes all the important relations that exist between such desires. Again, I must stress the complexity of the relations between desires. In many cases these relations will overlap, so that some desires may be related, for instance, both in a means-ends and a constituting way. Now I shall go on to consider life plans as ends, and particularly what sorts of relations may exist between relatively higher order ends, such as occupational goals, goals concerning the kind of life one wants to live, the sort of person one wants to be, etc.—the major goals of the person—and the life plan. Later I will go on to argue for the claim what everyone has a life plan.
Higher Order Ends and Life Plans

I have separated my discussion of the relation between higher order ends and the life plan (the highest order end) because of the possibility that there is a significant difference in the relations between them and the relations between lower order ends and higher order goals. In particular, it is possible that the only relation that holds between higher order desires of the sort I have been discussing and life plans is the constituting relation (one's life plan is constituted by one's major higher order goals). If this is the case, it is possible that there may be no distinct desire for the realization of the life plan.

This type of view is plausible when one considers some of the talk about the life plan as an inclusive end. In discussing the notion of an inclusive end, people like Hardie, who was the first to use the inclusive-dominant distinction, and Rawls and Kenny have been concerned to emphasize that happiness is not a dominant end, but rather an inclusive end. The inclusive, or "secondary" end is, according to Hardie, the "full and harmonious achievement of primary ends." This is about all that is said about the nature of an inclusive end. I might note that there is, in Hardie's account, which seems to be followed by Kenny and Rawls, talk of only two levels in the stratification of ends and desires, though that may be for convenience, concealing a more complex stratification.

Given what is indicated about the nature of the inclusive end, it is possible to interpret it as a kind of fiction, a construction of lower order ends, a collection of the important higher order ends a person has, having no existence of its own, apart from being constituted by these various ends. If this is the nature of an inclusive end, then it is plausible to claim there is no desire for this inclusive end, apart from the higher order desires which have been collected together in this inclusive end. If this is correct, then the inclusive end seems to be something manufactured by theory. Talk about ends can usually be correlated with talk about corresponding desires. If, in the case of an inclusive end such as a life plan, we cannot talk about a corresponding desire, it seems that we might be using "end" in an extended sense. This would then tend to weaken my analysis of happiness in terms of the realizing of a life plan, since the notion of a life plan would not be true-to-life.

Further support for this potentially damaging position exists in the claim that the life plan view is not realistic because it supposes there is a greater degree of planning of human lives than there really is. Rather few people, it might be claimed, plan their lives. So if we speak of a life plan as an inclusive end for such people, it seems that it must be a manufactured end, merely a collection of their various higher order ends. I believe this objection can be answered, but before doing so, I shall indicate various arguments that can be given for the claim that there is an independent desire for the realization of the life plan.

Parker has some arguments for the independence of the desire to realize the life plan from the desire to achieve the satisfaction of desires of lower order than that desire. Parker discusses his view of the life plan in terms of a certain view of the self. He claims that there are two selves: the focal self, and the matrix self. The focal self is the self of continuing experience, "always centered in some desire or appetite, some activity or passivity seeking assuagement." The matrix self is the life plan, with a conceptual component, a map of us and the world around us, and a volitional component,
which has to do with our interests and acts we want to perform. This matrix self, or life plan, is the basis of personal identity. Here we see a certain similarity to Frankfurt's claim that personal identity is based on second order desires, though Parker's view is a good deal more complex than Frankfurt's. Parker's first argument for the independence of the desire to realize the life plan is that this highest order desire and its relation to desires subsumed under it is analogous to the relation between other higher order desires and lower order desires. The example he gives is that of desiring to win a game of tennis. The higher order desire to win is independent of desires to make good strokes, etc. And the desire to win the game affects the development of desires as the game progresses, just as the life plan affects the development of various desires. The argument thus seems to be that there is a recognizable independent desire for the realization of the life plan, just as there is for winning the tennis game. Since the existence of such a desire is what is under examination, this argument seems to beg the question. Perhaps what Parker is driving at is this: in some higher order desires such as desiring to win a game of tennis we can see that this higher order desire exists, as well as lower order desires subsumed under it, such as to hit the ball when it comes to your side of the net, give good serves, etc. Likewise, the relation between the life plan and higher order desires subsumed under it is parallel to the structure of the various desires subsumed under the desire to win the tennis game. Therefore, it is plausible to believe that there is also a separate desire to realize the life plan. If this is what he means, it does show that there is some plausibility in claiming there is such a desire. However, this is not sufficient for proving that there is, given the fact that the life plan is an end of higher order than the end of winning the tennis game, and perhaps there just is no separate desire to achieve this end. Clearly we need more of an argument.

Parker has another argument, though. This argument is that there is a specific satisfaction that results from the realization of the life plan, and that this satisfaction cannot be related to any desire of an order lower than the life plan, which is the highest order of desire. If this is correct, then it shows that there is an independent satisfaction attached to the realization of the life plan. The satisfaction of various desires of lower order than a desire to realize the life plan can contribute to happiness, but they do not constitute it. It might be objected that while this shows there is such a satisfaction, it still leaves open the question of whether there is a corresponding desire. Perhaps this satisfaction is like a surprise pleasure or satisfaction, for which there was no desire, somewhat like the satisfaction one has upon smelling a pleasant odor that suddenly wafts by one's nose, or experiencing unexpected good fortune.

Parker's answer to this would be that since there is a satisfaction or pleasure, there must be a desire of which it is the satisfaction. In discussing surprise pleasures he speculates that there might be certain "desires of the organism of which we are not aware" which account for these satisfactions. There would be no pleasure or satisfaction if there were no desire. This account would bother those who believe desires are conscious experiences, and that it is conceptually impossible for us to have desires of which we are unaware. In addition, it would upset those concerned with simplicity in a theory of desire, since it postulates that there are all sorts of desires which we are unaware of whose satisfaction is responsible for surprise pleasures. These arguments can be revised and expanded in a way to make them more satisfactory, avoiding the criticisms I mentioned above. The points I will be arguing for, when taken together, make a case for the relative independence of a desire for the realizing of the life plan. First of all, we must expand the notion of desire, as we did earlier when
considering whether there is a separate desire for a higher order end constituted by lower order ends. The claim of the phenomenological view, that desires are conscious experiences that we are never unaware of, seems to be too narrow. There are standing desires which a person has which may not be felt at any given moment. Leaving open the question whether all people desire the realizing of a life plan, we might note that those who clearly do desire this generally have this desire as a standing desire. In addition to this, a hypothetical construct view of desire would allow us to attribute desires to ourselves and others when there is no felt desire. This can be done in terms of tendencies to act, feelings of joy, disappointment, etc. This may help us with claiming that there is a desire for the realizing of a life plan. For instance, to take just one typical feature of such an analysis, it seems plausible to claim that if a person would be disappointed were he to fail to realize his life plan (realize in a fairly harmonious way the higher order ends he has), then he desires the realizing of the life plan. So once we move away from a phenomenological analysis of desire, it becomes more plausible to claim that there is a desire for the realizing of the life plan. I think we can go further than this, too, in arguing for such a distinct desire.

In addition to expanding the notion of desire, we should look more closely at the set of higher order desires which is said to constitute the life plan. The life plan is constituted by the important goals or desires of a person, such as occupational goals, desires concerning the sort of person one wants to be, desires concerning marriage and family, perhaps important avocational goals, etc., those goals which satisfy the criteria of permanence, comprehensiveness and importance. Each of these higher order ends is desired, and, according to discussions of happiness as an inclusive end, happiness as an end is made up of these individually desired goals. We must note a feature of this which is easy to overlook. We can use as a clue a characterization of happiness as an inclusive end Hardie gives. He says: "the desire for happiness . . . is the desire for the orderly and harmonious gratification of desires." Happiness as an inclusive end is the set of these major higher order goals. But it seems that individuals desire the orderly and harmonious satisfaction of these desires. Thus, from the point of view of the life plan, it is somewhat misleading to state just that the person desires the satisfaction of each of his individual major goals. To be sure, he does desire that. However, qua element of the life plan, what he desires is the satisfaction of each of his individual major higher order desires, along with the satisfaction of at least most of the others. As elements in the life plan, in a sense each of one's major higher order desires becomes partially informed by the other major desires (except, of course, in cases where there is but one major higher order desire, a dominant end). So there seems to be a desire for realizing the life plan which is relatively distinct from the separate major desires. This is evidenced by the way in which the major higher order desires mutually influence each other. So the life plan is not just a collection of these major desires, but a collection unified and organized into a set because they are important goals of one individual.

This phenomenon concerning the elements of the life plan can be seen as an instance of a psychoanalytic principle called the "principle of multiple function." This principle was introduced by Robert Waelder. Waelder notes that the ego must find solutions to a variety of problems that arise from various sources, such as the id, the outside world, and the superego. (He believes there are eight types of problems.) The solutions that are attempted are never just solutions to one particular problem, but also represent attempted solutions to the other seven problems, though these solutions are always more successful in solving one sort of problem and are never complete solutions to all of them. This is not accidental, but due to the psychic structure of man.
Since the organism always reacts in its entirety and since all these problems are constantly living within it, each attempted solution of a problem must be conjointly determined, modified, and arranged through the existence and working of the other until it can serve, even if imperfectly, as an attempted solution for all these problems and thus necessarily preserve its multiple meaning.\textsuperscript{37}

The principle of multiple function is manifested not only by the person in his dealings with his own impulses, the demands of the outside world, and the superego. It is also manifested in social psychology, Waelder claims, so that something like a historical movement has a multiple function, with various elements such as an economic element, dealing with the outer world, but at the same time making allowance for gratification of instincts and collective ideals.\textsuperscript{38}

Just as it would be a mistake to deal with one aspect of personality as if it were isolated and had no effect on other aspects of personality, so too, I believe, it would be a mistake to think of a person's major goals, elements of his life plan, as separate things. As an element of the life plan, the attainment of a goal is desired, together with attainment, to some degree, of other goals. For this reason, it is plausible to say that there is a desire for the realizing of the life plan, even if it is not experienced as a felt, conscious desire. The hypothetical construct view of desire enables us to talk of such unfelt, perhaps unrecognized desires.

If the realizing of elements of the life plan each serve a multiple function, then there are two phenomena which might be noted which further indicate the relative distinctness of the desire for realizing the life plan. The first is that realizing one element of the life plan will not itself mean that an individual's life plan is being realized, and that he is happy (a connection I shall be arguing for shortly), unless it is a dominant end. This is the sort of thing that seems to be meant by claims that someone has achieved occupational success at the cost of "personal happiness"—such a person has achieved one major goal but has been forced to sacrifice some others, such as an enjoyable family life. The realizing of an element of the life plan contributes to happiness but doesn't insure it.

The other phenomenon is the readjustment that can occur in life plans. A change in a person's life plan can occur when he discovers that his life plan contains elements which are impossible to realize or inconsistent. Such a discovery can occur without a person's being fully aware of something like a life plan. All that is necessary is that he realize that some higher order ends he has are unrealizable or inconsistent. Continuing the example used above, someone may discover that his occupational goal is inconsistent with his goals concerning a family and readjust one or the other element of the life plan. If the life plan weren't functioning as a higher order end organizing the various important goals the person has, it is difficult to see how such changes could occur—where elements in the life plan are adjusted for the sake of realizing as much of the set of major desires as possible.

It might be objected that only certain people have a desire to realize their life plans—those who actually are prudent enough to plan for the satisfaction of their major higher order desires. Part of the motivation for this objection might be the belief that "plan" implies a careful, exact blueprint. But if, as I argued earlier, we allow for plans to be rather vague and note that this use of "plan" emphasizes a set of goals chosen in some
sense, rather than a design for achieving these goals, this motivation should be weakened. The main thrust of the objection still remains, though. A possible response is that, given the fact that people have major higher order desires and know that they have them, some sort of plan is inevitable. The plan may be so vague and fuzzy that we are tempted to say that it is no plan at all. However, a vague and fuzzy plan is a plan, even if it may be a bad and unrealizable one. Even a person who chooses to live rather spontaneously has chosen this as a plan to carry out. The question then shifts from whether or not one has a life plan to whether or not one has a good life plan.

In questioning whether there is a distinct desire for realizing the life plan, the constituting relation is kept in mind—the life plan is seen as being constituted by the major higher order desires a person has. If it can be shown that there may be other relations that hold between the life plan and major higher order desires, that may tend to reinforce my claim that there is a desire for the realization of the life plan. There seem to be some causal relations between the life plan and major higher order desires. First of all, the life plan, as a higher order end, can generate new major desires, such as in the case where a person undergoes a significant change in his life, such as changing occupation, getting married, etc., or lead to the elimination of a major desire, if, for instance, it is seen to be inconsistent with a number of other major desires. Second, the life plan is causally involved with major higher order desires in terms of choosing between them to determine which shall be effective in motivating a person. This often occurs by means of the development of time plans to try to insure the satisfaction of various higher order desires. Noting that the life plan can stand in these relations to major higher order desires serves to show, I believe, that the life plan stands in the same sort of relation to major higher order desires as they do to lower order desires subsumed under them. They are higher order desires which organize the desires of orders lower than their order.

These various points I have made together indicate that though the life plan is very closely related to the major higher order ends subsumed under it, it is in a sense distinct from them, and the desire for the realization of it is a desire different from the desires for the individual elements of the life plan. It was necessary to show this because of the lack of clarity concerning the notion of an inclusive end. Since there seems to be a temptation to regard an "inclusive" end as a mere collection of ends, the notion must be used with caution, noting the qualifications I made concerning the life plan as an inclusive end. This completes my discussion of orders of desires and ends. Now I would like to go on to indicate some examples that lend support to my claim about life plans, and then compare my own view with some similar claims made by Sartre and William McDougall.

**Life Plans**

In the previous section I argued for the existence of orders of ends, the highest of which is the life plan. I would like to now consider some examples which support this claim and which indicate that there is a close relation between the realizing of a life plan and happiness. Then I shall argue that this relation is one of identity.

A consideration of some of the things people say about their lives will lend further support to my claim about life plans and happiness as the realizing of a life plan. I
shall consider some claims made about religious lives, a claim about the role of ideal patterns in evaluating lives, John Stuart Mill, and some phenomena which point to the existence of life plans in cases where the person may not have engaged in much reflection about his life and his goals.

There are a number of people who argue that religion can play an important role in happiness. Quite typically religious persons claim that they are happy as a result of orienting their lives according to a plan that God has for them. God has a plan for the universe, it is often claimed, and an individual can and should live his life in such a way as to make it coincide with this plan for the universe. One's life is subordinated to the will of God, and God supplies the plan for this person's life. Such a life seems to have an unusually high degree of unity, since it has a dominant end (living one's life according to the will of God). Here happiness is seen as the realizing of a life plan, in this case a plan that the individual believes is supplied by God. The importance of the notion of realizing a life plan in this sort of view can be seen by noting two features of such a life that seem to be particularly valuable to believers. The first feature is that the believer is guaranteed that somehow God's plan for his life will be made clear to him by virtue of his being a believer. The second feature is that, regardless of what fate brings, God's plan for the person will be realized in his life. In other words, it is a plan which not only is somehow made known to the believer, but also which cannot break down.

There are some difficulties with such a view. There are questions about the justification of the theological claims upon which it rests, how one determines what God's plan is for him, and the denial of autonomy involved. However, this is a common view, and one which provides us with an example of the existence of a life plan the realizing of which is believed to constitute happiness.

R. W. Hepburn in "Vision and Choice in Morality" argues that moral philosophy has been too dominated by the model of obedience to rules and that another possibly fruitful model of morality involves seeing "moral endeavor as the realizing of a pattern of life or the following out of a pilgrimage." I shall not discuss his claim about this as a plausible model of morality. Rather, I want to consider his claim about the existence of ideal patterns of life that individuals seek to realize.

Hepburn discusses the autobiography of Edwin Muir, the poet and critic, as an example. In his autobiography Muir distinguishes the "story" of his life, which is just the narration of events in his life, from the "fable" of his life, which consists of personal symbols which give a unity to his life and around which his life is oriented, and which consists of memories, important aspirations, and discoveries. This is very much the sort of thing I have been discussing as the life plan, except that this would be a somewhat unusual example in terms of the care and thoroughness with which Muir worked it out. Muir saw the "fable" of his life as providing a way of evaluating his life. Consisting of his important beliefs about himself, significant things about his life, and his goals, it provided him with a standard by which he could ascertain whether he was realizing the pattern he desired in his life.

As a third example I shall consider John Stuart Mill. When Mill in his Autobiography describes his mental crisis at the age of 20, he describes it in terms of the loss of interest in an important higher order goal he had. He describes this goal as follows:
I had what might truly be called an object in life; to be a re-former of the world. My conception of my own happiness was entirely identified with this object . . . and I was accustomed to felicitate myself on the certainty of a happy life which I enjoyed, through placing my happiness in something durable and distant, in which some progress might always be making, while it could never be exhausted by complete attainment.  

Thus, Mill indicates he had a life plan which centered on the higher order end of social reform and this was an end chosen with some care, since he felt it was an end that he could fairly easily be in the process of realizing, and yet because it couldn't be completely attained, he didn't run the risk of attaining it and then no longer have an end to seek. 

Mill's mental crisis focused on his decision during a period of depression that the realization of the objects subsumed under this end wouldn't be a "great joy and happiness" to him.  

Mill found himself no longer desiring the goal that was so important to him; it seemed to cease being a goal for him. 

Thus, these examples seem to confirm my claim about the existence of life plans and a connection between the realizing of life plans and happiness, at least for some people. An important question here is whether this is true of all people, or just those people who happen to engage in much thinking about their lives. Are there not many people, it might be argued, who have no life plan? This would make my theory of happiness a rather elitist, restricted view: only those unusual individuals who have engaged in serious examinations of their lives could be happy. There are several arguments I would like to present for the claim that all persons can be seen to have life plans. 

The first argument I would give is one which opens up the possibility, of people having life plans even if they haven't thought much about their life and goals. We must avoid a too-narrow view of the life plan. As I indicated earlier, this use of "plan" is one which emphasizes goals or aims. In addition, a sketchy or vague plan is still a plan. If this is the case then it is possible that people with not very carefully thought about lives can have a life plan. 

A second argument that can be given is that people who haven't reflected much about their lives still have important goals that could be picked out, goals which give a pattern to their lives. Their goals may be foolish ones, or unrealizable, or inconsistent, making the realizing of such a life plan impossible; my view does not involve claiming that the goals people have are good or rational. Typically we find people avowing goals such as: success in a career, satisfactory personal relationships, the well-being of persons close to an individual, good health, acquisition of material goods, the improvement of society, etc. A person may be short-sighted in seeking the realization of goals and find that in seeking one of these he jeopardizes another, and in this way be made more clearly aware of his having a set of goals that are interrelated in complex ways. Of course some people's life plans center on spontaneity and openness. If someone should claim that he has no life plan, that would seem to be a way of stressing the fact that he is living spontaneously, not fixing any long-range goals. It wouldn't be a denial of a life plan of the sort I am arguing for. 

A third way of arguing for the existence of life plans even in cases where persons have not reflected much about their lives or their goals is to note that frequently we become
aware of the goals people have that form subplans or elements of the life plan through their avowed dissatisfactions. When things are going well persons are not apt to think much about their goals or say much about them. Two examples we might consider are job dissatisfaction and dissatisfaction in marriage. Goals concerning jobs and marriage form important sub-plans of an individual's life plan. So when people complain that their jobs are monotonous, use too little of their abilities, etc., they are indicating that these are some important goals concerning their jobs (e.g., that they be relatively interesting, use their abilities in a somewhat challenging way, etc.) that are not being realized. When dissatisfactions concerning marriage are felt, they indicate that certain goals in one's "marriage plan" are not being realized. For instance, if a woman finds that her marriage is stifling her career goals, a goal which she has concerning marriage (i.e., that it leave room for her to pursue her own career goals) is being frustrated. This example also indicates how subplans within one's life plan can be interrelated (e.g., those concerning marriage and career). Thus, evidence of dissatisfaction with respect to the realization of important goals people have, as well as the expressed goals that people have, indicate, I believe, that persons have life plans even in cases where the person hasn't engaged in a great deal of introspection about his life plan.

I have argued that people have higher order ends which can be seen, by virtue of the structure of human desires, to be organized into what I call life plans. I have, in addition, argued that there is a desire for the realizing of the life plan. Now I shall go on to compare my view with views of Sartre and William McDougall that bear some resemblances to my view.

A Comparison with Views of Sartre and McDougall

Sartre, in Being and Nothingness, makes some claims about persons having a "fundamental life project" that bear a certain resemblance to my claims about life plans. It will be useful to compare his view with mine.

According to Sartre, there is a primary or fundamental life project which is chosen by the individual. It is manifested in every action of the individual, and it is that through which all subprojects of the individual can be understood. This project is chosen by the individual and this choice is constantly renewed in choices and actions. It exists in all desires, but has no existence separate from these desires. In addition, on rare occasions, it can be changed in a radical conversion of the individual. Since human reality is identified and defines itself by its ends, this fundamental project is the way persons are ultimately identified. This project is not just a summary of a person's desires and it is not explained in terms of generalizations about the desires of the person. We must look behind the desires to find the fundamental project which is manifested in these desires. The fundamental project generally is not apparent to the individual himself. It is to be discovered only by a procedure which Sartre calls "existential psychoanalysis." This variety of psychoanalysis hasn't been fully developed yet, Sartre notes, but basically consists of comparing the various desires a person has and seeking an irreducible end or goal which will be the fundamental project. This psychoanalysis can be determined to be successful if it has great explanatory power and unifies the person, and if one has a self-evident intuition that in the analysis one has attained an irreducible end.
Let us consider examples of a subproject and a fundamental project. An example of a subproject or secondary, derived project that Sartre gives is a fondness for rowing. If we describe someone as being fond of rowing we are not indicating his fundamental project. It won't do, either, to generalize it, for example, as a fondness for open air sports. What we want in the fundamental project is an irreducible end of the person as a totality. That cannot be captured in a list of desires. An example Sartre gives of a choice of a fundamental project is that of Flaubert. An explanation of Flaubert's desire to write in terms of a number of general desires, such as empirical psychology might give, will not be enough to explain Flaubert's "calling." What we need, Sartre claims, is an original or fundamental project. In the case of Flaubert, this fundamental project is a tormenting desire to write, chosen in his early childhood.

My view of persons having life plans and Sartre's of persons having fundamental projects seem similar. An important difference I should note at the outset is that I make no claim about a person's life plan being chosen as a whole at a specific time, nor do I claim that it must be made up of a single dominant end. On my view, typically it is an inclusive end made up of higher order ends we come to have in various ways which I shall discuss later. Sartre claims that one's fundamental project is generally chosen by the person while he is quite young (e.g., Flaubert as a young child) and then in every choice and action of the person this project is chosen over again, or reaffirmed. The fundamental project seems to be a dominant end of the individual, under which all of the other ends of the person are subsumed. I would claim that some persons may have such a single prime end, but this may be relatively rare. The life plan, according to my view, typically involves a set of important higher order ends of the person that guide his life, in the sense of structuring his particular desires, choices, activities. I would make no claim about its being chosen at a specific time. Rather, it seems to me that the life plan is something that develops, and can change over a period of time. Sartre's claim that this is a free (and conscious) choice, one which ultimately makes us responsible for the lives we live, and which often occurs while one is quite young, is puzzling. It is difficult to imagine Flaubert as a young child being fully aware of what he was doing in choosing to be a writer. Also, this seems to conflict with Sartre's claim that the project doesn't exist as a separate thing first but rather in desires while we have them. Thus, I would not accept Sartre's claim that everyone has a fundamental project of this sort, a dominant end, chosen while quite young, and manifested in every choice and action. My view, then, involves a notion of a project in a broader sense than Sartre's.

There are a number of claims that Sartre makes that I would essentially agree with. I would concur with his claim that the fundamental project (weakened to the sort of thing I call the life plan) is a way of identifying a person. It seems plausible to me to say that, in large part, we identify and characterize people in terms of the higher order desires they have, the desires that provide a focus of their lower order desires, and that this figures in to our views of a person with the same personality existing over time. I would also agree with Sartre's claim that we cannot determine a person's project by summarizing his desires. We can't do this, on my view, because the life plan involves complex interrelationships between a person's desires. The structure of orders of desires will not be apparent from just a summary of his desires. Of course, Sartre's reason for rejecting this possibility is different. His claim is that it can't be done because it won't get at the original project that was chosen, the irreducible end manifested in all his particular ends. I would also claim that the life plan doesn't exist as something apart from and prior to a person's particular ends, but rather that it exists in the ordering and interrelationship of
these ends. Finally, I would agree that the life plan may not be fully apparent to the individual. First, if there are unconscious higher order desires that figure in the life plan, then the individual will not be aware of these. I do not have the space to consider the issue of unconscious desires, but merely wish to make the point that if there are such desires, they may be elements of the life plan individuals are not aware of. Second, if there are long-term desires of the individual which may be unrecognized (e.g., a desire for prestige one is unaware of but has not repressed), these, too, may be elements of the life plan of which individuals lack an awareness.

William McDougall also makes some claims that are similar to mine. First I shall look, at his view of the structure of "sentiments," and then his characterization of happiness. After that, I shall indicate some comparisons that can be made between his view and mine.

McDougall makes great use of the notion of sentiment. As he uses the term, "sentiment" stands for the disposition to experience certain emotions which are organized into systems by virtue of the objects that give rise to them. The three principle types of sentiments are love, hate and respect. In the mature person, his sentiments are organized in a hierarchy under a "master sentiment." The master sentiment is a dominant end, and McDougall considers a number of kinds of dominant ends a person might have. One is where it is a non-self-regarding end, as exemplified by a person whose master sentiment (also called "ruling passion") is the love of an ancestral home. In such a person, his behavior becomes organized around this master sentiment. He considers this sort of master sentiment less desirable than some variety of the self-regarding sentiment as the master sentiment. The self-regarding sentiment as master sentiment brings about a stronger character, especially when it is combined with an ideal of conduct, in which case it generates the best moral character, rather than the "lower" form of the self-regarding sentiment, which is ambition or pride. Thus, in the most fully mature person, his desires fit within a hierarchy ruled by the self-regarding sentiment centered on an ideal of conduct, so that one desires to do the right and can control one's desires and be free of the influence of opinions of other men in choosing one's actions.

McDougall gives the following characterization of happiness:

Happiness arises from the harmonious operation of all the sentiments of a well-organized and unified personality, one in which the principal sentiments support one another in a succession of actions all of which tend towards the same or closely allied and harmonious ends. Hence the richer, the more highly developed, the more completely unified or integrated is the personality, the more capable is it of sustained happiness in spite of inter-current pains of all sorts.

In his characterization of happiness, it is not clear whether happiness is to be identified with the realizing of these ends or with some feeling or emotion that results from this. If it is the former, then his view is close to mine. However, language like "happiness arises" and "sustained happiness" seems to suggest that it is some feeling or emotion. His view of the hierarchical structure of desires is quite similar to mine, except for his emphasis on the notion of "sentiments" in working it out and his emphasis on the master sentiment as a dominant end. On my view, a life plan may be made up of a dominant end or it may be an inclusive end, but most often it seems to be the latter. It appears that on McDougall's view the fully mature person must have his life ordered by a single end (ruling passion). This seems unrealistic in terms of over-unifying the
desires of a person. He views the person with the strongest character as one who has a master sentiment that is the self-regarding sentiment centered on a moral ideal of conduct. It is not clear what connection he would make between this and happiness (e.g., it is possible that he could claim that one must be moral to be happy, or that the happiest person is the moral person), although, given his emphasis on the well-organized and unified personality as being one with this sort of master sentiment, he would probably claim at least that the happiest person will be this sort of person. In my view, I have argued that it would be wrong to build morality into the concept of happiness, though it may turn out a posteriori that morally wicked persons are unhappy. Thus, I would argue that the conceptual connection between morality and happiness hinted at in McDougall's view needs some argumentative support.

Life Plans and Happiness

I have developed the notion of a life plan and argued for the existence of orders of desires and ends. This structuring of desires lends support to my claim that people have life plans which consist of their higher order ends. I also argued that people do desire the realizing of their life plans (and thus the notion is not just an explanatory fiction) and that this desire is in some sense distinct from the particular higher order desires that make up the life plan. I believe that the concept of happiness can be best analyzed as the realizing of a life plan (with certain additional conditions I shall be adding in the next chapter). This analysis of happiness will avoid the difficulties of the theories of happiness previously discussed and also captures what people generally seem to mean when they use "happiness" in the life sense. In the previous chapter I discussed a number of counterexamples which indicate problems with the identity and collection views of happiness. The counterexamples were: a person with many pleasures and achievements who is nevertheless unhappy (e.g., Skinner), a person with very few pleasures who nevertheless is happy (e.g., Wittgenstein), two different people with the same quantity of pleasure varying in happiness, and the same person being unhappy at a time when he has more pleasures than he had at another time when he was happy. All of these counterexamples can be handled by the life plan view of happiness, since happiness is not identified with pleasure or a collection of pleasures, and the view leaves open the sorts of ends that can make up the life plan. Thus, the life plan view allows the openness that we need in the concept of happiness, for there are many kinds of lives that can be happy. We can also readily see why happiness, when we are talking about lives or periods of lives, is a long-term thing. The realizing of a life plan is not a momentary or short-lived thing. It is something that can occur even when persons don't have feelings of happiness. Of the alternative theories of happiness, the life plan view seems to offer the most useful analysis of happiness. But let us go on to consider further features of happiness as the realizing of a life plan. In the next chapter I will continue my defense of the life plan view by examining views of happiness judgments.

In expanding the life plan view, the first thing I must emphasize is that according to it happiness is the realizing of a life plan. It is a process, an activity, and not an accomplishment. I must emphasize that my view is not claiming that our ends must have been realized in order for us to be happy. Rather, we must be in the process of realizing our ends to be happy. In this respect there is a resemblance to Aristotle's emphasis on happiness being an activity, not a state of mind or a disposition. 

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This feature of happiness is nicely illustrated by the example from Mill I used earlier. In describing what happened in his "mental crisis" Mill indicates that one thing about his life plan that particularly pleased him was that though some progress could always be made in realizing his major goal (social reform), "It could never be exhausted by complete attainment." Thus, Mill indicates that realizing rather than having realized is what is crucial. The full attainment of this goal would leave him without this higher order end that served to order many of his lower order ends.

Another example that illustrates this feature of happiness is that of the later life of Ernest Hemingway. Hemingway was disturbed a belief that he could no longer write well. A friend of his reminded him that earlier his ambition had been to live long enough to write three more novels and twenty-five short stories, and that he had surpassed this goal and could relax and take some time off from writing. Hemingway said he couldn't, explaining:

Because—look, it doesn't matter that I don't write for a day or a year or ten years as long as the knowledge that I can write is solid inside me. But a day without that knowledge, or not being sure of it, is eternity.

Hemingway's dissatisfaction because of his belief that he might not be able to write well any longer indicates, I believe, that what was important for him was realizing important goals, not having realized them. His having more than attained major goals isn't enough. He must be in the process of realizing a life plan.

As I am using it here, I understand the notion of realizing a life plan to involve something like the following: (1) having higher order ends which make up a life plan; (2) having one's lower order desires and behavior structured in some way by these higher order ends; and (3) not obviously failing in the attainment of one's higher order ends. To throw light on what is involved in realizing a life plan (which involves realizing one's higher order ends), let us consider as an example what would be involved in realizing the higher order end of being a good philosopher. If someone has such an end, realizing it involves its structuring many of his lower order desires in the ways I have discussed earlier. If one wants to be a good philosopher, presumably he will on occasion have lower order desires which cause him to engage in various activities subsumed under being a good philosopher (e.g., trying to understand a difficult passage in Aristotle, helping a student understand some philosophical arguments, writing a philosophical paper). If this were not the case, we would wonder whether he really has such an end at all. What is required for realizing a higher order end is its influencing a person's behavior in this way and his not obviously failing. If the higher order end of being a good philosopher does influence a person's behavior, but his lower order ends subsumed under it aren't achieved (he's unsuccessful in these activities), then he isn't realizing this higher order end (even if he mistakenly believes that he is).

The reason why I've included the "obviously" in "not obviously failing" is to allow for cases where a person is in the process of realizing a higher order end but doesn't fully attain it due to something of which he couldn't be expected to be aware. Here let us distinguish higher order desires which are satisfiable without being fully assuageable, in the sense of not ever being satisfied and then over and done with (e.g., desires to be a good philosopher, to have a good marriage) and higher order desires which can be fully assuaged in the sense of being satisfied and then being over and done with (e.g., desires to become president of the U.S., to write a book, etc.) This point about not obviously
failing is more applicable to the latter kind of desire. For instance, someone may have a
higher order desire to write a book, be in the process of realizing it, and then suddenly
die. In such a case the higher order end was not fully realized, but yet it was true, before
his death, that the person was realizing it. In such cases ultimate success does not seem
to be necessary for being in the process of realizing higher order ends. What is
necessary is being in the process of realizing the end, without its being obvious that one
will ultimately fail.

In the case of the other sorts of desires, the not fully assuageable ones, the end is
not a long-range one, but rather a certain continuing state of affairs. Here one will be
realizing the end if the desired state of affairs exists and one can reasonably expect that
state of affairs to continue. One can be realizing the higher order end of having a
good marriage even if, due to some reason the individual couldn't now know, the marriage
will break up later.

Some have claimed that, in addition to a certain pattern of life or realizing of the life
plan, there is a resulting feeling which is an aspect of happiness. As I mentioned in a
previous chapter, Sidney Zink has argued that there is a feeling of happiness which results
from the state of happiness, which consists of a certain pattern of life (what sort of
pattern it is left unclear in Zink's view). Each of these, Zink believes, is a different
sense of "happiness." Gordon Allport has a theory which seems to claim that happiness is
just the accompanying feeling. He says: "Happiness is the glow that attends the integration
of the person while pursuing or contemplating the attainment of goals." The
condition of the person that gives rise to the feeling Allport speaks of sounds rather
close to my view. However, Allport seems to emphasize that happiness is that accompanying
feeling rather than the state which gives rise to it.

It seems to me that the sort of feeling that Zink and Allport are talking about does
occur, especially when one has good fortune in realizing an element of one's life plan.
Thus, if I have as an element of my life plan publishing a philosophical article, then, if
a paper I've written has just been accepted for publication, I may find myself quite
joyous or happy about it. However, I would not want to emphasize this feeling as the
essential nature of happiness as Allport seems to, nor would I put it on equal footing
with the realizing of the life plan, being one of the two main senses of "happiness" as
Zink does. I do not want to do this because it seems to me that such a feeling is generally
not of very long duration--my joy or feeling of happiness at my paper being accepted for
publication will probably not last much longer than a day or several days, or perhaps it
will come when I dwell upon this, and then go as my attention turns to other things. But
happiness is a state that lasts longer than this, and is not a feeling which can come and
go in this way. So this resulting feeling should be called "happiness" in only a derivative
sense.

One's future expectations play an important role in happiness. This is something which
Rawls emphasizes a good deal. In his definition of "happiness" he claims that there are two
aspects: "... we can think of a person as being happy when he is in the way of a
successful execution (more or less) of a rational plan of life drawn up under (more or
less) favorable conditions, and he is reasonably confident that his plan will be carried
through." However, the notion of a plan makes it unnecessary to emphasize the
second aspect, reasonable confidence of the continued realizing of the plan. The very
notion of the realizing of a plan involves there typically being some degree of con-
fidence that this success will last. Anticipation of future success contributes more
toward happiness than do memories of past successes. The life plan analysis of
happiness can account for this by noting that a plan is essentially forward looking,
though, of course, knowledge that one's life plan is being realized requires some
memories of successes.

There are some other differences between Rawls' account of happiness and mine that can
be noted here. One is that though he makes some use of the notion of higher order ends
and desires, he gives no arguments for or accounts of the stratification of desires, nor
does he give much argumentative support for the notion of a life plan. Another more
important difference is that Rawls analyzes happiness as the realizing of a rational
life plan. In spelling out rationality with respect to life plans, Rawls claims that a life plan
is rational if it is consistent with the principles of rational choice (is the best means
to the ends the person has), if in addition it is the one he would choose with "full
deliberative rationality, that is, with full awareness of the relevant facts and after a
careful consideration of the consequences,"68 and his desires and beliefs are rational. I
believe that rationality in a weak sense is implied in the notion of a life plan, since
only a being with reason can have higher order ends and a life plan. However, I
object to the rather strong sense of "rationality" (particularly with regard to all of one's
desires being rational) used by Rawls on the grounds that it would narrow the concept of
happiness too much. It is this strong sense that I shall assume in my discussion of the
claim that happiness is the realizing of a rational life plan.

I shall be arguing more fully against the view that happiness is to be analyzed as the
realizing of a rational life plan in the next chapter, after I have spelled out my view
of the nature of happiness judgments, arguing that this would narrow down the concept of
happiness too much, and that the view seems to imply that third person happiness judgments
are evaluative, a claim I shall also be arguing against. We might note here that Rawls'
analysis of happiness is an important part of his theory of justice, and it might be
catered to fit the theory. He wants to show eventually the congruence of justice and
goodness on his theory—that in a good society operating according to his theory of
justice, it will be to a person's own good to be just.69 The happy man will then be a just
man. My basic objection to Rawls' analysis is his making it conceptually true that
happiness requires rationality, without arguing sufficiently for it. I do not believe it is
conceptually true, but that it seems to be contingently true that, other things being
equal, there is a greater probability that a fully rational life will be happy. I also object
to Rawls' making it conceptually true that the just man is the happy man. Hopefully this
is contingently true, at least generally. But we should not rule out conceptually the
possibility of a wicked person's being happy.

I have at several points addressed myself to aspects of the charge that the life plan
view is unrealistic. One of the main forms of this charge is with respect to the amount
of planning of their lives people do, as a matter of fact, engage in. I earlier indicated
that life plans, as well as other sorts of plans, are often rather vague—and rarely, if
ever, are elaborate blueprints for a person's life. Noting some of the ways in which life
plans or elements of them develop will help to further weaken this criticism.

First, I would like to consider a claim David Braybrooke makes. He claims that second
order preferences, preferences for ways of life, develop out of what he calls "schemes of
orientation."70 These operate over particular preferences and control them before second

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68 Mark Chekola 68 The Concept of Happiness
order preferences are developed. Braybrooke seems to believe they become second order preferences by one being conscious of them and, I suppose, consenting to their guiding one's behavior. They can be fallen into, or chanced upon by the individual. I think this is a very important feature of the development of life plans. Having a life plan does not necessarily imply that the plan has been carefully worked out by the individual. Rather, it, or parts of it, may be fallen into or chanced upon. I may have as my occupational goal one fostered in me by my parents, about which I have thought little—or I may have chanced into a certain occupation and find myself with a number of goals within it. Life plans are not necessarily the results of rational deliberation.

Second, the important role various sorts of ideals play in development of the life plan should be noted. We have many ideals with respect to occupational goals, goals concerning personal relationships, goals concerning personality characteristics, etc. These may be characteristics of particular persons I admire, or abstract persons or qualities I admire. This greatly simplifies the adoption of life plans and subplans. We do not construct life plans anew out of nothing. We construct them out of various ideals formed by observing people around us and history. The important role ideals play in the development of life plans accounts for the emphasis on happiness as an ideal. But just claiming that happiness is an ideal way of life for the individual does not elucidate the concept of happiness very much. Ideals do have an important function in the development of life plans, though. And the ideals we have may or may not have deliberated about.

A third thing to note about the development of life plans is that many elements of our life plans and sub-plans have their source outside of us. Thus, my view does not require that all higher order ends be chosen autonomously in the formation of life plans. I believe this would not be true to life. A religious person, for instance, may claim that his life plan has been given to him by God (though he may claim he has autonomously chosen to follow whatever God's plan is). One way in which elements of the life plans of all persons may have their source outside of us is that roles we are expected to fulfill which become elements of our life plans (e.g., being a good philosopher, being a good husband, father, citizen) are, in large part, adopted by us from an outside source. These seem to be generally adopted by a person with some degree of awareness as to what is involved. There are plans or goals, too, that persons often have which are, in a sense, forced on them by society, goals which they are taught but which they sight not choose themselves were they to examine them with full knowledge and rational deliberation. We might recall here Brandt's distinction between authentic and unauthentic desires. An unauthentic desire is one acquired through some means other than actual experience of the thing in question. Can the realizing of a life plan which includes important elements which are unauthentic still be counted as happiness, or must the individual have an autonomous life plan to be happy? The answer to this, it seems to me, is that autonomy with regard to the major elements of one's life plan is not built into the concept of happiness. The realizing of such a life plan, if it is the life plan of the person, constitutes happiness. Autonomy with regard to one's major higher order desires is important contingently, in the following ways. First, if an individual becomes aware of the fact that this plan or goal which he has adopted is, in a sense, not really his, this upsets the life plan in a very serious way. It is important that a person believe his major goals are goals he would still keep were he to examine them with full knowledge and rational deliberation. Second, they are risky, in that if they are not being realized, the person may be unhappy whereas an authentic higher order desire in its place might have been less difficult to realize. So autonomy may be very important for happiness generally, but this is a contingent rather
than a conceptual matter.

In this chapter I have presented a view of happiness which is a variety of the inclusive end or pattern view discussed in the previous chapter. I developed the notion of a life plan and argued for a hierarchy of desires and ends, with the highest order end being the life plan. I have argued that people do have life plans and desire their realization, and further, that happiness is plausibly analyzed as the realizing of a life plan. This view avoids the difficulties of views discussed earlier and fits in nicely with the examples of claims about happiness I have discussed earlier and in this chapter. It gives us some understanding of the concept of happiness while allowing for many different kinds of lives to be happy lives. In the next chapter I will focus on the meaning of judgments of happiness and amplify my view a bit.

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**Endnotes Chapter III**

2. In *Plans and the Structure of Behavior* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1960), George Miller, Eugene Galanter and Karl Pribram argue (p. 100) that roles one has are plans a person is expected by some group to execute.
3. Josiah Royce seems to be the first person to use the term “life plan.” He discusses it in *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1908), particularly in Lecture IV. His use of “life plan” is in many ways similar to mine. However, his account lacks the sort of underpinnings I give the notion through my forthcoming discussion of the stratification of human desire.
4. “Permanence” may not be quite the right word for the continuing, ongoing, not fully assuageable nature of higher order ends that I want to get at here. Since it is closely related to the permanence of higher order desires, it seems to be a suitable term to use.
5. C. A. Campbell, in “Moral Intuition and the Principle of Self-Realization,” Annual Philosophical Lecture, Henriette Hertz Trust, *Proceedings of the British Academy*, XXXIV (1948), 26, uses these two criteria (permanence and comprehensiveness) to distinguish desires of the real self’s nature from transitory desires, in order to argue for the claim that desires differ in status, as well as strength.
7. I shall use “desire” and “want” synonymously.
8. Ibid., p. 10.
10. Ibid., p 10.
12. Parker, *The Philosophy of Value*, p. 124. Parker speaks only of second order desires. However, I believe he is using “second order” in a generic sense, to include various levels of higher order desires.
13. Ibid., p. 130.
15. Ibid., p. 57.
16. Ibid., p. 61.
20. This distinction is used by Goldman, *A Theory of Human Action*, p. 86.
21 An example borrowed from Thomas W. Smythe, "Unconscious Desires and the Meaning of 'Desire,'" The Monist, LVI (July, 1972), 421.
26 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 550, also claims that realization of the life plan is wanted for its own sake. However, I find no argument there to support this claim.
27 Parker. The Philosophy of Value, p. 125.
28 Ibid., p. 126.
29 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 561, also makes a similar claim, that the unity of the self lies in the notion of the life plan.
30 Parker, The Philosophy of Value, pp. 123, 130.
31 Ibid., p. 130
32 Ibid., p. 130
36 Ibid., p. 49.
37 Ibid., pp. 51, 52
38 Ibid., p. 58.
40 Ibid., p. 14. P. F. Strawson makes a similar sort of point in "Social Morality and Individual Ideal," in Kenneth Pahl and Marvin Schiller, Readings in Contemporary Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), pp. 344-359, except that there he argues that pictures of ideal forms of life have to do with the region of the ethical rather than the region of the moral, and doesn't think of such ideal forms of life as being unified and comprehensive within the person the way Hepburn does.
41 Ibid., p. 15.
43 I indicated earlier in the dissertation that Mill is not consistent in his use of "happiness." Sometimes he uses it as a synonym for "pleasure," other times he uses it in a sense closer to the one I am arguing for.
44 For example, in a news magazine article on work, "Modern Times: Workers Speak," Newsweek, March 26, 1973, p. 81, a person interviewed claimed, "To be happy, you have to feel that you are making a contribution."
46 Ibid., p. 565.
47 Ibid., p. 557.
48 Ibid., p. 558.
49 Ibid., p. 570.
50 Ibid., p. 574.
51 Ibid., p. 562.
52 Ibid., p. 561.
53 Ibid., p. 559.
55 Ibid., p. 223.
56 Ibid., p. 176.
57 Ibid., p. 224.
60 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1. 8. 1099a1-3. 2Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 113.
61 Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 113.
63 In addition to the importance of realizing rather than having realized goals, Hemingway's statement brings out the importance of his knowing that he could still write. His difficulty in believing that he could still write seemed to cause him great dissatisfaction. In Chapter Four I shall be indicating that serious felt dissatisfaction precludes happiness, even when a life plan is being realized.
64 Zink, The Concept of Ethics, pp. 105-106. See also above, pp. 34-35, and below, pp. 75-76.
66 I shall be discussing this view again in the next chapter in relation to views of the nature of happiness judgments.
68 Ibid., p. 408
69 Ibid., p. 513.
71 See above, p. 60.
73 Miller, Galanter and Pribram, Plans and the Structure of Behavior, p. 100.
74 See above, p. 48.
75 See, for example, Ilham Dilman, "Life and Meaning," Philosophy, XL (October, 1965), 331.
CHAPTER IV

JUDGMENTS OF HAPPINESS

Introduction

I have argued for the claim that the nature of happiness is best construed as the realizing of a life plan. It must now be considered how judgments of happiness are to be made and whether any other conditions must be added in my analysis of happiness. This requires a consideration of a cluster of questions such as: How does one determine a life plan is being realized? Is some kind of feeling or attitude necessary as either a logical condition of happiness or as a criterion for judging a person to be happy? What are the differences between first person and third person judgments of happiness? What possibilities are there for mistakes in first person and third person happiness judgments? My procedure will be first to indicate some of the implications of views of the nature of happiness discussed earlier. Secondly, I shall consider a group of views which I shall call "attitude views" that claim that a certain kind of attitude is essential for happiness. One of the difficulties with the attitude views, and some of the views I discussed earlier, is that they sometimes attempt to make something that is contingently true of many instances of happiness part of the concept of happiness. Thirdly, I will discuss what view of happiness judgments my theory commits me to. In doing so I shall indicate that there is a certain truth to the attitude views, and shall recognize this by amplifying my analysis to include two negative conditions which can rule out happiness even when a life plan is being realized: serious dissatisfaction felt and an attitude of being displeased with or disliking one's life. Fourthly, I shall discuss some issues concerning differences between first and third person happiness judgments. Finally, I shall make some comments about rationality and happiness. Thus, in this chapter I shall be both expanding my analysis of the concept of happiness and arguing for it as being superior to alternative analyses which have not yet been considered in the dissertation.

Happiness Judgments According to the Identity and Collection Views

Two of the more commonly held views of the nature of happiness are what I have called the identity view and the collection view. The nature of happiness judgments on these views can be seen rather easily. The identity view identifies happiness with pleasure. Such views have generally not specified what sort of analysis of pleasure would be given, but often seem to assume a feeling view of pleasure. However, it would be possible for someone to hold the identity view and offer an adverbial analysis of pleasure, in terms of attending or motivation (an experience one would want to continue for its own sake). In any case, a judgment of happiness would involve determining whether one has a certain feeling or is attending to what he is doing, or wants his experience to continue for its own sake. The person himself would presumably be directly aware of whether or not he is happy, and his judgment would seem to be incorrigible. A third person judgment would have to be based on either the first person reports of the person in question or behavioral evidence, and would be liable to error when the individual is lying or the behavioral symptoms are somehow misinterpreted. Happiness judgments would on the identity view be rather uncomplicated. The collection view maintains that happiness is a collection of pleasures. Typically, a collection
theory will maintain that happiness consists of a balance or a surplus of pleasures over pains. A problem with such a view that I brought up earlier was the difficulty of specifying how large the collection must be, or how great a balance of pleasure over pain there must be to constitute happiness. This makes happiness judgments somewhat difficult to make or to justify. If any surplus of pleasures over pains constitutes happiness, then a person can judge himself to be happy if he has more pleasures than pains. In this case his judgment might not be incorrigible, though, for it is possible for self-deception to occur. In examining his life, he may give undue weight to his pleasures (or his pains, for that matter) or he may overlook certain pains, and thus incorrectly judge himself to have a balance of pleasures. Perhaps then a collection theorist might resort to the view that a collection or aggregate of pleasures constitutes happiness if the individual believes it to be large enough or takes a certain attitude (e.g., being pleased with or liking) toward the set of pleasures he has. This helps the collection view by providing a criterion for what sort of collection it must be. However, it changes it from a collection view to a more complex view (happiness is a collection of pleasures plus a certain attitude or belief of the individual). I shall be discussing some views that claim a certain attitude is an important part of happiness, and the comments I make about that sort of view will be applicable to this kind of view I have just sketched. For the straightforward collection view a third person judgment would be based on avowals of the individual or observation of his behavior or his situation (e.g., "Anyone that well-off or that successful must be happy"). Since both of these views of the nature of happiness are, as I have argued, unsatisfactory, the particular views of happiness judgments they entail will be unsatisfactory too. It will be useful, though, to have them in mind for comparison with the other views I shall discuss.

Happiness Judgments According to Accompanying Feeling Views

I have discussed some views which have claimed either that happiness involves a certain sort of feeling accompanying a certain kind of life or, in some cases, that happiness is that accompanying or resulting feeling. The latter sort of view seems to be held by Dewey, Duncker, and Allport. These views seem to stress that happiness is not the kind of life involved, but rather the feeling or emotion that results from it. Happiness judgments on this sort of view would seem to involve ascertaining whether the individual has the indicated feeling or emotion. First person judgments would seem to be incorrigible if the feeling rather than the pattern of life is stressed. However, it might be claimed that self-deception can occur in cases where a person's life does not really satisfy the kind of judgment being made (it is not as good as it seems to the person), but if the feeling is stressed, it would seem that the way the person perceives his life is more important than what his life is really like. We must keep in mind that this is a view concerning the life use of "happiness" and not the feeling use. It claims that happiness is a special feeling which can be attributed to a life or a portion of a life. Feelings of happiness (feeling use) clearly aren't of long enough duration to serve as candidates for this. One can imagine a person feeling joy for several days, but not for much longer than that. Happiness, however, is of longer duration than that, generally, and is not interruptable in the way feelings and emotions are. Someone may be happy and yet experience anger, sadness (such as upon the death of a loved one), etc., where those other feelings occupy one's consciousness so that it would seem that, at those times, the person had no feeling that we could characterize as happiness. Yet, in spite of these feelings, he is a happy man. Contentment seems to be a candidate for a long-lasting feeling. However, the same sort of objection can be brought up here: given changes in a person's state of consciousness, it would seem difficult to claim someone had a feeling of contentment over a long period of
time. Rather, we would probably interpret the "feeling" of contentment as a disposition to experience feelings of contentment on certain occasions. So the only way happiness could be analyzed as a special feeling is by analyzing it as a disposition. There doesn't seem to be any long-lasting continuous feeling that could be happiness. I shall be arguing later that the happy person has a disposition to experience feelings such as enjoyment. The special feeling view seems to fail, because the dispositional analysis it is driven to appears to be very different from the sort of thing those who hold the special feeling view want. (This would include those individuals in ordinary life who seek happiness as a special feeling.) They want happiness to turn out to be some kind of feeling or glow or tone of experience. We might also note that if we consider examples such as the Wittgenstein case discussed earlier, it would be very difficult to come up with something we could identify as a feeling of happiness there (even in the dispositional sense), given the apparent relative scarcity of enjoyments in his life. For these reasons I think we must reject this special feeling view. It works neither as a theory of the nature of happiness nor as a theory of the meaning of happiness judgments.

Another kind of view which claims a feeling has some importance in the concept of happiness is that which stresses an accompanying feeling or emotion is an important part of happiness. (It is possible that some who hold the group of views just discussed above actually hold this view; their views are not articulated sufficiently to be sure.) A clear example of someone who holds this view is Sidney Zink. Zink argues there are two uses of "happiness" referring to what might be called two parts or aspects of happiness. One is the feeling of happiness and the other is the state of happiness. The feeling of happiness is the pleasure a person feels when he judges his life to be a happy life. The state of happiness is a condition of a person's life or a period of a person's life. Zink refers to it as a pattern of moments. He is rather unclear about this pattern of moments, but seems to hold it is a pattern of pleasures and, in large part, pleasures that arise from virtue.

Zink claims that happiness is primarily a state and secondarily a feeling (again, a feeling of pleasure from judging one's life to be happy). He doesn't indicate whether it is necessary that any person whose life is in a state of happiness have feelings of happiness. He does point out, though, that a judgment of happiness can be mistaken, where a person feels happy, but is not really in a state of happiness. His feeling of happiness would seem to be a pleasure arising from his judgment that his life is a happy one where that judgment is, as a matter of fact, a false one. It would seem that he doesn't really feel happy in Zink's sense, since a state of happiness is the object of such a feeling. Thus, a claimed feeling of happiness is not a sufficient condition for a life being a happy one.

Since Zink's account is not clear on the role of the feeling of happiness, it is difficult to indicate where my account would disagree with his. If he would claim that feelings of happiness are necessary for being happy, then my account disagrees with his. If, however, he would claim that feelings of happiness are quite often or typically had by persons in a state of happiness, his view may not be far from mine on this point. In any case, as I shall soon indicate, my account of happiness does not give feelings as important a role as his account does. This is essentially because, as I indicated above, any feeling of this sort is a relatively short-lived and changeable thing, whereas happiness is not. (Zink does agree with this claim as far as the state of happiness is concerned.)

My view of the state of happiness is somewhat different from Zink's. Zink gives a skeleton of an analysis in terms of a pattern of experiences—pleasures, and especially pleasures arising from virtue. My view is spelled out in terms of a pattern of experiences, but these experiences
are the realizing of a life plan rather than pleasures.

Since a claimed feeling of happiness is not sufficient for one's being happy (a genuine feeling of happiness would be sufficient since its object is an actual state of happiness—but to know that this obtains would require our having clear criteria for the state of happiness), happiness judgments are not on Zink's view easy judgments. They would be if the feeling of happiness were a feeling of which one were somehow directly aware. But since it is a feeling of pleasure whose object is a state of happiness, and one can be mistaken about that, seeming to feel happy is never enough to be feeling happy.

Ultimately, Zink's view doesn't help us in understanding happiness judgments. If his feeling of happiness were an incorrigible state of consciousness it would. However, it isn't, and we are driven back to the state of happiness for determining whether we or others are happy, and Zink tells us very little about what this state of happiness is. In addition, the distinction between the feeling use and life use of "happiness" I made in Chapter One would seem to be a simpler way of drawing the distinction between a feeling and a state of happiness than the way Zink draws it.

Pleasure as a Criterion of Happiness

Another way one might attempt to give a feeling an important role in happiness is to argue that pleasure is a criterion or standard of happiness. This could be combined with a view like the one just previously discussed, where pleasure accompanies a certain state of the person, however, here the emphasis would be on pleasure serving as a standard or criterion for determining whether a person is happy.

In a recent article, D. A. Lloyd-Thomas suggests this as a possible view which he himself rejects. He discusses it in relation to the use of "happiness" where it refers to a long period, such as a happy life or period of a life. This use of "happiness" is applied when a person's life (or period of his life) meets his standards for the good life. One of these standards might be pleasure. That is, a person might believe that feeling pleasure is a criterion of the good life.³

First let us consider the extreme view that pleasure is the standard or criterion of the good life, and the only such standard possible. This view would be rather close to the collection view, but not the identity view since happiness is seen as a relatively long-lasting state. If one held this view, it would seem redundant to analyze happiness in terms of achieving the standard for a good life, since only one standard is seen as being conceivable. It would seem more economical to analyze it in terms of a state of a person in which he has been having pleasures (some version of the collection view). Since the collection view was rejected as being unsatisfactory, so too this view must be rejected.

A less extreme view, the one that Lloyd-Thomas holds, is that pleasure is a possible standard for the good life, but not the only possible standard. A person who holds that pleasure is the standard of the good life would seek pleasures and would judge his life as being a happy one if he experiences a fair amount of pleasure. But on this view, pleasure is not the only possible standard for the good life. Another possible standard Lloyd-Thomas indicates is achievement. If this is the standard someone uses, the amount of pleasure he experiences is unimportant. What is important is his being successful (perhaps even regardless of whether success is
experienced as pleasant). Thus, pleasure is a possible standard for the happy life, but not the only one.

However, there is a qualification that Lloyd-Thomas adds that may indicate a certain sort of feeling plays a role in happiness. He indicates that though there is a wide range of possible standards for the good life there is an important limitation: standards must have a hedonic tendency, presumably because of the hedonic tendency of the concept of happiness. Lloyd-Thomas gives as examples of possible standards for the good life that we would probably reject promoting moral virtue and promoting the glory of one's nation. These would stretch the concept of happiness too much. Even in the case of achievement being the standard, Lloyd-Thomas indicates he's not thinking of the person who avoids all pleasure, but whose main goal is achievement rather than pleasure. Presumably, pleasure would be a by-product of the attainment of his goal. So any happy life must include pleasures of some kind.

There are two interpretations of this claim. The second will lead us into a discussion of the role of certain attitudes in happiness. The first interpretation is that Lloyd-Thomas is claiming that some pleasure is necessarily part of the happy life since, even if one's goal is not pleasure, one must receive pleasure from meeting the standard for the good life that one has. Thus, pleasure is in a sense part of happiness, since with no pleasure at all there can be no happiness. If this is what Lloyd-Thomas means, it may be a little too strong. I have some doubt whether we should rule out a priori a life with few or even no pleasures as being a happy life, just because of this lack of pleasures. The lack of pleasures may make us suspect it is an unhappy life, but wouldn't be enough evidence for us to be certain. Wittgenstein's life may be an example of this sort of life. I shall discuss this point later. If it is interpreted in this way, the claim about the hedonic tendency of happiness seems false, because it tries to make something which is perhaps contingently true of most cases of happiness part of the concept of happiness. Now we can move on to the second interpretation of Lloyd-Thomas' claim.

If he means that an individual, in order to be happy, in addition to having a life that meets his standards of the good life, must be in a positive way pleased with his life, then the hedonic tendency of the concept of happiness results from the importance of a person's having a certain attitude toward his life. I shall discuss this view at some length, since it has a number of adherents, some of whom present analyses that may be far stronger in what they are claiming than Lloyd-Thomas (e.g., that happiness can be analyzed just as being pleased with one's life).

Before going on, I would like to make some comparisons between my view of happiness and the earlier claim of Lloyd-Thomas, that happiness is a state of the person where he has met his standards for the good life. There is a certain degree of similarity between this claim and the view that happiness is the realizing of a life plan. However, the life plan analysis is more thorough than this view. For one thing, Lloyd-Thomas' view comes closer to a dominant end view of happiness than mine does (but suggesting that there must be some dominant end in a happy life, not that it must be one particular dominant end, such as pleasure). My view, allowing for the possible complexity of life plans, and the complex interrelationships of desires, is truer to life. In addition, my view can be construed as including the view of Lloyd-Thomas. A life plan sets up certain standards for one's life. Realizing one's life plan would include satisfying those standards one has for the good life.

One of the aims of Lloyd-Thomas' view is to allow for a good deal of variation in the particular kinds of lives that will be seen as happy lives. The happy life is one which meets
a person's standards for the good life—but there are different standards that are possible. This openness is easily allowed for by the life plan view, since happiness is interpreted as the realizing of a life plan, and there are many different possible life plans.

**Attitude Views of Happiness**

The next cluster of views to be considered are those which either analyze happiness as just an attitude, or as including an attitude as an important element. As I mentioned above, Lloyd-Thomas' claim that one limitation on the possible standards for the good life is that they must have some hedonic tendency can be interpreted as claiming that an attitude of being pleased with one's life or liking it is essential to happiness, so what I say here will apply to that view, too. The significance of such views is that if this is so, a happiness judgment involves ascertaining whether a person has such an attitude (in addition to whatever else, if anything, is required, such as realizing a life plan).

I shall discuss two views which attempt to analyze happiness in terms of "being pleased with life" (John Wilson and C. C. W. Taylor), and one which suggests an analysis in terms of "liking" (Jean Austin). Von Wright also holds an attitude view, which I shall discuss later, when examining the nature of first and third person happiness judgments. Before setting forth the views, it might be of value to note some of the reasons why people have resorted to such views. These reasons are: (1) the occurrence of the satisfaction of some wants that people have which they do not find satisfying makes an emphasis on the attitude a person takes toward the satisfaction of his wants, life, etc., more plausible; (2) the related reason that noting that different people in similar circumstances may be happy or unhappy makes the attitude people take toward the features of their lives more important in happiness than what those particular features are; (3) in rejecting a feeling theory of happiness (either an identity view, or a view which makes happiness a special variety of feeling, such as joy), some people have been led to an attitude theory as an alternative; and (4) in holding an attitude theory, one can make the claim that since attitudes are at least to some extent controllable by persons, happiness is something that a person has a degree of control over. (Though their view of the nature of happiness is not an attitude view, one can see this kind of concern in the Stoics. They claimed that by adopting certain attitudes, e.g., not caring for things outside of one's control, one could greatly increase one's chances for happiness.)

It would be valuable to have at least some notion of what an attitude is to work with. At this stage in contemporary discussion of the concept of attitude, it is impossible to give a simple definition of "attitude." However, perhaps two important features of attitudes can be noted, features which must be emphasized in any account of attitudes. The first feature is that attitudes consist of beliefs and rather complicated sets of dispositions, dispositions concerning one's thoughts, feelings, emotions, actions and statements about the particular object of one's attitude. The second important feature is that attitudes are, to a large extent, under our control, and in this respect are different from feelings and emotions.

A problem we face in dealing with these views is that they are not stated as full-blown theories, but rather as suggestions about the concept of happiness. Therefore, I shall sometimes have to draw out theoretical implications of the suggestions offered by the people whose views I am considering. The lack of elaboration makes it somewhat difficult to fully evaluate the views. I believe there are two important points which the attitude views get at, but which they overstress. These points, which I shall adopt for my own view, are: (1) an attitude of being displeased with or disliking one's life rules out happiness, and (2) a
happy person has a tendency to be pleased with his life. I shall argue, though, that the attitude of being pleased with one's life seems to not be a necessary condition of happiness, and this is the way the truth of the attitude view gets overstressed. Some of the difficulties I find with attitude views I shall be pointing out are: first, it seems difficult to claim happiness is just an attitude. Most attitude theorists go on to add something else, such as satisfaction of wants, to their analysis of happiness. Second, once you've added something else (such as the satisfaction of wants), the question arises: is the attitude part of its nature or a by-product? Is it part of the concept of happiness or is it contingently true that all or most happy people have such an attitude? Third, attitude views do not seem to be very informative. I believe my view is such more informative and yet shares the advantages of the attitude theories. Fourth, there may be counterexamples to the attitude views.

Now let us go on to consider some of the attitude theories of happiness. John Wilson hints at an attitude theory in a recent article. His article is an attempt to bring out some of the general features of the concept of happiness. Though it is not a sustained attempt to analyze the concept, in it he gives strong suggestions of an attitude analysis of the concept. He claims initially that "We might say, as a sighting shot, that to be happy is to be generally 'pleased with life.'" A bit later, in arguing against the view that happiness is a particular state of mind, Wilson claims "Happiness is conceptually tied to a man's 'state of mind' only in the sense of a man's enjoying or (better) welcoming his state of mind, and not to any other feature of that state of mind." Initially, being pleased with life and welcoming one's state of mind may not seem fully compatible as characterizations of happiness, since welcoming one's state of mind seems to focus on just the present. However, if we interpret "state of mind" in a broad sense, so that we are speaking about one's general state of mind, or one's states of mind collectively (rather than talking about particular, separate states of mind), then the two may be different ways of describing the same state of the person. Wilson claims that the attitude one has towards one's life ("life" being interpreted here as consisting of one's states of mind) essentially determines whether one is happy or unhappy. Welcoming it (which seems a little stronger an indication of general satisfaction with it than "pleased with") is being in a state of happiness. In Wilson's suggestions we can see a rejection of an identity or feeling view of happiness. In addition, he indicates that because of differences in human nature, the circumstances of a person's life never give us conclusive evidence concerning happiness or unhappiness. These seem to be the reasons why he is drawn to an attitude view.

Though Wilson's view avoids some of the simpler errors of the collection and identity views by suggesting happiness has to do with enjoying or welcoming one's state of mind rather than having a particular state of mind, some problems arise. A happy man can sometimes have states of mind he doesn't enjoy or welcome (e.g., pain, a difficulty he is going through) and yet be happy. Similarly, there are most likely some states of mind an unhappy man enjoys. If this view is to be spelled out fully, we seem to need some indication of what proportion of his states of mind are welcomed or enjoyed. It seems to be quite true that often we pick out happy people by noting the way they enjoy or welcome their lives. But if this is to be a view concerning the nature of happiness, it seems, at this point, rather uninformative. It seems to be true, too, as Wilson indicates, that we cannot judge a person to be happy just on the basis of the circumstances of his life. But this and the phenomenon of happy people at least generally welcoming or enjoying their lives seems to be easily explainable by the life plan view. Since a happy life is the realizing of a life plan, that is, a person's higher order desires, it is, typically, the sort of life that is welcomed or enjoyed. Also, circumstances are
not enough for judgment because we need to know what the person's life plan is before we can judge that it is being realized.

A second example of a view of happiness which makes use of the notion of being pleased with life is that of C. C. W. Taylor in an article on pleasure, in which he carries out an analysis of pleasure in terms of various cases of being pleased. He indicates there is a connection between pleasure and happiness which is that being happy is being pleased with. Happiness as an end of life is being pleased with life. Being pleased with life is "being pleased with the direction of the whole pattern of one's actions as tending towards the achievement of one's general goals." In spelling out what one's general goals are, Taylor indicates that we must eventually get to a stopping-place of explanation (a desirability-characteristic), which will be things wanted for their own makes. These include enjoyments, but not only enjoyments, for there are things wanted for their own makes which are not enjoyments. An example might be a desire to exercise a characteristic human capacity. Taylor's example is doing philosophy where one's goal is to get at the truth, rather than achieving some action or passion of the individual. Since enjoyments can only have to do with actions or passions of the individual, this goal cannot be an enjoyment.

In concluding his analysis, Taylor makes the remark: "Happiness is getting what one most wants for its own sake, which may be something other than one's own actions and passions." It is somewhat puzzling to see how this correlates with the claim that happiness is being pleased with life. Initially, there are two possible interpretations: (1) "being pleased with life" and "getting what one most wants for its own sake" both refer to the same thing (Taylor's omission of any explanation perhaps indicates he has this in mind) or (2) the nature of happiness is the attitude of being pleased with one's life, but this attitude is caused by getting what one most wants for its own sake. On this second interpretation, the nature of happiness is the attitude, and getting what one wants is the condition of happiness. Taylor's analysis itself doesn't indicate which of these interpretations he means. However, there is a serious difficulty with the first one. It is impossible for both of those expressions to refer to the same thing. "Being pleased with" refers to an attitude. "Getting what one most wants" refers to a state of the satisfaction of these wants, which is different in nature from an attitude. Therefore, the second interpretation seems to be the one that works. That still leaves us with the puzzle of why Taylor made the shift from one expression to the other. My guess is that he thinks there is such a close connection between the satisfaction of these wants and the attitude of being pleased with one's life that they virtually mean the same thing. However, if the sort of case where one does achieve the satisfaction of certain wants but yet finds oneself not fully satisfied does occur, then we cannot be sure that this connection (which is a causal one) is as invariable as Taylor thinks (I think he believes it is so invariable that it is virtually a kind of logical connection). We might consider the Hemingway example, discussed in the previous chapter. Presumably, he had more than achieved a major aim, and yet was unhappy, due to his coming to have a new goal (to still be able to write well), or to the importance for him of realizing rather than having realized his life plan. If this second interpretation is what Taylor means, then "getting what one most wants" isn't a sufficient condition of being pleased with one's life, or of happiness. A third possible interpretation of the correlation of these two claims arises: (3) the nature of happiness is being pleased with one's life together with the satisfaction of one's major wants (or some similar condition). This third interpretation is not very far from my own view, except that I would make the "being pleased with" into a disposition or tendency. Taylor's emphasis on happiness as being pleased with suggests that the second interpretation is what he has in mind, rather than this third one, though. So Taylor's view, when interpreted in some ways, seems to fail;
when interpreted in other ways, it seems close to my own view.

Before going on, I should note that there is a certain similarity between one of Taylor's formulations of happiness and my own view. Taylor says that happiness, or being pleased with one's life, is "being pleased with the direction of the whole pattern of one's actions as tending towards the achievement of one's general goals." It seems that Taylor is here indicating that happiness is being pleased with something like the realizing of one's life plan. However, in my view I have analyzed happiness as the realizing of the life plan. Taylor analyzes it here in terms of being pleased with the realizing of the life plan. I shall indicate shortly that I believe such an attitude may be common or typical when a life plan is being realized. However, I view the nature of happiness as the state of realizing rather than the attitude.

At this point I would like to indicate some difficulties that face a straight attitude view of happiness, where the attitude (e.g., being pleased with one's life) constitutes happiness, with no other conditions added to the analysis. It is not clear how weakly or strongly we should interpret the "pleased with." On the one hand, if we interpret it in a strong sense, so as to mean positively pleased with one's life, then we exclude some lives where we might claim a person is happy but yet "pleased with" is too strong. The example of Wittgenstein's life, discussed earlier in the dissertation, could fit in here. It would seem to be a little strong to say that he was pleased with his life, given some of the features of his life, and yet he claimed, at the end of his life, that it was a happy one.

On the other hand, if we interpret the "pleased with" in a weak sense (roughly, something like "not being displeased"), so as to allow in cases where the person is not positively pleased with his life, we may allow in some cases that should be excluded. Let us consider the case of a severely retarded person. Let us assume that as long as his basic needs (food, shelter, etc.) are taken care of, he is pleased with his life (in the weak sense). There would be, though, a strong inclination, I believe, to deny that he is happy. The attitude view, analyzing happiness only in terms of being pleased with one's life in the weak sense, would not be able to explain this. The life plan view could account for it, though, by noting that since such a person is incapable of having higher order ends, and thus incapable of having a life plan, the question of happiness or unhappiness just doesn't apply. Another possible example here might be that of a person who feels pleased with his life (either in the weak sense or the strong sense) because he is drugged over a long period of time. In reply to this case, someone might argue that we should distinguish between being really pleased and feeling pleased, and claim that this person isn't really pleased with his life. But this serves to support my point that being pleased with will not alone serve as an analysis of happiness, since at the very least, we need some additional condition in the analysis of happiness to distinguish "feeling" pleased from "really being" pleased. Thus, if we interpret Taylor's view (or any attitude view) as analyzing happiness as just having the attitude of being pleased with one's life, the view seems to fail. If, on the other hand, we add a condition or some other conditions to the analysis that have to do with the realizing of one's goals, the view has some plausibility, and in addition, seems close to my own view. I shall be arguing shortly that even this version, though, has problems, and the being pleased with can be part of an analysis of happiness if we reduce it to two conditions: (1) a negative condition, that one is not displeased with his life, and (2) a tendency or disposition of persons realizing life plans to be positively pleased with their lives.

I shall discuss one more version of an attitude theory of happiness, that of Jean Austin. Austin is offering suggestions concerning the analysis of happiness and is careful to point out
that her suggestions may not constitute a complete analysis of happiness. She says, for instance, "to like what one has got, rather than to get what one wants, is a necessary though not perhaps a sufficient condition of happiness." Later she stresses that any analysis of happiness must be done in terms of "liking and enjoying what one has got" rather than in terms of "wanting and getting what one wants." Thus, Austin claims the attitude of liking what one has may be a sufficient condition of happiness, but nevertheless it is a necessary condition. If it is not a sufficient condition, then it is not clear what other conditions must be added to make up a set of sufficient conditions. Perhaps satisfaction of important wants, together with the attitude of liking it is sufficient. (This would be basically the same as the third interpretation of Taylor, except that Taylor formulated the attitude in terms of "being pleased with." ) But here I can only speculate. What is clear is that for Austin the attitude of liking what one has, or liking one's life, is essential to happiness.

There are three arguments Austin offers for emphasizing the role of this attitude of liking in happiness. One stems from an analysis of Mill and Aristotle's views of happiness. Mill emphasizes an analysis in terms of pleasure and Aristotle in terms of virtue, but each seems to bring in the other's main notion. Mill is careful to argue that virtue yields important pleasures, and Aristotle is careful to argue that virtue (I would prefer "virtuous activity" here) yields pleasure. So neither pleasure nor virtue is sufficient for happiness. Austin then claims that this is so because an analysis of happiness should instead be directed at one's attitude toward one's life. If we fill in the argument a bit, we can get the claim that Mill realized that having pleasures alone won't do, and Aristotle realized that it is important for happiness that one like one's activity or state. Then Austin would claim that this attitude analysis brings out an important feature of happiness that was overlooked. A second argument is that it won't do to analyze happiness in terms of just satisfying wants, for sometimes we may not be pleased with the satisfaction of a want once we've got it. A third argument, which I won't go into in detail, is that the importance of an attitude of liking in happiness can be seen by examining predicates which seem to be logically incompatible with "happy." They include "lonely," "frustrated," "anxious," and "remorseful." Examining these, we can see that what makes them incompatible with happiness is that they involve disliking our situation. Thus, our attitude toward our situation is more important for happiness than what our particular situation is.

It seems to me that Austin's view ultimately fails. It fails because liking in the strong sense, as I have already argued, cannot be a necessary condition of happiness. She correctly notes some problems with historical views concerning happiness. Clearly there have been some shortcomings of these theories. They lack something, but it isn't clear that what they lack will be supplied by the condition of liking as a necessary condition. Nor is it clear that it is the only way of solving the problem of satisfactions of wants one isn't pleased with. The life plan view is another alternative. Finally, the argument about predicates incompatible with happiness implying dislike supports the claim I shall be arguing for later, that being displeased with or disliking one's life rules out happiness, but it doesn't follow from the argument that liking is a necessary condition of happiness.

Before giving an overall assessment of the attitude view, I shall indicate what the nature of happiness judgments would be on such a view. If one analyzes happiness in terms of being pleased with or liking one's life alone, then a third person judgment of happiness will be based on whether one believes the person has that attitude. One will perhaps look for symptoms of such an attitude in a person's verbal and nonverbal behavior. Attention
will have to be focused not on the person's situation or the conditions of his life, but rather on the person's reaction to or attitude toward it. First person judgments should be fairly reliable, barring insincerity. There is room for some self-deception, though, about whether one is pleased with or likes one's life. If happiness is a combination of such an attitude and something else, such as satisfaction of important wants, then happiness judgments will require information as to whether the person's important wants have been satisfied. A new kind of mistake is possible in first person judgments. A person may wrongly believe his important wants have been satisfied.

The attitude view has a number of strong advantages. First of all, it can handle two problematic phenomena: satisfaction of wants that leave a person unsatisfied, and people being unhappy and happy in similar sorts of circumstances. It is clear that often a person remains unsatisfied after the satisfaction of even a very important want. This dissatisfaction may have two different causes: first, he may find that what he wanted was not as great as he thought; second, he may find that once that important want is satisfied, he has a new important want that takes its place, and he remains an unsatisfied person. The attitude view can fairly easily handle this phenomenon and that of some people being happy in the same sort of situation other people will be unhappy in (e.g., Wittgenstein being happy living a sort of life that many people would find to be an unhappy one for themselves). The attitude theorist will emphasize that the attitude one takes toward one's life is more important than whether one's wants are satisfied or what situation one is in. The unsatisfied person is one who is not pleased with his life. But, I should note that there is another alternative here, the one I shall be opting for: the reason for the difference, and the reason why one is dissatisfied with his life and the other isn't might be that they have different aims. Though their circumstances are similar, their life plans may be different.

A second advantage of the attitude view is that it pictures persons as having more control over whether or not they are happy than many of the other views do. This control comes from the possibility of the individual's adopting a certain attitude toward life or changing the attitude he has. He is less at the mercy of external conditions than he is according to the identity or collection views. This seems to fit in with the examples we considered earlier that suggested one has a measure of control over whether he is happy, in terms of choosing his goals (e.g., Mill) or choosing the ideals by which he will measure his life.

Thus, there are advantages to the attitude view of happiness. However, there are some serious difficulties with it as a theory of the nature of happiness. In addition, I believe the theory of happiness I have been developing can account for the features that make up the advantages of the attitude view, while avoiding the difficulties.

First let us consider straight attitude views. I have already given some arguments against such views. We might note that the fact that typically attitude theorists have been forced to add conditions to their analyses should make us suspicious of the plausibility of a straight attitude view. Austin indicated she is not sure whether "liking what one has got" is a sufficient condition of happiness. Taylor seems to be driven to bringing in satisfaction of wants, and is very unclear about the relation he sees between this and the attitude of being pleased with life. It seems that other conditions must be added because "pleased with" is rather uninformative, and there are counterexamples to straight attitude views, both weak and strong versions.

We found that a straight attitude view interpreting "pleased with" in the strong sense seems to
exclude the Wittgenstein case. In addition, there seem to be cases of happy people not being pleased with their lives while going through trying difficulties or working for some future goal where the expectation is something they might be pleased with, but the work involved in achieving it is something one might not be pleased with (e.g., writing a book). The cases I am envisioning are cases where "displeased with one's life" would be too strong in the opposite way. One way the attitude theorist might try to handle this is to distinguish between a long-term and a short-term attitude and claim that one might have a long-term attitude of being pleased with his life while experiencing several short-term attitudes of not being pleased with his life. This might explain some cases, such as persons who say that the period of their lives when they were raising children was a happy one, although portions of it were disliked, such as times when children suffered illnesses, or occasions when the restrictions brought upon their lives by the raising of children were annoying, etc. However, it seems to me there are other cases, such as wars, social struggles, difficult projects (writing books, dissertations) where "pleased with" in the strong sense would seem to be inappropriate with regard to such a period of one's life, and yet it may be characterized as a happy one. My point is that the strong sense of "pleased with" is too strong. Something more like one's being in a state where one would have been displeased with one's life if it weren't lived in this way seems closer to the truth. I shall be saying more about this later. Thus, a straight attitude view of happiness, using a strong sense of "pleased with" or "liking" is unsatisfactory.

We've already seen that interpreting "pleased with" in the weak sense helps us only partly, for while it would allow these cases, there are counterexamples that can be brought up against it (e.g., the severely retarded and drugged persons). Thus, we might try mixed attitude views, those which claim that happiness is being pleased with or liking one's life, plus something else (such as satisfaction of one's major wants, realizing a life plan, etc.). There then will be two (or perhaps more) necessary conditions of happiness which together are sufficient.

I shall, in discussing this sort of view, leave out consideration of the additional condition or conditions, and deal with the question of whether an attitude of being pleased with or liking one's life is necessary for happiness. First let us consider the claim that being pleased with or liking one's life in the strong sense is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of happiness. It would seem that the above argument I gave against a strong version of the straight attitude view would also be an argument against any view where being pleased with in a strong sense is a necessary condition. Thus, we can now fairly easily dismiss the mixed view with being pleased with one's life in the strong sense as a necessary condition.

Second, let us consider a mixed view that claims that being pleased with or liking one's life in the weak sense is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of happiness. The counterexamples to the straight attitude view (weak sense) could be handled by the second condition. This view, it seems to me, is getting closer to the truth. I, myself, shall be arguing that "being pleased with" when interpreted as: (1) not being displeased with or disliking one's life, and (2) having a disposition or tendency to be pleased with one's life, is necessary for happiness. When we have weakened the attitude condition of happiness this much, though, and put the emphasis on another condition, as I do, I think we no longer have what would fairly be called an attitude view of happiness. Before I go on to spell out these new qualifications, I shall present a general argument against mixed attitude views of happiness.
If an attitude theorist, in giving an analysis, supplements the attitude of being pleased with one's life with another condition, such as satisfaction of one's major wants or the realizing of a life plan (and, as I have argued above, he seems to be forced to do this), it then may be questioned whether the attitude is really part of the concept of happiness, rather than being somehow contingently connected with the state of happiness. Several reasons can be adduced for considering it a by-product rather than part of the nature of happiness. First, we can note that when people are pleased with their lives (here I am assuming the strong sense of "pleased with" since a full-fledged attitude view would), reasons seem to be either given or implied as to why they are pleased, and these seem to be put in terms of attaining goals or something like the realizing of a life plan. In addition, it seems that we would not ascribe happiness to someone who was pleased with his life and the reason did not have to do with goals or a life plan, but instead being severely retarded, drugged, etc. Since the attitude is brought about by achieving goals or realizing a life plan, there is some plausibility in claiming that it is a by-product. Second, as I have argued above, being pleased (it should be remembered we are using it here in the strong sense) is not necessary for happiness. If this is so, and if when a happy person is pleased with his life he gives reasons why which he sees as causes of his attitude, it follows that such an attitude must be a contingent by-product rather than part of the nature of happiness.

Thus, any full-fledged attitude view of happiness, either mixed or a straight attitude view, seems to fail. However, as I have indicated, there may be something significant about the concept of happiness that the attitude view is getting at, particularly when considered in the weak sense of "attitude." In the next section I shall take this into account. I shall also show that the analysis of happiness as the realizing of a life plan has the same advantages as the attitude view without its disadvantages.

Further Development of the Life Plan View

My basic view, spelled out in the previous chapter, is that happiness is the realizing of a life plan. The realizing of the life plan is a higher order end which is made up of the relatively higher order ends a person has which might be called, roughly, his goals for his life: occupational goals, goals concerning the sort of life he wants to live, the kind of person he wants to be, important avocations goals, etc. These ends which are elements of the life plan can be identified in terms of their permanence (in the two ways described earlier), comprehensiveness and importance. We can distinguish between believing that one is happy and being happy. One can believe that one is happy without being happy, in cases where one believes one's life plan is being realized but it actually isn't. (I shall discuss this possibility of first person mistakes at greater length later in this chapter.) I deny that any particular feeling or that any attitude such as the ones I have just discussed is necessary for being happy. I have rejected the feeling views because no feeling, whether it be pleasure or some special kind of joy, lasts very long, and I have rejected the attitude view because an analysis in terms of an attitude alone won't work, and even if one argues for it as one necessary condition among several, there seem to be counterexamples, unless "pleased with" or "liking one's life" are used in a very weak sense, meaning roughly "not displeased" or "not disliking." There is, however, a certain truth about happiness that the accompanying feeling and attitude views have been getting at, I believe, and this would be something along the lines of the weak sense of "being pleased with one's life." What this actually is is two sorts of negative conditions concerning happiness and a weak positive condition (a disposition to have certain positive feelings and attitudes). The negative conditions, in particular, need to be added, because even though...
typically they obtain when a person is not realizing a life plan, there seem to be cases (melancholic depression, for instance) where a person can be realizing his life plan and yet be seriously dissatisfied or displeased with his life. This is an important contribution from the attitude views of happiness that needs to be included in an analysis of the concept.

I believe there are certain negative conditions governing the concept of happiness. Their presence rules out happiness. (This does not mean that one is happy provided those negative conditions don't apply. In addition, one must be realizing one's life plan.) It seems to me that there are two important negative conditions: (1) a serious dissatisfaction, either actual or just felt, and (2) having an attitude of being displeased with or disliking one's life (which typically will apply when the first condition does).

Adding these negative conditions does not amount to an abandoning of the life plan view, switching to another. There is a connection between the claim that happiness is the realizing of a life plan and these negative conditions. The connection is this: in those cases where a person is realizing his life plan but yet has serious felt dissatisfaction or is displeased with his life, he sees his life as an obviously unhappy one. The beliefs and attitudes he has about his life are those that are typical of a clear case of someone's not realizing his life plan. I shall now go on to consider these negative conditions.

First, a serious dissatisfaction, either actual or just felt, precludes happiness. In the case of an actual serious dissatisfaction, where one is somehow prevented from realizing an element of the life plan (with stress here on not realizing rather than not having realized, since it is the realizing which is important for happiness), it is obvious how this precludes happiness. However, in addition to actual dissatisfaction precluding happiness, felt dissatisfaction, even where there is no corresponding actual dissatisfaction, precludes happiness. This is the phenomenon most advantageous to the accompanying feeling and feeling views. Thus, if one feels that realizing one of the elements of one's life plan is impossible for some reason, happiness is precluded. Typically, of course, felt dissatisfaction accompanies actual dissatisfaction. However, there are numerous examples of persons feeling serious dissatisfaction, feeling their life plan isn't being or cannot be realized, where this does not correspond to what actually is the case. Some examples might be: believing (incorrectly) that one cannot attain an occupational goal because one is a failure; believing one cannot be the sort of person one wants to be (e.g., strong, loving, worthy, etc.), or believing one cannot live one's life in a certain way that is important to the person (e.g., after the loss of a loved one feeling that there is no possible replacement for the role of that person in one's life). Happiness is also precluded by believing that one is prevented from realizing one's life plan at all (e.g., through an impending undesired death). Another way felt dissatisfaction can occur is in terms of believing one's life plan lacks worth. Actual dissatisfaction is not necessary; felt dissatisfaction is enough. Thus, if one wrongly believes one's life plan is worthless or that one cannot realize one's life plan because of a terminal illness, happiness is precluded, even though in actuality one's life plan is worthwhile or one does not have the imagined terminal illness. In this negative way the feelings of persons are important, and if one believes one is unhappy in this way, one is unhappy. Therefore, persons' feelings can prevent happiness, though no special feelings constitute all or part of happiness.

Such felt dissatisfaction typically occurs in melancholic depression. (Simple depression would be related to actual dissatisfaction.) The view of happiness I have been arguing for nicely accommodates some of the explanations of depression. Let us consider as an example
that of Edward Bibring. He defines depression as "the emotional expression (indication) of a state of helplessness and powerlessness" (where powerlessness is a felt, subjective state)\textsuperscript{23} and "the emotional correlate\textsuperscript{24} of a partial or complete collapse of self-esteem of the ego, since it feels unable to live up to its aspirations (ego ideal, superego) while they are strongly maintained\textsuperscript{25}") Depression results from a tension within the ego, between its ideals and its feelings of being unable, for some reason, to attain any of these ideals. Typically these aspirations which the ego maintains fall into three categories: (1) a wish to be worthy and not inferior; (2) a wish to be strong and not insecure; and (3) a wish to be good and loving.\textsuperscript{26}

This view of depression fits in rather nicely with my view of the nature of happiness. The feeling of powerlessness to achieve aspirations can be interpreted as the feeling of powerlessness to realize an important element of the life plan that one still holds. Since that higher order end is still held, but the person believes he can no longer realize it, because of fate or some unchangeable personality trait such as weakness, aggressiveness, etc., it is easy to see why a person feels such a paralysis in this sort of state. Bibring stresses that the conflict whose affective correlate is depression is within the ego, and not between the ego and the id, superego, or environment.\textsuperscript{27} My view is compatible with this, since the life plan could be located in the ego (even where an ideal within the life plan has its source outside of the person, since in this case the ego has adopted and internalized this higher order desire), as well as the belief that one cannot realize an important part of the life plan. However, my view is not necessarily committed to the ego psychology of Bibring. Parts of the life plan could be located in the superego, if Bibring's broadened concept of the ego is unsatisfactory. Thus, any kind of feeling of dissatisfaction, believing that for some reason an important part of the life plan is unrealizable, is incompatible with happiness.

Now that I have shown that serious felt dissatisfaction can rule out happiness, I shall go on to a second kind of negative condition, an attitude of being displeased with or disliking one's life. Typically, such an attitude will be present when the first negative condition is present, felt dissatisfaction. When one is not realizing one's life plan, one is likely to be displeased with one's life. However, there may be some cases where a person is realizing his life plan and yet is displeased with his life. Later I shall discuss some ways in which dangers can exist in life plans and can be avoided rationally in certain ways. There I shall be concerned with ways life plans can be frustrated. Here I am concerned with cases where persons are realizing life plans, yet are displeased with their lives. I shall discuss four sorts of cases: one is melancholic depression, the second is where one's life plan is being realized, but it doesn't involve an interest the person has or is insufficiently challenging, not making sufficient use of a person's abilities; the third sort of case is where one's life plan is too easily realized so that a person soon feels goalless; the fourth is where one loses interest in one's goals, where one's life plan or elements in it no longer seem worthwhile.

The first sort of case, where one may be realizing one's life plan but yet be displeased with one's life, is that of melancholic depression. The dissatisfaction caused by an incorrect belief that one cannot realize some important higher order goals typically will cause a person to be displeased with his life. Since I have already discussed depression in looking at the first negative condition, serious felt dissatisfaction, I shall not go into it further here.

The second and third sorts of cases are more difficult to discuss. What makes them difficult to discuss is that it is hard to distinguish these cases from cases where a life plan is
actually not being realized, and the attitude of being displeased with one's life results from this failure to realize one's life plan. What is going on in the following two cases is something like this: sometimes persons have what we sight call "conscious life plans" that in some way fail to include some important interest of the person. In other words, sometimes persons have higher order ends that go unrecognized and unattained. In such cases the higher order ends the person has that he's aware of (the conscious life plan) may be realized, and yet the person is displeased with his life.

The second sort of case is where a person has a conscious life plan that he is in the process of realizing and yet finds that he is displeased with his life. One way this can occur is through one's life plan not being fully rational, in the sense that it neglects an interest that is important for that person. In one sense, if it is a strong interest, it is an element in his actual life plan, though not in his conscious life plan. For example, suppose someone has an interest in producing artifacts of various sorts; he enjoys working with his hands. His occupation, though it satisfies a number of important needs, does not involve this sort of activity. His avocations, for some reason or another, do not include this sort of activity either. If it is important enough to that person, he may be displeased with his life, even though he is realizing his conscious life plan.

Another way this kind of displeasure with one's life can occur is through one's life plan being insufficiently challenging. People enjoy exercising their abilities and enjoy activities that are relatively more complicated, making use of more of their abilities. Rawls refers to this as the "Aristotelian Principle," based in part on R. V. White's theory of "effectance motivation," a desire to achieve mastery of something for its own sake. Given this psychological fact, if a person's conscious life plan doesn't make sufficient use of his abilities, or isn't challenging enough, it might leave him displeased with it even when he is realizing it, although in many cases he might not be displeased, but just not as pleased as he might be. For an example, let us consider a case which is not about realizing a life plan, but rather realizing a goal concerning one's occupation. There has been much criticism of assembly-line work where the worker does one sort of task repeatedly, and evidence that in factories where workers switch operations on the assembly line, the job seems to be less boring because it is more challenging. Moving now to life plans, if this principle is true, then a person may be realizing his conscious life plan and yet be displeased with his life because it isn't sufficiently challenging and doesn't make sufficient use of his abilities.

The second sort of case involved being displeased with one's life even when the life plan is being realized, because the life plan being acted on fails to include certain interests or makes insufficient use of a person's abilities. A third sort of case involves being displeased with one's life even when the conscious life plan is being realized because the life plan is, in a sense, too easy. If a person has a life plan consisting of a number of important goals that are relatively easy to realize, he may find himself achieving these goals and then feeling goalless. On my view happiness is the realizing of a life plan, and for this to be occurring, it is necessary that a person have some wants which haven't been satisfied. This may be related to a psychological phenomenon that Abraham Maslow has noted. He calls his explanation of it the "Grumble Theory." He points out that once a desire is satisfied, it tends to be forgotten, and is replaced by a new desire. "Apparently we function best when we wish for something that we do not have, and when we organize our powers in the service of striving..."
toward the gratification of that wish. I shall make some more remarks about this later, when I discuss rationality and life plans.

The fourth sort of case, where one's life plan or an element in it no longer seems worthwhile to a person, has to do with one of the aspects of self-esteem with regard to life plans: that one's life plan seems worthwhile. The other aspect of self-esteem has to do with a person's belief that he has the ability to realize elements of his life plan. Some cases of persons lacking this aspect of self-esteem were discussed with regard to depression. J. S. Mill affords us a nice example of a person's life plan no longer seeming worthwhile to him. In the portion of his Autobiography where he discusses his mental crisis he says:

... it occurred to me to put the question directly to myself: "Suppose that all your objects in life were realized; that all the changes in institutions and opinions which you are looking forward to, could be completely effected at this very instant: would this be a great joy and happiness to you?" And an irrepressible self-consciousness distinctly answered, "No!" At this my heart sank within me: the whole foundation on which my life was constructed fell down. All my happiness was to have been found on the continual pursuit of this end. The end had ceased to charm, and how could there ever again be any interest in the means? I seemed to have nothing to live for.

In a case like this, one sight be realizing one's life plan, but yet because one finds oneself without any desire to realize it, one is not happy. A species of this sort of attitude of being displeased with or disliking one's life is the experience of realizing one's goals aren't really one's own, an experience sometimes referred to as a kind of self-alienation. This seems to be true of Mill's case, given his feeling at this time that his goals weren't really his, but his father's. The risk of this seems to be one of the dangers of life plans that include elements that are not authentic desires of the individual, desires that would not be kept by the person if he became fully aware of their nature.

Thus, there are certain negative conditions governing the concept of happiness; having either serious felt dissatisfaction or an attitude of disliking or being displeased with one's life rules out happiness. As I indicated earlier, these fit in with the main condition of my analysis, the realizing of a life plan, in that cases where the life plan is being realized but nevertheless happiness is precluded by one of the negative conditions obtaining are cases where a person views his life as one who is not realizing his life plan would. His beliefs and attitudes about his life are those of a person who is not realizing his life plan.

I believe it is true that those who are happy have a disposition to experience certain positive feelings, enjoyments, and to have favorable attitudes toward their lives. This, again, is emphasized by the feeling and attitude views. I shall question whether it is as significant for an analysis of the concept as feeling and attitude theories have maintained.

First let us consider feelings and the question of whether the experience of certain feelings must be included in the analysis of happiness. It seems to me that a happy person has a disposition to experience pleasures or enjoyments. Some will be relatively universal enjoyments, such as those of food, sex, etc. Those which might be thought to be unique to happy persons are enjoyments arising from realizing elements of the life plan. It would seem that typically happy persons do experience enjoyments while undergoing the process of realizing elements of their life plans. Realizing an end, even a higher order end, typically has pleasure as a by-product. But this is not unique to happy people. Those who are not probably
experience some such enjoyments, but have some major dissatisfaction or are generally displeased with their lives. Therefore, I would maintain that happy people tend to have such pleasures or enjoyments, but such enjoyments are not unique to happy people.

Nor are such enjoyments necessary for happiness. They are not necessary for a number of reasons. First, I have argued that happiness is the realizing of a life plan. Typically (i.e., in cases where the person doesn't have a single dominant end) this will involve the realizing of a number of higher order ends. The realizing of such an end is different from any enjoyment which may be a by-product. So, conceptually, what is necessary for happiness is the realizing of the higher order ends that make up one's life plan. Second, there seem to be cases of realizing life plans where no enjoyment or special pleasure seems to occur as a by-product. I earlier discussed C. C. W. Taylor's claim that some things wanted for their own sake (such as a philosopher's desire to discover the truth) are not actions or passions of a person, and therefore not a possible object of enjoyment. As an example of a person in whose life this sort of goal played an important role he gives Wittgenstein. As I noted earlier, though from accounts of his life enjoyments played a very minor role, if any, at the end of his life he said to someone who was present: "Tell them it's been a wonderful life." This kind of life, where a major goal was working out philosophical problems in an obsessive way, seems to be a counterexample to a claim that enjoyment of some special kind of pleasure must accompany happiness. It seems to be more a case of seeking something because one would be very dissatisfied not doing so, rather than because one gets great satisfaction or pleasure doing so. Lives with such little enjoyment that are happy may be rather rare, but as long as it is possible it is necessary in an analysis of the concept that we not have enjoyment (except in a very weak sense of "doing what one wants to do") as a necessary condition.

Another kind of counterexample might be persons devoted to causes or to the welfare of others. Kenny suggests, wrongly or misleadingly, I believe, such persons cannot be seeking happiness. He says "people may be trained from childhood to pursue an ideal such as the service of the Party, or obedience to God, without this necessarily being presented to them as means to their own happiness in this life or in another life. A daughter, from the first moment at which she is of an age to manage her own life, may forgo the prospect of marriage and congenial company and creative work in order to nurse a bedridden parent." It is true that such a person might not be raised in this way to seek happiness, but we must distinguish that from the possibility of his seeking the goal and being happy doing it. If such a life involves frustrating an important element of one's life plan that is retained in the life plan, then it will be an unhappy life. However, I see no reason to rule out devotion to a cause or to the welfare of others as a higher order end within the life plan, even when there is no resulting enjoyment. Therefore, enjoyment, or a special kind of pleasure, is not necessary for happiness. The only way one can plausibly argue that enjoyment is necessary is if a very weak sense of "enjoyment" is used, such as "doing what one wants to do." But that is not the sense of "enjoyment" feeling theorists have had in mind.

So much for the question of whether certain feelings are necessary for happiness. Let us now consider whether a positive attitude such as being pleased with one's life is a necessary part of the analysis of the concept of happiness. It seems to me that typically a happy person will be pleased with his life. This follows from the notion of realizing one's life plan. But I think this would have to be "being pleased with one's life" in a rather weak sense ("not being displeased"). Earlier I mentioned cases where a person isn't displeased, but yet might not be pleased with his life, because of some difficulty he is going through, such as illness of himself or a loved one, some difficult future goal being worked on (such as writing a book),
economic difficulties, etc. What is important for happiness is not being pleased (in the strong sense) with one's life, but rather not being displeased.

Thus, I believe happy persons tend to experience pleasures and enjoyments in realizing their life plans and tend to have attitudes such as liking, being pleased with their lives. But this is not true of all cases of happiness, and therefore is not a necessary component in an analysis of happiness. Such things are contingent and will vary according to the nature of the elements of a person's life plan and differences in temperament. What is necessary, and must be included in my analysis of happiness, is that if a person feels significant dissatisfaction or is displeased with his life, that rules out happiness. Thus, feelings and attitudes come into the analysis in terms of negative conditions (felt dissatisfaction or being displeased with one's life in a significant way rules out happiness) and a weak dispositional condition (having a disposition to experience positive feelings and attitudes).

At this point I might make some general comments about the sort of analysis I have offered. My analysis emphasizes happiness as an objective state of affairs (the realizing of a life plan). I do not put emphasis on subjective states of the individual, such as his beliefs and attitudes, except indirectly, in bringing in the negative conditions and the weak positive condition. I have done this because it seems to me that this is the way the concept of happiness operates. Happiness, on my view, basically is a state of affairs in which the higher order ends of an individual are being realized (whether he has any pleasures related to the realizing of these ends and is positively pleased with his life or not). To be sure, certain subjective states of the individual are typically implied by the realizing of the life plan (e.g., that the person probably has enjoyments, probably believes he is realizing his life plan, or at least doesn't believe he's not realizing it, etc.). This seems to follow from the notion of realizing one's higher order ends. Where subjective states of the individual become important in the analysis of the concept is where the subjective states seem to be out of line with the objective state of affairs, cases where a life plan is being realized but one has serious felt dissatisfaction or is displeased with his life. Adding these negative conditions does not involve moving away from the main condition of the analysis (realizing the life plan), but rather qualifying it by noting that there are cases where a person views his life as the life of an unhappy person and is unhappy, even though his life plan is being realized.

My view then captures what is true about feeling and attitude views without running into the difficulties they run into by over-stressing the role of feelings and attitudes in the concept of happiness. My view also has the advantages that these views have. For instance, in discussing the attitude views I pointed out that one of the reasons given in favor of the view was that the occurrence of the attainment of some wants that people have which they don't find satisfying makes emphasis on the attitude a person takes to his life plausible. This phenomenon can be explained on my view in terms of the wants' not fitting in with the important elements of the life plan, or one's losing interest in a goal in case the want did originally fit in with the life plan. Another reason given for holding the attitude view was that it easily accounts for different people in similar circumstances being happy or unhappy. This is easily explained on my view by noting that the life plans of these individuals may be different. Still another advantage of the attitude view was the implication that happiness is something that a person has a degree of control over. My view allows for this in that a person can change elements of his life plan, though this is not done frequently. Therefore, the life plan view seems preferable to the alternative views, both those discussed in this chapter and those discussed in Chapter Two.
Now I would like to focus more closely on the issue of what is the nature of happiness judgments. I shall discuss the implications of my theory on the issue, and then compare my view with those of Hare, J. J. C. Smart, and von Wright, who claim that happiness judgments are normative.

According to the view I have been arguing for, happiness consists of the realizing of a life plan and the absence of both felt serious dissatisfaction and an attitude of being displeased with one's life. In a first person happiness judgment, it will be easy to determine whether the negative conditions obtain. A first person judgment about whether one is realizing one's life plan is more difficult. One difficulty that presents itself immediately is that if one were to ask someone "Are you happy?", the person might be confused, either not knowing for sure what is meant by "happy" by the person asking the question, or by believing that happiness is, for instance, a special kind of feeling, perhaps a state of continued euphoria. Assuming this sort of confusion is cleared up, a person has to determine whether his life plan is being realized (he already knows that the negative conditions don't obtain). His life plan may be sketchy in his mind. He may have to think about what his higher order ends are and whether he's realizing them, particularly if there are no obvious serious dissatisfactions that he has. A person is, however, better able to judge whether he is realizing his life plan than another person is.

Third person judgments about someone's higher order ends can be made in a behavioristic way, observing behavior patterns in an individual. However, this leaves out an important element in the concept of a plan: that it is not just patterns in a person's behavior, but some sort of design or scheme that a person wants to follow in the choices he makes in his life. The plan may be very sketchy, inconsistent, wide open (e.g., a plan to live spontaneously), but such plans are still plans.

Even though first person judgments about whether one is realizing one's life plan are more apt to be correct than third person judgments, there is a possibility of mistake. Someone may judge that he is realizing his life plan when he really isn't. First, he may be factually misinformed. For instance, someone might believe that he is realizing a higher order end of being a great poet, but be mistaken because his poetry, though he would refuse to admit it, is extremely bad poetry. Or someone might believe that his occupation fits in with his higher order ends better than any other, when in actuality there is another occupation which would include more of his higher order ends. In this case his life plan is, in a sense, being realized. It is the degree to which it is (and, correspondingly, the degree of his happiness) that he is mistaken about. Second, he may be unaware of, perhaps by forgetting, a certain higher order end and its importance to him. When one is determining whether one is realizing one's life plan there may be a tendency to overlook respects in which one is not realizing one's life plan. Third, if there are unconscious desires, perhaps some are relatively higher order desires and need to be considered in determining whether one is realizing one's life plan. There are some difficult questions involved in this notion of unconscious desires which I do not wish to discuss here. I just want to indicate this possible cause of mistakes in first person happiness judgments. Thus, first person judgments about realizing life plans are not incorrigible. If a person is careful to dispassionately consider his higher order ends, taking into account these possible sources of error, this would seem to be the most reliable sort of judgment about realizing life plans that can be made.
A problem arises concerning first person happiness judgments with regard to the realizing of goals that are very difficult. For instance, let us suppose that someone has as a higher order end being president of the United States, and in reality has not made much obvious progress toward the attainment of that goal, but is trying and is not displeased with his life. Let us furthermore assume that this person has true beliefs about where he is with respect to the achievement of this goal. (If a person is seriously deluded about the realizing of his life plan we would probably judge him to be unhappy though he believes he is happy.) As long as he is trying to attain this higher order end and as long as what he is doing to attain it is not obviously failing and he is not dissatisfied seriously, it seems to me that he is realizing this element of his life plan. In general, it is the realizing and not having realized that is important for happiness, and in the case of very difficult long-range goals, one can be realizing the life plan even if no noticeably significant progress has been made. Of course, one of the difficulties one faces in such difficult goals is that of dissatisfaction or being displeased with one's life should one come to be disappointed.

When we move to third person happiness judgments we must take care to distinguish between the judgment "he is happy" and the judgment "he should be happy." Sometimes persons are judged to be happy when it is observed that they have had very good fortune, are very talented, etc., meaning really that they should be happy, given this good fortune. On my view, a third person judgment of happiness will be a judgment that the negative conditions about dissatisfaction and being displeased don't obtain, and that the person is as a matter of fact realizing his life plan. Such judgments will have to be based on behavioral evidence, the avowals of the individual, and knowledge of the circumstances of his life. Typically, a third person judgment of unhappiness will be easier than one of happiness, since dissatisfaction and displeasure with one's life are apt to show in one's behavior. For determining whether a person's life plan is being realized, we are dependent on the individual's avowals, and our knowledge of the circumstances of his life. Here our third person judgments are open to mistakes because of insincerity as well as errors in the first person judgment.

It should be noted that there are two sorts of "he should be happy" judgments. One is where, on the basis of good fortune, wealth, great talent, etc., one asserts that the person should be happy, meaning either that there is a great probability of the person's being happy or that one would be happy oneself if one were the other person. This sort of "should be happy" judgment is open to some degree of error because of first, a lack of knowledge of the other person's higher order ends, and knowledge of whether the negative conditions I discussed apply, and, second, the possibility that one reads one's own higher order ends into the other person's life. The second sort of "he should be happy" judgment is made when one observes a person who is either actually realizing his life plan, but either has some felt strong dissatisfaction (e.g., he is depressed and the "should be happy" judgment means "You'd be happy if you just stopped thinking you are a failure") or dislikes his life, or is not realizing his life plan, but could be, if he revised it (e.g., "He expects too much of himself. He feels he should be a great artist or not one at all, and though he's not great, he is good."). This sort of "should be happy" judgment is actually a recommendation, and, except for the prediction included in it, is not true or false. In the rest of my discussion I shall be focusing on "he is happy" judgments rather than "he should be happy" judgments.

Before moving on to the views of others, it should be noted that on my view neither first nor third person happiness judgments are normative. This will be one respect in which my view will differ from the views of Hare, Smart, and von Wright.
Normative Views of Happiness Judgments

The first of the views that claim that happiness judgments are in some respect normative I shall examine is that of R. M. Hare. He argues in *Freedom and Reason* that happiness is a normative rather than an empirical concept, because happiness judgments involve appraisal both in their first person and third person forms. He focuses on third person judgments. He says:

To be brief, we may say that, when somebody calls somebody else happy, there is a rather complicated process of appraisal going on; for the appraisals of both of them are involved, but in a different way. The person who is making the judgment is appraising the life of the other person; but not entirely from the speaker's own point of view. . . . Deciding whether to call somebody else happy is an exercise of the imagination. . . . In asking whether another person is happy, we have, before we can begin to answer, to imagine ourselves in his shoes.  

Thus, on Hare's view, when we judge a person to be happy, we are not just reporting on his state of mind, or some condition of his life. When we judge a person to be happy we are appraising or evaluating his life, largely from his own point of view, except in those cases where we disapprove of imagining ourselves having his likes and dislikes. In such cases we might claim he is satisfied but not happy (such cases as a mental defective or an opium addict).

A judgment of the individual's state of mind is part of this complex judgment. Hare indicates that when we put ourselves in this person's shoes, we appraise his life from his point of view, asking whether he likes his life. Hare suggests that we might sometimes judge a person to be happy when we have reason to believe he doesn't like his life, on the grounds that we believe someone in that sort of situation should be happy. He does note a negative condition we operate with here, though:

"However highly we appraise the state of life of a person, we cannot call him happy if he hates every minute of his existence."  

Thus, on Hare's view, a first person judgment is an appraisal of one's own life. In it he examines his life and is happy if he judges that he likes it.

A third person judgment involves appraising his life by imaginatively putting oneself in his shoes and asking whether one would like one's life if one were that person. In doing so one cannot entirely leave one's own shoes, and where his desires and interests are such that one is very much against having them oneself, one cannot judge him to be happy.

In Hare's view there is no notion of a life plan operating. Happiness for him has to do mainly with liking a certain sort of life, with emphasis on liking being a certain form of approval or evaluation, not just an attitude toward one's life. I think my view of happiness gives a much more accurate picture of both first and third person happiness judgments. In the case of third person judgments in particular, Hare's view seems quite implausible. He fails to distinguish clearly between "he is happy" and "he should be happy." Even though we're very much averse to having the desires of an opium addict, providing that he is not seriously dissatisfied or dislikes his life and is realizing his life plan (perhaps he has a dominant end of having as many pleasant feeling states as possible of the sort that opium can produce) it seems to me we would judge him to be happy. It may be an irrational, risky kind of happiness, because it
involves an irrational life plan. And it may be an immoral kind of happiness, if it harms others in certain ways. Nevertheless, an irrational kind of happiness and an immoral kind of happiness is still a kind of happiness. The mental defective (Hare's example is of a man who can enjoy only food and dislikes only pain, cold, starvation, etc.) can be ruled out because presumably such a person is incapable of having a life plan, incapable of having higher order ends.

J. J. C. Smart's view of happiness is similar to Hare's in claiming that the concept of happiness is in a significant respect normative. He is led to this view by consideration of the dispute between qualitative and non-qualitative hedonism concerning whether some pleasures are in some non-quantitative way better than others. He focuses the issue on an example of his own.\textsuperscript{43} Noting experiments that have been done on rats where they seem to be able to induce pleasurable experiences in themselves by bar-pressing, thereby inducing an electrical charge in a region of the brain into which electrodes have been planted, Smart speculates on the possibility of devices allowing humans to do the same to themselves. Asking whether an "electrode operator" who works during the day and then comes home in the evening to spend a few hours giving himself extremely pleasant experiences in this way is happy, Smart concludes that our reluctance to call him happy is due to the evaluative aspect of the concept.

According to Smart there is a descriptive component of the concept of happiness which consists of contentment and enjoyment: "For a man to be happy, he must, as a minimal condition, be fairly contented and moderately enjoying himself."\textsuperscript{44} But there is an evaluative component, which is to have a favorable attitude toward one's having that kind of contentment and enjoyment. In the case of the electrode operator, even though he is contented and getting enjoyment, we are reluctant to call him happy because we disapprove of the kind of enjoyment and contentment he has.

Thus, according to Smart's view, a third person happiness judgment consists of a judgment that a person is content and has enjoyments, and in addition, an expression of our approving of this kind of contentment and enjoyment. The descriptive part is susceptible to the usual sorts of mistakes. It would seem that the evaluative part is open to mistakes only indirectly, where the beliefs upon which we have based our evaluation are incorrect.

Smart doesn't specifically discuss first person happiness judgments. They would seem to involve a judgment that one is content and has enjoyments and an approval of this kind of contentment and enjoyment. There is a possibility of mistakes here, due to self-deception, for instance, about whether one is really content.

Smart's emphasis on contentment and enjoyment (he uses a weak sense of "enjoyment," the Rylean sense of "doing what you want to be doing and not to be wanting to do anything else")\textsuperscript{45} is not incompatible with my own view, though my view offers a much fuller analysis. Where our views differ is on the claim that there is a normative element in the concept. Like Hare, he fails to distinguish between "he is happy" and "he should be happy." I believe that a third person judgment that someone is happy is a judgment that he is, as a matter of fact, happy, regardless of whether we believe he should be happy. Some cases may be difficult, such as the electrode operator. They are difficult, though, not because we are not sure whether we approve of such a life (that is a different question), but because we are not really sure whether such a person would not have some dissatisfaction with his life or not really be realizing a life plan. Once we've eliminated these possibilities (which may be a psychologically difficult thing to do), then I believe we would say that such a person is...
happy. The judgment is difficult because we find it hard to believe that such a life could really satisfy the logical conditions of happiness.

In insisting on the normative element of happiness in third person judgments both Hare and Smart run into the following problem. A conflict between first and third person judgments is easily possible (e.g., in the electrode operator case). Assuming that any descriptive part (e.g., Smart's contentment and enjoyment) is judged truly to be satisfied in both, both judgments, on Hare's and Smart's views, would seem to be correct. So he is happy (because he judges himself to be happy) and he is not happy (because he is judged by another to be not happy). This kind of contradiction is made possible by allowing the attitudes of approval and disapproval to figure into the concept. I think we are unwilling to let this contradiction be eliminated by claiming that what it means is that his kind of life is approved by him and not approved by another, for we believe he is either happy or unhappy and that is what is being questioned. My disapproving of his life doesn't mean he is unhappy, but rather that I wouldn't like to live his kind of life, or I'd hate to see people living this sort of life on aesthetic or moral grounds.

G. H. von Wright holds an attitude theory of happiness in which first person happiness judgments are normative, but not third person judgments. A first person happiness judgment is an evaluation of one's life. Liking one's life as it is is being happy. There is a concealed logical form in a happiness judgment. It seems to be the attribution of a property, but rather it is an indication of a relationship: "if a man says of himself 'I am happy,' he manifests in words an attitude which he takes, or a relationship, in which he stands, to the circumstances of life." In this respect happiness judgments are similar to hedonic judgments. "X is pleasant" at first seems to be an attribution of a property to X, but really is an expression of an attitude toward X. First person happiness judgments are not true or false, since they express a subject's valuations of his own circumstances. A person cannot be mistaken in a first person happiness judgment, except in the sense that his expression may be insincere. Von Wright excludes the possibility of self-deception, claiming that the criterion of the insincerity of such a judgment is that the person admits it.

A third person happiness judgment, when it is not a judgment such as "he should be happy," is a judgment about a person's valuation of his own life. Therefore, it can be true or false, depending on whether the person really does hold that attitude toward his life. Therefore, third person judgments are open to error due to the insincerity of the subject, one's lack of knowledge of his attitude toward his life, and the possibility that one lets his evaluations of whether the subject should or should not be happy influence his judgment.

I have already argued against attitude theories of happiness in general. It seems to me that von Wright has correctly noted that there is a kind of subjectivity of first person happiness judgments, but has exaggerated it. Such judgments are subjective in the sense that the individual himself is best able to judge whether he has a serious dissatisfaction or is displeased with his life and whether he is realizing his life plan. But such judgments are not subjective in the sense of being expressions of one's evaluative attitude toward one's life. Von Wright doesn't allow for enough objectivity in such judgments. When a person judges himself to be happy, he is not just saying he likes his life. He may be in part saying that, but judging he likes it is secondary to judging he is not dissatisfied, does not dislike his life, and that he is realizing his life plan. Von Wright's view doesn't allow enough room for error in first person happiness judgments, nor for the kind of objectivity implied.

Von Wright's view of third person happiness judgments is closer to my own than Hare's or
Smart's is, though on my view a third person judgment is not just a judgment that a person has a certain attitude toward his life. His view does not result in the puzzle about disagreement between first and third person judgment that the views of both Hare and Smart result in.

Thus, it seems incorrect to claim that "happiness" is normative in either its first or third person uses. The term can be used in making normative claims, especially when someone prefaces it with "true" or "real" (e.g., "Real happiness can be found only in a life of service to God" or "The truly happy life is one of serving others"), but that does not make the term itself normative. I have argued that the life plan analysis of happiness must be developed a little further to include besides the main condition of realizing a life plan the negative conditions concerning felt dissatisfaction and attitudes of being displeased with or disliking one's life. These negative conditions are truths about happiness that seem to give the attitude and accompanying feeling views their plausibility. Another truth about happiness that lends plausibility to these views but gets overstressed in them is that happy people have a tendency to experience positive feelings and attitudes. By adding the weak condition claiming that happy people have this tendency or disposition to the life plan view, that view can be seen to capture what is true about the attitude and accompanying feeling views without running into the difficulties those views have. The life plan view offers an analysis of happiness judgments that is better than those these views would offer, as well as the alternative views discussed in Chapter Two, and the views of Hare, Smart and von Wright which claim that the concept has a significant normative component.

**Rationality and Happiness**

Throughout my discussion of happiness' as the realizing of a life plan and the absence of serious felt dissatisfaction and an attitude of being displeased with or disliking one's life, I have made no assumption about the life plan being a rational one. I have done this because I believe it is possible for a person to be happy pursuing a life plan which is not a rational one. It may be a risky sort of happiness, but we should not rule out happiness in such a case.

Rawls distinguishes between happiness defined objectively and happiness defined subjectively. The basic definition of happiness is that it is the successful execution of a life plan, combined with confidence that the success will continue. When we define happiness objectively (which is the definition Rawls prefers), we assume the life plan being pursued is one which is rational for that person, and that his confidence of continued success is based on sound beliefs. When we define it subjectively, it turns out as:

> A person is happy when he believes that he is in the way of a successful execution (more or less) of a rational life plan, . . . adding the rider that if he is mistaken or deluded, then by contingency and coincidence nothing transpires to disabuse him of his misconceptions.\(^{50}\)

In the case of a person who is happy in the latter sense and has an irrational life plan or mistaken beliefs about his continued success, we are tempted to say that he is not really happy. We are so tempted, I believe, because of the fairly good chance that something will go wrong, not because he may not really be happy.

It seems to me that Rawls is wrong in claiming that happiness is the realizing of a rational life plan. Rationality to some degree is built into the notion of a life plan, but not to the degree that Rawls suggests. What is built into the concept of happiness is that a person must be a
rational being in order to have higher order ends (plans), to have the ability to adjust elements of a life plan, and also to choose means to bring about the ends he has. What is not built into the concept of happiness is that one's desires and beliefs are fully rational, and that one's life plan is that plan out of alternative life plans one would choose with deliberative rationality. I think Rawls is incorrect in claiming that happiness requires rationality in this strong sense.

There are several arguments that can be used to support my claim. First of all, if this strong degree of rationality is part of the concept of happiness, then it makes the concept too narrow, ruling out what seem to be obvious cases of happiness. For instance, let us suppose that someone has as an important element in his life plan having a great degree of economic security, and that his strong desire for this stems from deprivation of such security while young, and that if he were to clear-headedly think about this desire, he would try to reduce its intensity a great deal. If this person is realizing this aim, he can still be seen as being happy, all other things being equal, even though this is an aim desired irrationally. Second, Rawls' view seems to imply that third person happiness judgments are evaluative. Since Rawls claims that the rational life plan for a person determines his good, it would follow that if I truly claim X is happy, I am, in addition to claiming that he is realizing his life plan, also claiming that it is a rational plan, and thus a good plan to have. I already argued that third person happiness judgments are not evaluative, but are rather judgments that a person is realizing his life plan, and has no serious dissatisfaction and is not displeased with his life. Thus, Rawls' view incorrectly implies that third person happiness judgments are evaluative. His analysis of happiness builds too strong a notion of rationality into the concept of happiness.

Thus far I have been arguing that full rationality is not part of the concept of happiness, and this is why I object to including it in the analysis of happiness. I would hasten to note, though, that rationality in our life plans is a very valuable thing. It is valuable because it makes our life plans safer, less risky. The problem with the realizing of a life plan that is in some sense irrational (not the best plan given my ends, or including some irrational desires and beliefs) is not that it isn't happiness, but rather that it is a risky, dangerous happiness. The person realizing a rational life plan may be happier and more secure in his happiness, and for that reason his life is more choiceworthy than that of the man with a life plan that is in some respect irrational. An important kind of risk involved is this: the belief that one's life plan is rational, that it is a good one to have, seems to be an important feature of life plans, and part of self-respect. Finding out that an element of one's life plan is irrational (e.g., having as a goal becoming a doctor, then finding out one is not suited for that profession) is very distressing. So a belief that one's life plan is rational may be important in happiness. Therefore, it seems to be true that people do, in a sense, desire the realizing of a rational life plan: they would find it disturbing were they to discover that their life plan is in some respect irrational, and life plans that are in some respect irrational are risky. It is the riskiness of a not fully rational life plan that is the problem with it, and what makes it desirable to avoid such a life plan. However, it is a mistake to build full rationality into the concept of happiness.

Now I would like to go on to discuss some features of rational life plans, and ways in which things can go wrong with respect to realizing of the life plan. First of all, there are some principles of rational choice commonly recognized which can readily be applied to life plans, and I shall briefly consider them. Rawls applies three principles of rational choice to plans, both subplans and life plans: (1) the principle of effective means, (2) the principle of greater likelihood, and (3) the principle of inclusiveness. The first two are fairly straightforward. In the case of the first principle, that of effective means, one plan is preferable to another
if it provides for more effective means for realizing the ends we have. For instance, if one vocation rather than another realizes more of the ends I have, it is to be preferred. The second, the principle of greater likelihood, is that if two plans provide for the realizing of the same ends, one should be preferred over the other if the chances are greater of its realizing its ends.

The third, the principle of inclusiveness, requires a bit more explanation. Basically, the principle of inclusiveness stipulates that we should prefer one plan over another if it, in addition to providing for the realizing of the ends the other plan provides for, provides for the realizing of at least one other end as well. When we apply this to a life plan, this principle suggests that the life plan which allows for the realizing of more present ends and of more ends in the future is better (assuming the chances of realizing the larger set of ends are as great as the chances of realizing the smaller set, and the principle of greater likelihood takes care of this). Rawls defends his application of the principle of inclusiveness to life plans by appealing to what he calls the "Aristotelian Principle": "Other things being equal human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities, and . . . this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity." The more inclusive life plan is preferable because it involves more of our abilities to realize ends. I think Rawls has noted an important characteristic of happiness and life plans here. Human beings derive greater happiness out of life plans employing more of their abilities. Part of this may be due to the great unpleasantness of boredom. An aspect of this I shall be discussing shortly is the danger of life plans that are too simple, leaving a person with a realized plan and no conscious plan to continue with.

Another way in which the principle of inclusiveness can be defended in its application to life plans is to note two things: first, that plans which provide for the realization of more of our present ends are obviously preferable, and second, in the case of ends we do not yet have, we know that persons' life plans change and develop, so a plan which allows for new and changing ends is preferable for providing room for these changes.

The principle of inclusiveness, when applied to life plans, is not only a way of improving the life plan. In addition, it is a way of avoiding the kind of attitude of being displeased with one's life even when a life plan is being realized that I discussed earlier, where that attitude results from one's life plan not being challenging enough or not using enough of one's abilities.

If one is to have a rational plan of life, these three principles are valuable in choosing the elements of one's life plan: one's occupational goals, goals concerning personal relationships, goals concerning one's personality, avocational goals, etc. The value of a rational life plan lies in the greater likelihood of its realization. In addition to these principles of rational choice that Rawls applies to life plans, there are a number of other characteristics of rational life plans that I would like to note which Rawls does not discuss. I shall discuss these characteristics in terms of ways things can go wrong with life plans.

One danger with regard to life plans and subplans is that of the plan's being too specific. I have previously emphasized, to counteract the temptation to construe a plan as an elaborate blueprint, that plans are often rather open and vague. There is great value in this openness of plans. Specific goals or ends pose threats in two ways: (1) they are sometimes harder to achieve than relatively open goals, and (2) if too much of one's life plan consists of specific goals, one could find oneself planless when the specific goals are attained. The first threat, the difficulty of achieving some specific goals, arises from the fact that the more specific
an end is, the fewer activities or events there are which will satisfy this end. Thus, if I have as an important end that of becoming president of the American Philosophical Association, the difficulty of realizing this end is greater than a more open end, such as that of being in a position of administration in some academic organization. A simpler example, having to do with a lower order end, would be that a desire to own one particular house may be more difficult to achieve than the desire to own a house (but not one particular house). The second threat posed by specific goals is that of having a lack of plans when the ends are attained. Now, of course, a life plan will usually be composed of a number of important higher order ends which in turn are composed of a number of important higher order ends which in turn are composed of further ends (subplans), which become more and more specific. However, if a person has a life plan with a number of relatively specific ends as its elements, the above-mentioned danger is present. Suppose that I have as a dominant end that of being chairman of my department. If that goal is attained, I may find myself without a conscious plan, or higher order end, to work toward. And happiness lies in the realizing of a life plan, rather than in having realized such a plan. Of course, I may develop a new end, but nevertheless, this specific end poses this threat.

In addition to there being a danger in a life plan's being composed of elements that are too specific, there is a second sort of danger, that of their being not clear enough. If an end or plan is unclear (open without any clear alternatives for its realization), it will be hard to realize. It will be an end whose object is unclear. Suppose I have a higher order end to devote a good portion of my life to helping people, but find myself undecided as to whether I want to do this in terms of helping them medically, as a doctor perhaps, or financially, or socially, or in some other way. Realization of this end will be extremely difficult. So while life plans and ends subsumed under them should be open, they should not be unclear.

A third danger of life plans is in conflicting ends. Human beings have many desires, and it is fairly certain that a number of them will conflict. A life plan one has not reflected about may contain some conflicting higher order ends one is not aware of. Thus, if I have an occupational goal which requires that I spend most of my time working toward it, but I also have higher order ends concerning marriage (for instance, that I spend a fair amount of time with my wife) and an avocational goal (e.g., I want to be a good amateur photographer), I may find that unless some readjustment of my major higher order ends is made, my life plan may be unrealizable.

The fourth and final danger I shall discuss is that of a lack of resilience or adaptability. Realizing a life plan depends to a certain extent on good fortune. Since one's life plan is directed toward the future as well as the present, and events may happen which have a great influence on the realizing of one's life plan, a certain amount of resilience or adaptability is valuable. One's occupational goals can be affected by events outside of one's control. For instance, there may be a great shortage of positions in the sort of occupation one desires to engage in. In such a case, the ability to adapt one's life plan, perhaps by seeking an available position that satisfies as many of the ends one has as possible, is necessary to avoid unhappiness. This danger is somewhat similar to the danger of too specific goals, discussed above. In some cases, it will be necessary to make our ends less specific (such as in the occupation example). However, adaptability also involves the ability to change elements of one's life plan when necessary, such as when one discovers that an important end one has is impossible to achieve, or unrealistic for oneself. For example, if I have as an end being an artist, and discover my artistic talents are meager, it will be beneficial to me if I am adaptable enough to drop this end in favor of another.

I should point out that in claiming a lack of resilience or adaptability as a danger, I do not
mean that one should change one's ends every time they become difficult to attain. When persons have a tendency to do this it seems to indicate an attitude of not being pleased with their lives, or a feeling that their ends are not worthwhile (or at least not worthwhile enough to retain when they become difficult to attain). In addition, the attainment of goals sometimes depends in large part on what kind of effort and perseverance an individual is willing to put into it. In that respect a person sometimes has a large role in choosing whether he will attain a goal. Rather, the importance of resilience or adaptability lies in being able to choose new ends when others become impossible or very, very difficult to achieve (e.g., one has clearly failed in a certain occupation; one wants to live one's life with a certain person, but that person has died; etc.).

This resilience or adaptability is one way of dealing with actual dissatisfaction (i.e., dissatisfaction which is not just felt) and being displeased with one's life where this is due to failure to be realizing one's life plan. There are those kinds of cases, though, where one may in actuality be realizing one's life plan, but nevertheless feel dissatisfied or dislike one's life. The existence of such cases led me to adopt the existence of serious felt dissatisfaction and an attitude of disliking one's life as negative conditions ruling out happiness. The various principles discussed above for rational plans will, I believe, avoid the possibility of disliking one's life when one's life plan is being realized. A rational life plan will not neglect an important interest nor be insufficiently challenging, thus ruling out these sorts of cases of disliking one's life which I discussed above.

The possibility of felt dissatisfaction while one's life plan is actually being realized is more difficult to handle. Some of the suggestions made above about rational life plans are applicable here. For instance, in cases where what has triggered the felt dissatisfaction is the failure to attain some goal which then may lead to a belief that one's life plan is not worthwhile or that it is impossible for one to be the sort of person one wants to be, resilience or adaptability in replacing the attained goal may be a way of avoiding this felt dissatisfaction. There is also a fifth danger that becomes clear here: the danger of having unrealizable elements in one's life plan. If one retains a higher order end which is logically, physically, or psychologically unattainable, one insures the impossibility of realizing one's life plan. Typically this will result in actual dissatisfaction, rather than felt dissatisfaction where there is no actual dissatisfaction in the life plan corresponding to it. It is still possible for someone to be realizing his life plan and to believe wrongly that he isn't realizing or cannot realize it (e.g., because of wrong beliefs that his life plan is not worthwhile, that he can never be successful in his occupation, that he is an unlovable person, etc.). Here it would seem that rationality is relevant, not in terms of having a rational life plan, but in terms of having true beliefs about oneself and one's situation. Such true beliefs ought to prevent this kind of felt dissatisfaction. How to foster such true beliefs when people have felt dissatisfaction with no corresponding actual dissatisfaction (melancholic depression, for instance) is a very difficult problem. Its solution lies within the domain of psychology.

Once we are clear about the concept of happiness, in making use of this understanding in life we will need much information from psychology concerning the causal conditions of happiness and unhappiness. This brings in such areas as motivation theory (to supply us with a clear understanding of human motivation) and personality theory (to supply us with an understanding of such things as the effects of personality on one's desires and their satisfaction), as well as things like depression.
Endnotes Chapter IV

1 See above, pp. 29, and pp. 67.
2 Zink, The Concepts of Ethics, pp. 105-106. Also, see above, pp. 69-70.
4 Ibid., p. 105.
5 J. C. B. Gosling in Pleasure and Desire (Oxford: The Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 160, claims that this sort of attitude view of happiness has historically played an important role in hedonism. Thinking of pleasure as being pleased with life makes pleasure seem to be a more acceptable goal than when it is thought of as a feeling.
6 An example of this sort of phenomenon is implied by Epicurus' encouragement that we be as independent of desire as possible so that if, for example, we are used to a simple diet, we will not be dissatisfied when we don't have luxurious foods, as someone used to such foods will be. See Epicurus, "Epicurus to Menoeceus," in Ethical Theories, ed. by A. I. Melden (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 145.
8 Ibid., pp. 43, 47.
10 Ibid., p. 13.
11 Ibid., p. 15.
12 Taylor in Pleasure, "p. 13.
13 Ibid., p. 17.
14 Ibid., p. 19.
15 Ibid., p. 13.
16 R. M. Hare in Freedom and Reason (Oxford: The Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 127, uses the example of a mental defective who can only enjoy food and dislikes only pain, cold, starvation, etc.
17 Jean Austin, "Pleasure and Happiness," Philosophy, XLIII (January, 1968), 56.
18 Ibid., p. 59.
19 Ibid., p. 58.
21 There is a resemblance here between the attitude view and Stoicism. Although Stoicism identifies happiness with virtue and the satisfaction of desire, its emphasis on the simplification of desires and taking things as they are clearly suggests the cultivation of a certain attitude toward life. However, the attitude view identifies happiness with the attitude, whereas, according to Stoicism, having the attitude helps one attain happiness.
22 See above, pp. 41-42.
24 There is some disagreement as to whether depression should be considered as primarily an affective disorder, since it seems that mood abnormality doesn't occur in some cases of depression, and thus, mood abnormality is perhaps secondary rather than primary in depression. See Aaron T. Beck, Depression: Clinical, Experimental and Theoretical Aspects (New York: Harper and Row, Inc., 1967), pp. 6, 12. However, the dovetailing of my analysis of happiness with accounts of depression is independent of the outcome of this dispute.
26 Ibid., p. 163.
27 Ibid., p. 163.
30 This phenomenon is discussed by Miller, Galanter, and Pribram, in Plans and the Structure of Behavior, pp. 113-114.
31 Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. xv.
33 Ilham Dilman, "Life and Meaning," Philosophy, XL (October, 1965), 331.
I have in mind the sort of thing John Milton gets at, contrasting the interests of the carefree, gay person and the pensive person in "L'Allegro" and "Il Penseroso," in The Complete Poems of John Milton (New York: Collier and Son, 1909, pp. 31-39.)

Hare, Freedom and Reason, p. 126.

Hare indicates (Ibid., p. 126) that in his discussion he is using "appraisal" rather than "evaluation" or "value judgment" since he wants to restrict the latter judgments to those we universalize.

Typically I believe one could hold an attitude view without claiming that happiness judgments are evaluative. It seems to me there probably is a distinction between liking one's life and appraising one's life as a good one. Typically one who has such an attitude will make such an appraisal, but the attitude of liking is different from the act of appraising. Typically we regard the addiction as a symptom of there being something very wrong with his life from which he is trying to escape. In such cases the addict will obviously be unhappy. Here I am imagining a case where this isn't so.


Rawls does claim in ibid., pp 404-407, that he believes his definition of a person's good in terms of rational life plans is basically descriptive, and does not have an emotive component. However, since we would, in judging another person to be happy, be evaluating his life plan (implying it is a fully rational one), it would seem that such judgments are, in part, evaluative.

Miller, Galanter and Pribram, in Plans and the Structure of Behavior, pp. 113-114, discuss this point.


See above, pp. 87-89.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

Summary

I have argued that the life use of "happiness" can be analyzed in terms of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Happiness is (1) the realizing of a life plan along with (2) the absence of both (a) serious felt dissatisfaction and (b) an attitude of being displeased with or disliking one's life and (3) a disposition to experience favorable feelings and attitudes associated with the realizing of one's life plan. Each of these conditions is necessary (though it should be remembered that the third condition is a disposition, and there may be cases of happiness where the disposition is not actualized), and together they are sufficient. The main condition of the analysis is the realizing of a life plan. I argued for this condition by first of all establishing a picture of the complex structure of human desires showing that there are levels or orders of desires, and that the object of the highest order desire is the realizing of a life plan which consists of those higher order ends of a person which are the more permanent, comprehensive and important of his ends. I believe this portrayal of human desire makes much more sense of it and of what goes on in conflicts of desires than the competing view which claims desires are all of the same order. Another way I argued for the existence of life plans was by presenting some examples which indicate that at least some people view themselves as having what I have called a life plan, and by arguing that as long as we avoid reading too much into "plan," we can note that all people have a life plan which is evidenced by their avowed ends and also by the dissatisfactions they have which imply the existence of higher order ends. In Chapter Four I added the negative conditions and the condition of the disposition to experience favorable feelings and attitudes associated with the realizing of the life plan. It was necessary to add the negative conditions to account for instances where it seems to be the case that persons are realizing their life plans but because of depression feel great dissatisfaction which doesn't correspond to actual dissatisfaction, and cases where a person might have an attitude of being displeased with his life even though his life plan is being realized, either because of something like serious felt dissatisfaction or because there is something wrong with his life plan. These negative conditions and the condition of the disposition to experience favorable feelings and attitudes is what is true about happiness that gets overstressed in attitude and accompanying feeling theories of happiness.

I believe that this view of happiness has a number of advantages. First of all, it avoids the difficulties of the alternative views discussed while also having the same advantages that the other views might have. It avoids the mistakes of the identity and collection views that result from their placing too much emphasis on the role of pleasure in happiness, and confusing the life and feeling uses of "happiness." The problem cases which the collection view could not handle can be handled by the life plan view. The life plan view is free of the confusions and the vagueness of the unique state of consciousness view of Stace which, although it avoids the errors of the identity and collection views, still ties happiness too closely to feelings or elements of feelings. The life plan view avoids the difficulty the attitude view had in terms
of being too broad, in allowing in cases that should be excluded, while not being too narrow, as Aristotle's theory, for instance, turned out to be. It allows for much variation, since the higher order ends making up life plans will vary quite a bit, but it still gives a definite meaning to the concept of happiness.

Anyone thinking about the concept of happiness will probably at some time wish to see how his thinking will compare with Aristotle's. There are some interesting similarities between my theory and Aristotle's. First of all, Aristotle emphasized that happiness is an activity; my view emphasizes that happiness is a kind of process or activity, the realizing of the life plan. Second, Aristotle emphasized that there are two formal features that happiness has and which can be used to determine whether a proposed theory of happiness is on the right track; those features are that it is something which is final (an end, but never a means to something else) and self-sufficient (once one has it one lacks nothing significant). On the life plan view happiness has these features. Since the life plan is the highest order end of the person, it is an end which is final, and can never be a means to another end. Also, since the life plan is made up of the more permanent, comprehensive and important higher order ends of the individual, when one is realizing it there will be nothing significant lacking; the realizing of the life plan is self-sufficient. Finally, Aristotle argued that though happiness is not pleasure, there is a pleasure accruing to happiness. On my view pleasure or enjoyment is typically a by-product of the realizing of one's higher order ends, a weaker connection between happiness and pleasure than Aristotle's. We agree on pleasure's being a by-product rather than being happiness itself, but Aristotle seems to believe pleasure always accompanies virtuous activity, as a kind of completion of the activity, a supervenient property. I would claim that pleasure invariably accompanies the realizing of the life plan only if we use "pleasure" in a very wide sense, meaning that one is doing what one wants to be doing. I don't think that pleasure in its conventional sense of a feeling or positive hedonic tone of experience always accompanies the realizing of the life plan.

More on Uses of "Happiness"

In Chapter I, I distinguished five main uses of "happiness": feeling, mood, behavioral, attitude and life uses. I argued that the life use is the most significant use, for two reasons. One is that this is the use that is the one we are most interested in with regard to our thinking about our lives. The other is that perhaps the life use of "happiness" is conceptually prior to the other uses and that at least some of the other uses are derivative. I would like to give now some suggestions about some light my analysis might throw on this. At the outset, I should note that this is speculative and its not working does not damage the life plan view; if it does work, it is a useful further application of the view.

Some of the uses of "happiness" might be related to the life use in terms of being indicative (in a somewhat weak sense of "indicative" to be described) of a happy life. I think it could be argued that a happy feeling is a feeling which is seen as being indicative of one's having a happy life (realizing a life plan). Happy feelings or emotions are states of consciousness whose objects are typically notable success or cases of good fortune, or a state of affairs that greatly pleases one. Such feelings will typically be experienced when one is realizing an element of the life plan in a definite way. Sometimes "happiness" in the feeling use is applied when the feeling is more one of contentment than being positively pleased about something. Even here, though, we might note that this feeling of contentment would be a feeling of being satisfied with things the way they are, feeling there is nothing significantly wrong.
So, typically we can interpret the feeling use as being indicative of or suggesting one is in the process of realizing a life plan.

Of course, one can have happy feelings without being happy in the life sense (just as one can have a healthy complexion while not being in good health). The feeling is indicative of living a happy life only in the sense of its being the kind of feeling appropriate to an experience of realizing an element of one's life plan in a very real, definite way. These experiences would not seem to be extremely frequent, even in a happy life, and perhaps that is why happiness seems so elusive when it is sought as a special feeling a person wants to have all the time.1 Happiness in the life sense is what is referred to in the central use of the term "happiness." Each one of these non-life uses may or may not be applicable to a happy person. They are not necessary conditions of happiness, but rather are seen, when they occur, as signs that one's life or experience is at that time very much like the life of a happy person.

Moving on to the mood use, let us recall that a happy mood is a state in which an individual has a disposition to have happy feelings, to see things as being favorable, and to like elements of his situation. It seems plausible that the mood use has reference to the life use in being seen as referring to a state indicative of the sort of life that may be a happy life. Similarly, the behavioral use can be interpreted as referring to someone's behaving in a way that one would see as being a symptom of being happy in the life sense. Again, one can be in a happy mood or behave happily without really being happy. The mood or the behavior is just seen as being possibly indicative of a happy life.

In Chapter One, when I speculated about possible connections among the different uses, the attitude use was the one that didn't seem to fit in very well. My analysis of happiness opens up some new possibilities, though. I think there might be two ways in which the attitude use can be seen to be related to the life use. One way, which has to do with the attitude use applied to elements of the life plan is that being happy with one's marriage, job, etc., is an attitude which results from being in the process of realizing elements of one's life plan.2 It is an attitude that typically those who are happy (life use) have with regard to the realizing of their higher order ends. The second way the attitude use can be related to the life use is particularly helpful with regard to the attitude use when its objects are relatively less important things. This relationship is one of analogy: some instances of the attitude use seem to refer to the attitude one has upon realizing a plan other than the life plan. For example, "I'm happy with my dentist's work" can be seen as meaning one is content, satisfied as a result of realizing one's plan with regard is the care of one's teeth. Thus, we have plans for various sorts of things that aren't important enough to be part of the life plan. The realizing of the particular plan, being analogous to realizing a life plan, results in an attitude of being happy with the thing in question.

Thus, my analysis of happiness as the realizing of a life plan might provide us with a way of seeing relationships between the different uses of "happiness." They relate to the life use in being indicative of, a result of, or analogous to happiness in the life sense. If it is the case, as I have argued, that the main interest in happiness is in the life sense (or "living well" as Plato and Aristotle would have put it), it is not surprising that the notion of happiness gets applied in these various ways to feelings, moods, behavior and attitudes.

What we must avoid doing is confusing different uses or seeing one of the other uses as being the most significant use of the term. Happiness (life use) is the realizing of a life
plan and not a feeling or an attitude. I think it would be helpful in our thinking about our lives if we avoid confusing the life use with another use—particularly the feeling use, since this is the one so often mistaken for the life use. This is the respect in which my analysis is, though, basically descriptive, recommendatory—"happiness" and "happy" get used in sloppy ways. There is a need for sharpening the concept and taking care in our use of it.

**Happiness and Ethics**

Some interesting questions remain for future consideration concerning the role happiness has played in ethics. I have argued that virtue isn't part of the concept of happiness, as some have held; there may be morally bad happinesses. On my view, happiness cannot serve as a unit in anything like a hedonistic calculus. Happiness, being the realizing of a life plan, cannot be measured or added in any neat, precise way. Happiness has often been viewed as "the good," and it is easy to understand why. I would like to make a suggestion here: let us distinguish between the questions "What is the (nonmorally) good life?" and "What things are intrinsically good?" When philosophers have talked about "the good," most often they seem to have been concerned with developing a theory of intrinsic value. Happiness, or the realizing of one's life plan (the nonmorally good life) is desired as an end. It is an intrinsically good thing. But there seem to be other intrinsically good things. Rather than seeing happiness as a candidate for being "the good" in the sense of being the only intrinsically good thing, we should see it rather as something whose own possibility makes it possible for there to be intrinsically good things. Without beings with desires (which are in persons organized in the complex structure of a life plan) there would be no such thing as intrinsic value. To find out what things are intrinsically good, we will have to see what it is that people, when they are clearheaded about it, desire as ends.

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**Endnotes Chapter V**

1 This might be compared with Maslow's claim, in *Motivation and Personality*, p. xv, that happiness is episodic rather than continuous because "peak experiences" are not long-lasting. He himself seems to hold that happiness is some kind of feeling.

2 See above, pp.84-85 and 90-91.
APPENDIX I

PASSAGES FROM KANT ILLUSTRATING TWO DIFFERENT VIEWS OF HAPPINESS

A passage in Kant which suggests a hedonistic concept of happiness as uninterrupted pleasantness is:

Now, a rational being's consciousness of the pleasantness of life uninterruptedly accompanying his whole existence is happiness; and the principle which makes this the supreme ground of determination of the will is the principle of self-love.¹

This passage seems to suggest a mixture of the identity view and the collection view.

Some representative passages in which Kant suggests a pattern or inclusive end view of happiness are:

To secure one's own happiness is a duty, at least indirectly; for discontent with one's condition, under a pressure of many anxieties and amidst unsatisfied wants, might easily become a great temptation to transgression of duty. But here again, without looking to duty, all men have already the strongest and most intimate inclination to happiness, because it is just in this idea that all inclinations are combined in one total.²

Against all the commands of duty which reason represents to man as so deserving of respect, he feels in himself a powerful counterpoise in his wants and inclinations, the entire satisfaction of which he sums up under the name of happiness.³

Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires; extensive, in regard to their multiplicity; intensive, in regard to their degree; protensive, in regard to their duration.⁴

² Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, ibid., p.15.
³ Ibid.
These are some passages where Butler seems to equate happiness and interest, and may be leaning toward a pattern or inclusive end view:

For . . . men form a general notion of interest, some placing it in one thing, and some in another, and have a considerable regard to it throughout the course of their life, which is owing to self-love . . . . Besides the very idea of an interested pursuit necessarily presupposes particular passions or appetites; since the very idea of interest or happiness consists in this, that an appetite or affection enjoys its object.¹

. . . the very idea of interest or happiness other than absence of pain implies particular appetites or passions; these being necessary to constitute that interest or happiness.²

Happiness or satisfaction consists only in the enjoyment of those objects which are by nature suited to our several particular appetites, passions and affections.³

In the first passage above, Butler notes that men differ in their notion of what is their interest or happiness. If happiness were pleasure, then it would be difficult to argue for this claim. Men could differ in how they achieve pleasure, or what they get pleasure from, but they would still be seeking the same thing. But if one argues that happiness is a certain pattern of life of the kind I have been discussing, that it is an inclusive end, then it is easy to see why men could differ in their notion of their happiness or interest. Their happiness will be constituted by the particular desires they have. The pattern view, being a rather formal view in nature, not indicating what the particular desires that men have must be, allows for a good deal of variation in the content of particular cases of happiness. This is one of the strong advantages of the pattern view.

²Ibid., p. 239.
³Ibid., p. 260.
REFERENCES


